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Foreword by the guest editor

*Henning Melber*

The difficult and violent transition from the former so-called Belgian Congo to the independent state nowadays called The Democratic Republic of the Congo dates back half a century, when the country obtained Independence in June 1960. Patrice Lumumba was the first elected Prime Minister as from 24 June 1960 and was ousted from office in a coup in September 1960. During the subsequent civil strive he was arrested, tortured, and murdered on 17 January 1961. The decolonisation of the Congo is also inextricably linked with the role of the United Nations and its second Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld. Hammarskjöld, who is widely considered as a unique international civil servant setting norms and living values not matched since then, lost his life – later in the same year as Lumumba – in his efforts to find a peaceful solution to the conflict following the secession of Katanga.

On his way to a meeting with Moise Tshombe, leader of the secessionist movement, the plane crashed upon approaching Ndola (a mining town in then Northern Rhodesia, what today is Zambia) shortly after midnight (local time) between 17 and 18 September 1961. None of the almost 20 people on board survived. Hammarskjöld died at the site during the early morning hours of...
18 September 1961 before the wreckage was discovered. It remains a matter of speculation and conflicting theories, what the cause of the crash had been.

Ever since this tragic loss numerous efforts to bring lasting peace and stability to the resource-rich but torn country in the heart of Africa have failed. Like then, the people today have to pay the highest price. It is mainly the innocent ones who are the victims. They are sacrificed on the altar of greed. Even if his life would not have ended so untimely and tragically, Dag Hammarskjöld might not have been able to bring, against all odds, his mission to a successful end. Too much was at stake for the big powers, and all of them had their vested particular interests guiding their own selfish agendas.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations was aware of this. In a statement before the Security Council on 15 February 1961, he characterised the Congo as ‘a happy hunting ground for national interests’ and the UN’s role ‘to be a road-block to such efforts’. He was not prepared to compromise and never surrendered to the influence the big powers were seeking to exert over him and his office. In his attempts to find a solution for the Congolese people, he maintained integrity and his independent role as a negotiator and facilitator, seeking to bring a solution to the suffering by ordinary people.

For Hammarskjöld the United Nations was supposed to be the unique instrument for peaceful solution of conflicts. This required an urgent shift of emphasis: from the purpose of preserving the established international (dis) order of the superpower rivalry between West and East during the Cold War period to the purpose of meeting and dealing in a constructive way with the challenges represented by the newly independent countries.

When, over the escalating conflicts of interest being played out between the powers seeking to secure their own agendas in the Congo, the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev demanded Hammarskjöld’s resignation at the UN General Assembly in September 1960, the Secretary-General responded with the following historical words:

- It is very easy to resign. It is not easy to stay on. It is very easy to bow to the wishes of a Big Power. It is another matter to resist. As is well known to all members of this Assembly, I have done so before
on many occasions and in many directions. If it is the wish of those nations who see in the Organisation their best protection in the present world, I shall now do so again.

Hammarskjöld’s refusal to give in to the demand for his resignation as Secretary-General during the most turbulent phase of the UN involvement in the Congo crisis was approved by a standing ovation from those he felt most accountable to, namely the delegates from those countries who normally are denied any meaningful agency in the world body.

His even-handedness towards the big powers is documented by an incident, shared by Sture Linnér (1917–2010) with an audience attending his presentation at the annual Dag Hammarskjöld Lecture in October 2007 in Uppsala. Linnér was, at the time of Hammarskjöld’s death, as Under-Secretary-General in charge of the UN mission in the Congo. In July 1961, the USA President J.F. Kennedy tried to intervene directly in local politics and UN affairs. Afraid of Antoine Gizenga – then campaigning for election as Prime Minister and suspected of representing Soviet interests – coming into political power, he demanded that the UN should prevent Gizenga from seizing office. If the UN did not comply, the USA and other Western powers might withdraw their support to the UN. Reportedly, Hammarskjöld in a phone conversation with Linnér dismissed this unveiled threat with the following words:

I do not intend to give way to any pressure, be it from the East or the West; we shall sink or swim. Continue to follow the line you find to be in accordance with the UN Charter.

Hammarskjöld’s integrity and conscience, combined with his sense of duty and his commitment to the search for peace and the recognition of fundamental human rights as the guiding principles of his defined mission in office were contributing factors to his decision to embark on a mission to Ndola on 17 September 1961 – which others warned might be a great risk. He nonetheless felt that the efforts to bring peace to the people of the Congo would require exploring all possibilities for dialogue, even with those who were among the main reasons for instability. At the end, Hammarskjöld was unable to accomplish this mission. Instead, he had to give his life in vain.
Kofi Annan, as Secretary-General of the UN, delivered on 6 September 2001 the annual Dag Hammarskjöld Lecture in Uppsala. The homage he paid to his predecessor almost on the day 40 years after his death remains valid:

Dag Hammarskjöld is a figure of great importance for me – as he must be for any Secretary-General. His life and his death, his words and his action, have done more to shape public expectations of the office, and indeed of the Organization, than those of any other man or woman in its history.

His wisdom and his modesty, his unimpeachable integrity and single-minded devotion to duty, have set a standard for all servants of the international community – and especially, of course for his successors – which is simply impossible to live up to. There can be no better rule of thumb for a Secretary-General, as he approaches each new challenge or crisis, than to ask himself, ‘how would Hammarskjöld have handled this?’

Sture Linnér ended his Dag Hammarskjöld Lecture with some final reflections on what Hammarskjöld had accomplished of lasting value in the Congo. He came to the conclusion:

The Congo crisis could easily have provoked armed conflicts in other parts of Africa, even led to a world war. It was Dag Hammarskjöld and no one else who prevented that. And it is certain that for a suffering people he came to be seen as a model; he brought light into the heart of darkness.

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This special issue of AJCR on Southern Africa – 50 years after Hammarskjöld revisits in the first part hitherto less known aspects of the Secretary-General’s commitment to find solutions to challenges often considered to be ‘missions impossible’ and recalls the history of the early 1960s in some Southern African dimensions in new perspectives. The articles by Chris Saunders and Tor Sellström are based on genuine archival research. While a lot has been written already
on Hammarskjöld and the Congo, they share for the first time some detailed information on his visit to and role in South Africa. Timothy Scarneccchia enters similar unknown territory by exploring so far not yet published archival material, which shows the dynamics linking the turmoil in the Congo to its effects on the formation of the early Zimbabwean anti-colonial resistance to the Rhodesian settler regime. The historical depth and value of these contributions are at the same time a reminder about the essential role the UN’s second Secretary-General played during the times when ‘the winds of change’ started to blow.

The legacy of Hammarskjöld is however far from being confined to the past. He stood for values and norms of global policy-making and international diplomacy in an independent international civil service. In the way he defined and executed his tasks he was – as shown in the first part of this introduction – rather more general than secretary. Fifty years after his untimely and violent death it is therefore most appropriate to bring the relevance of his legacy for today back into public awareness and discourse.

That the challenges Hammarskjöld was confronted with and unable to solve then have remained on the agenda of our current efforts to come to terms with violence and conflict, is shown by the contributions to the second part of this issue. They devote attention to the sub-regional challenges we are confronted with. Henning Melber links the normative framework advocated by Hammarskjöld to the demands put on us to position ourselves in regard to unresolved conflicts in the region, where the need is to speak truth to those in power. James-Emmanuel Wanki revisits Hammarskjöld’s original role in the continuing conflict in the Congo, and the United Nations’ interventions since Hammarskjöld’s death in seeking a solution to the continuing crisis and unabated civil war. Sarah Ancas refers to the cases of Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo as she reflects on the opportunities and limitations of conflict handling within multilateral concerted initiatives. Alfredo Tjiurimo Hengari adds a special emphasis on the emerging collaboration between external players in contrast to continental institutions and the effects this might have.

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Henning Melber

This special issue underlines the current relevance of Hammarskjöld’s legacy and the continued relevance of his mindset and convictions for our efforts today to enhance peace and reduce violence and discrimination. This covers not only dimensions seeking to protect individual people. It also includes efforts to ensure more equal relations among states within the international system, often misleadingly called ‘order’ but more often tantamount to a structurally embedded disorder. By doing so, the following contributions also articulate parameters for better conduct by and among states and their leaders, respecting the interest of ‘We, the Peoples’ as the Preamble of the United Nations Charter declares (in contrast to what follows in the actual clauses, which focus on the governments of states).

The pages following are the result of collaboration between ACCORD and the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation. It thereby also strengthens the institutional ties seeking to overcome the North-South divide. I am grateful to members of the AJCR team for their support. Jannie Malan generously offered (and practised) constant, meticulous support during the editing of this issue. Angela Ndinga-Muvumba also backed us up with her warm and generous support during the production process. Thanks to both their support and the timely delivery of quality texts by the authors, we are able to publish this issue as planned in time for being launched at the international conference co-arranged between the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation and the Department of Political Sciences at the University of Pretoria. It takes place in mid-July 2011 at the Pretoria campus and has as theme ‘The United Nations and Regional Challenges in Africa – 50 Years after the Death of Dag Hammarskjöld’. The collection of articles presented here will certainly add value to the scholarly deliberations.
Foreword by the regular editor

Jannie Malan

In more than one previous foreword, I have shared with our readers some of the insights or inspirations I experienced while reading and editing the articles appearing in that issue. This time, the articles on Dag Hammarskjöld’s visit to South Africa have prompted me to look up a page I wrote two weeks after that very significant visit. It was the first time I ventured to write a letter to the press, and I sent it to the Afrikaans newspaper in Cape Town, Die Burger (The Citizen). With a little bit of open-mindedness, this newspaper was remaining loyal to the ‘Christian-national’ ideology of the white Afrikaners, and to the Verwoerdian apartheid government. Nevertheless – on 30 January 1961 – it did publish my anti-apartheid appeal, and even placed it prominently at the beginning of the readers’ column!

I wrote from a Christian perspective, since most of the group of people among whom I grew up were convinced that apartheid was divinely ordained. Our view of life and of fellow-South Africans was moulded by the dominating influence of our Afrikaans-speaking politicians and religious leaders. There was the socio-political policy of ‘separate development’, and it was endorsed by the (perhaps well-intentioned but) own-group-centred teaching of the theologians. In our church, a few dissenting voices were heard, but strongly criticised and almost ostracised.
Jannie Malan

Reading my sentences and paragraphs of 50 years ago – now as an editor! – I realise that I could have used better wording or phrasing here and there. But without tampering with it, here is an English version of what I wrote:

*Measuring buckets that extinguish lamps* [This heading and the two sub-headings were provided by the newspaper.]

J.C. Malan, 21 Herold Street, Stellenbosch, writes:

If one takes the things you nowadays hear and read and see happening around you with regard to our race relations, and test them against the principles of the Sermon on the Mount, you have to draw the conclusion that for many people it is no longer a matter of a lamp under a measuring bucket [the Afrikaans Bible translation of that time had ‘maatemmer’ in Matthew 5:15], but one of nothing else than a measuring bucket – strictly calibrated according to political and ecclesiastic traditions. It is a tragedy that some are trying to form a fire brigade with buckets ready to extinguish any brightly burning lamp(s).

On the other hand, however, it is encouraging to see (also in letters you publish) how many and who have already discarded the buckets, and are radiating the light of a truly Christian conduct towards our non-white compatriots.

Allow me to mention a few symptoms of the measuring bucket view of life, for the benefit of those whose views are so obstructed by their buckets as mine were before I became disillusioned.

*Remaining the Master* [In Afrikaans ‘Baas’ was the form of address that white males insisted upon, and that all blacks obviously detested.]
1. The selfishness that keenly accepts the work done by brown hands for your own comfort and/or enrichment, but does not grant the owner of those hands anything more than minimum privileges in life (for instance by the pay you regard as sufficient for his services).

2. The convenient conception that spending large amounts of money on providing housing, education and welfare for non-whites (the amounts concerned eagerly being mentioned abroad) makes it unnecessary to abandon the attitude of I-am-still-your-superior.

3. The unperturbed detachment in which we tolerate glaring injustice inflicted on those who can afford it least (for instance in the implementing of the Group Areas Act at particular places).

4. The fact that we as whites think we have enough wisdom to regulate important issues for non-whites without consulting them in any way, or by at most consoling them with a mere pretence of consultation (not even to mention proper representation in Government).

Principles

5. The avoiding of decent forms of address, such as ‘Mr’, ‘Mrs’, ‘Miss’, even when speaking to duly educated non-whites, while we teach our children to respect whites of all levels, even tramps.

Writers of letters published in your columns have already correctly emphasised that principles of life are either to be consistently practised or to be duly refuted. A majority of votes is irrelevant.
[Something was left out here.] Let us fervently hope that a growing number of those who are with inner conviction promoting real light will have the courage to discard the old-fashioned measuring buckets – even in church meetings and in Government. If we are too afraid to do that, do we then not deserve the judgement of being salt that has lost its savour?

I received letters and telephone calls of criticism and repudiation, but also a few of acknowledgement and even acclamation. This letter of mine was the first of fifteen, which Die Burger accepted and published over twenty-seven years. Much more can be shared about those years of the struggle against apartheid, and the accompanying struggle against a literalistic, and often fundamentalist religiosity. At that time, each little statement, discussion, protest or appeal seemed to be trivial in light of the comprehensive change that was required, but retrospectively, we can be grateful that the drops did eventually make up an irresistible wave.

May the approach and the legacy of Dag Hammarskjöld, and of others who over half a century were committed to seeking solutions and promoting justice and peace, inspire and empower us to continue doing our little bits to contribute towards dialogue and coexistence.
Hammarskjöld’s visit to South Africa

Chris Saunders*

Abstract

In the last eighteen months of his life Dag Hammarskjöld was taken up with two major African issues, the Congo and South Africa. In the Congo he organised a United Nations (UN) mission to stabilise the country as it threatened to collapse into chaos following decolonisation; in South Africa he tried to deal with the conflict situation after the Sharpeville massacre by engaging in discussions with the South African Prime Minister, Hendrik Verwoerd. For that purpose he made a long-delayed visit to South Africa in January 1961. What did he try to achieve through his contacts with the South African government, and what other significance did his visit have for the unfolding history of apartheid and the struggle against it? This paper will focus on these questions, while a more substantial version, with detailed references to the sources upon which it is based, will be presented to the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation in mid-2011 as part of the commemorations marking fifty years since Hammarskjöld’s death.

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Background

From soon after he became Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN) in 1953, Hammarskjöld had to deal with Southern African issues, but they did not loom large before 1960. Throughout the 1950s there was the mounting criticism at the UN of South Africa’s apartheid policy and a UN Commission on the Racial Situation in the Union of South Africa (UNCORS) much annoyed the South African government, which kept repeating its claim that the UN had no role to play, because apartheid was a domestic affair and article 2 in chapter 7 of the UN Charter said that nothing in the Charter ‘shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state’ (United Nations 1945:5). Also in the 1950s there was a growing campaign at the UN to challenge South Africa’s occupation of its de facto colony of South West Africa, where it was implementing apartheid policies. From the late 1940s the Herero people of that territory had, through their Chiefs’ Council, been petitioning the UN and asking that the UN should take over the mandate role of the League of Nations and end South African rule of South West Africa. By the end of the 1950s, thanks in part to the advocacy work of the Reverend Michael Scott, long-time petitioner at the UN, a case was being brought before the International Court on this issue (Saunders 2007; Irwin 2010). After the police shooting in Windhoek, the capital of South West Africa, in December that year, in which twelve unarmed protestors were killed, the South African government hinted that it would not welcome the UN Secretary-General making a visit to South West Africa, but nothing came of the idea that he would visit Southern Africa at that time. When later UN Secretaries-General visited Southern Africa, they did so chiefly in relation to the Namibian issue – Dr Kurt Waldheim in 1972 and Pérez de Cuéllar in 1982 (Du Pisani 1985:217; De Cuéllar 1997).

It was the apartheid issue, as a conflict situation of potential international significance, that took Hammarskjöld to South Africa. His visit followed another police shooting – this time of unarmed protestors against the pass laws at Sharpeville, south of Johannesburg, on 21 March 1960 – and on the same day yet another shooting in the township of Langa outside Cape Town. Until this time, neither the apartheid issue nor that of South West Africa had been
taken to the UN Security Council, but after the Sharpeville massacre, and as further violence and unrest followed, a group of African and Asian members of the UN urgently requested the Council to consider the matter, as having ‘grave potentialities for international friction, which endangers the maintenance of international peace and security’ (United Nations 1994:244). As the Council discussed an appropriate resolution to indicate the world body’s abhorrence at what apartheid meant, the South African government declared a state of emergency on 30 March. Two days later (critics of the UN in South Africa were quick to point out that it was April Fool’s day) the Council, by nine votes to none, with two abstentions, adopted resolution 134, which deplored ‘the policies and actions of the Government of the Union of South Africa which have given rise to the present situation’, called upon that government ‘to initiate measures aimed at bringing about racial harmony based on equality…and to abandon its policies of apartheid and racial discrimination’, and requested the Secretary-General, ‘in consultation with the Government of the Union of South Africa, to make such arrangements as would adequately help in upholding the purposes and principles of the Charter and to report to the Security Council whenever necessary and appropriate’ (United Nations 1994:244–245).

This was a relatively mild, compromise resolution. The United States Embassy in South Africa reported that it came ‘as a relief’ to the government there, leaving it ‘with the impression that they need not fear any real difficulty from U.N. side and that the old policies could be pursued without serious consequences from abroad’ (Hammarskjöld Papers). The representative of the only African country on the Council at the time, Tunisia, said he had expected ‘a great deal more’, while France and Britain abstained because they thought the resolution went beyond what the Charter permitted. That was also the line taken by the permanent South African representative to the UN, Bernardus (Brand) Fourie, when he addressed the Council, though Fourie also went on to say that if there was any further bloodshed in South Africa, the Security Council would have to accept its share of responsibility! The American representative, Henry Cabot Lodge, chair of the Council, said that the resolution was designed to build a bridge, not a wall, between the UN and South Africa, while the Soviet representative made it clear that, while he would vote for the resolution, the Soviet Union
would have preferred one that did not transfer responsibility from the Council to the Secretary-General and one that would have asked the Secretary-General to observe and report, not consult with the apartheid government. Others who spoke on the resolution, however, said that they trusted the ‘political acumen’ of the Secretary-General and thought the resolution was admirably non-specific in not laying out the precise steps that the Secretary-General should take (New York Times 2 April 1960). Those who were to criticise the vagueness of the resolution were to point out that it did not make clear, for example, whether, if the Secretary-General were to visit South Africa, he would merely speak to the South African government, or whether he should also consult more widely and gather information on the South African situation for the UN (e.g. Cape Times 9 January 1961).

Among the key hurdles initially facing Hammarskjöld were whether the South African government would see a visit by him as interference in its domestic affairs, and, if a visit took place, who, besides the government, Hammarskjöld would see. When he met the British Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, in April, a few days after the African National Congress (ANC), along with the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), which had organised the demonstrations on 21 March, had been banned, the two men agreed that ‘the necessary change’ in South Africa ‘can only come from within’, and that meant change from within the government, for there was no realistic likelihood of the government being overthrown by internal resistance. After the Sharpeville massacre a number of prominent people, including the Minister of Lands, Paul Sauer, called for a change in racial policy away from a rigid application of apartheid laws. Taking up the idea of exploiting divisions in South Africa’s ruling elite, Hammarskjöld suggested to Selwyn Lloyd that ‘pressure should be maintained in support of the moderates, but in such a form as not to lead to any international showdown with ensuring entrenchment of the diehards in their positions, before a countervailing influence within the Union can have made itself felt’ (Hammarskjöld Papers). If the South African government did not allow him to visit – and this was by no means certain; Hungary had refused to allow him to visit after the events of 1956 – he anticipated that his report to the Security Council ‘undoubtedly would provoke an immediate Security Council meeting likely to decide at least
Hammarskjöld’s visit to South Africa

on withdrawal of [South African] diplomatic representation’ (Hammarskjöld Papers). While the African and Asian countries at the UN probably hoped that he would be refused entry, and that such a refusal would help their case for the imposition of economic sanctions by the UN against the apartheid regime, the British government urged the South African government to agree to the visit, and Eric Louw, South Africa’s Minister for External Affairs, soon issued a formal invitation to him to visit, with the proviso that such a visit ‘did not imply any recognition by the Union government of UN authority in relation to South Africa’s domestic affairs’ (Hammarskjöld Papers).

While the post-Sharpeville mood probably influenced the decision to allow Hammarskjöld to visit, the South African government of course realised that allowing him to visit would end any possibility of any immediate further action against South Africa by the UN Security Council. In an interim report to the Council on 19 April, Hammarskjöld informed it that he would go to London to meet Louw after the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ conference in May (and he would have met Prime Minister Verwoerd there as well, had he not been recovering from having been shot in the head in an attempted assassination), and that ‘It is agreed between the Government of the Union of South Africa and myself that consent of the Union Government to discuss the Security Council’s resolution with the Secretary-General would not require prior recognition from the Union Government of the United Nations authority’ (United Nations Security Council 1960). The South African government told Hammarskjöld that it would be best to defer his proposed visit until the judicial commissions into the shootings at Sharpeville and Langa on 21 March had submitted their reports, and when he met Louw at South Africa House in London on 13 and 14 May, the two men agreed that he would visit in July 1960, after which he planned to report back to the Security Council before the annual UN General Assembly session beginning in September. Hammarskjöld reported to Selwyn Lloyd that ‘the discussions with Mr Louw turned out surprisingly well, and the road is paved to Pretoria, not only through good intentions, but, I hope, also by some solid realisation of the need for substantive progress, be it ever so modest’ (Hammarskjöld Papers).
Before he met Louw in London, four leading members of the resistance in South Africa then in London, including Oliver Tambo of the ANC and two representatives of the PAC, asked Hammarskjöld for a meeting. They wanted him to insist that when he visited South Africa he should talk to Chief Albert Luthuli, the President-General of the ANC, and Robert Sobukwe, President of the PAC, though the former was banned and restricted and the latter was in jail (Hammarskjöld Papers). Hammarskjöld did not meet the four, but did ask Louw for ‘free access to such non-governmental persons as it might be useful for him to see’. Louw said there would be no strings attached to his visit, but pointed to certain ‘risks and possible objections against other contacts’, to which Hammarskjöld replied that contacts ‘with any specific people or groups would have to be decided upon as the means to an end’ and such a decision ‘was a question of “wisdom” which it was no use to discuss at the present stage’ (Hammarskjöld Papers). When a tentative schedule was then drawn up for the visit, it provided for a ten day visit that took him to Johannesburg for ‘discussion with representative Africans’ on day four, to Cape Town on day five, where he would have ‘discussion with representatives of “Cape Coloureds”’, to Umtata and to Durban, where he would have ‘discussions with representatives of Africans and Indians’ (Hammarskjöld Papers). When Hammarskjöld approved this, ‘subject to adjustments which can only be made on the spot’ (Hammarskjöld Papers), he did not anticipate that from the beginning of July he would become almost entirely consumed with the Congo issue.

In July 1960, as the date of his visit approached, concerns began to be expressed in South Africa that he should not only talk to the government and those black leaders whom the government might want him to meet. Alan Paton, chairman of the non-racial Liberal Party, issued a statement calling for him to meet people across the political spectrum, and Paton wrote to Eleanor Roosevelt in New York to ask her to use her influence to ensure that this happened (Hammarskjöld Papers). At a meeting in the City Hall in Cape Town a Liberal Party spokesperson claimed that there was ‘intense interest’ by Africans in the forthcoming visit, and the Cape Times stressed the importance of Hammarskjöld getting ‘a balanced picture’ by meeting other than government people (Cape Times 26 July and 2 August 1960). The South African Indian Congress and the Congress of
Democrats urged him to meet ‘representative leaders’, mentioning Luthuli in particular, and Duma Nokwe, Secretary-General of the banned ANC and a lawyer, wrote to Hammarskjöld from Pretoria Central prison, where he was detained, to appeal to him to meet Luthuli (Reddy Papers). Though the PAC leadership within the country was silent on Hammarskjöld’s visit, from Windhoek in South West Africa, Uatja Kaukuetu, the acting President-General of the South West Africa National Union (SWANU), which like the PAC had been formed the previous year, asked for an interview with Hammarskjöld, presumably expecting him to visit South West Africa. Kaukuetu claimed that SWANU represented ‘by far the greater majority of the total population of the territory’ and said that it could explain apartheid and its impact to him. Moreover, his statement continued, such a meeting would enhance the prestige of the UN, for, referring to the Herero petitions, it would ‘obviate suspicion on the part of those who have called on the United Nations for the past 13 years’ (Cape Times 29 July 1960; cf. Sellström 1999:142–143).

But Hammarskjöld was not to visit anywhere in the region in 1960, for from early July the Congo crisis became his chief priority, and it was first announced that his visit to South Africa would be shortened, so that he would only meet the government, then that his visit would be postponed until late August or early September, and then, when he had to return to UN headquarters in New York to report on the Congo, that it would not take place at all at that time (Hammarskjöld Papers). All he could report to the UN Security Council on 11 October was that he had had another meeting with Louw at UN headquarters in New York on 28 September, that Louw had issued a new invitation to him to visit, and that he now planned to undertake the visit in January 1961. His interim report added that ‘during the contemplated visit to the Union of South Africa, while consultation throughout would be with the Union Government, no restrictive rules were to be imposed on the Secretary-General’ (United Nations Security Council 1960).

This lengthy delay meant that by the time he did visit, the post-Sharpeville crisis in South Africa had abated, the ruling white minority had recovered its confidence – in part thanks to Verwoerd’s ‘miraculous’ recovery – and talk of any relaxation in apartheid had disappeared. Also, the urgency expressed by the African and
Asian countries at the UN to tackle the South African conflict had faded. On the other hand, during the intervening months many more independent African countries had become members of the UN, and Hammarskjöld knew that their presence would mean that the campaign against apartheid at the UN was likely to grow more intense in the future. The question in 1960–61 seemed to many to be whether South Africa would follow other African countries and ‘decolonise’ in some form, which would mean abandoning apartheid and perhaps accepting some form of power-sharing, for the idea that the ruling white minority would lose all political power seemed far-fetched to most, though some thought it possible. For South Africa’s ruling white elite, however, their country was quite different from the rest of Africa, and there was no question of them following the route to black majority rule. As we will see, this was the argument that was put forcefully by Verwoerd in his talks with Hammarskjöld.

The visit

Hammarskjöld’s visit did not begin well. When he disembarked at Leopoldville in the Congo from the Pan American Airlines DC8 that had taken him there from New York, certain ‘important’ documents relating to his visit to South Africa were found to be missing. At Jan Smuts airport outside Johannesburg Pan American staff searched the plane, but did not find the documents, which, it was reported at the time, another passenger had picked up (New York Times 6 January 1961). These documents may have included the lengthy briefing papers on South Africa that had been prepared for him at UN headquarters the previous April and May. He had then also read Leo Marquard’s The peoples and policies of South Africa, which he called a ‘sober and for that reason all the more appalling analysis of the South African problem’ (Hammarskjöld Papers). Though the problems of the Congo must have remained in his mind throughout his South African visit, Hammarskjöld was clearly well-prepared for his discussions with Verwoerd. His chief African adviser, Heinrich Wieschhoff, an American of German origin, knew South Africa well, having lived in Pretoria before the Second World War, where he had continued his studies at the local university. Wieschhoff accompanied Hammarskjöld throughout his visit and Hammarskjöld relied on him for advice on where to go and what to see.
When Hammarskjöld flew into South Africa, his plane was at the last minute instructed to land at the state airfield at Waterkloof and not at the main commercial airport of Johannesburg, Jan Smuts, where a group of demonstrators had gathered. He was therefore welcomed initially only by some government officials and a few journalists, but by the time he reached his hotel in Pretoria, there were about 300 ‘Africans, Indians, half-castes and a few whites’ there to greet him with the thumbs up sign of the Congress Alliance, formed in the mid-1950s of the main anti-apartheid movements and led by the ANC. They sang the anthem of the ANC, ‘Nkosi sikelel’ iAfrika’, and held up placards that read, inter alia, ‘Welcome to our Police State’, ‘Dag: Take the Yokes off our Neck’, ‘Dag Baas (Good day, Master) – where is your pass?’, ‘Meet Non-white leaders’, ‘Don’t forget Sharpeville’, ‘Dag: visit Pondoland’ and ‘We want Human Rights, Higher Wages’. One of the group tried to present him with a letter asking him to meet recognised leaders and others tried to garland him. While both the letter and the garland had to be left for him at the hotel reception desk (Cape Times 7 January 1961; New York Times 7 January 1961), there was clearly hope that his visit, watched by the world, would allow at least some space for engagement with the chief official of the world body.

Though Hammarskjöld began his talks with Verwoerd almost immediately after his arrival, he would by then have received an unsigned memorandum submitted to him by the ANC and its associated organisations. This argued that ‘Whereas the unjust nature of South Africa’s form of government was only of academic interest in the past, it is now a source of great concern to many nations throughout the world. This is because South African tension and violence is recognized as a threat to world peace’. The memorandum concluded: ‘Above all, we hope that your investigations here will bear out our repeated contention that the South African Government is a monster, imposing its arrogant will on a dissenting people. We hope that you will recognize, as we do, that this Government is holding the vast majority of our people down by sheer force, and that its policies are contrary to world practice. We hope, too, that you will inform the Security Council that the majority of the South African people are looking to that body for substantial assistance in their struggles for the realization of true democracy in our country’ (Memorandum 1961).
Hammarskjöld’s visit was, for the most part, carefully controlled by the government, which of course knew of the appeals for him to meet opposition leaders and knew that he would be seen in some quarters in South Africa as representing hope for change and an end to apartheid. Though certain events were arranged for him in advance, he was able to go where he wished, but a heavy security presence followed him, and for the most part he travelled in government cars. After his initial talks with Verwoerd, he flew to Cape Town for a ‘day off’ on Sunday 8 January. One of the diplomats in the talks in Pretoria was J.F. (Frikkie) Botha, who had represented South Africa at the UN before Fourie and so had got to know Hammarskjöld in New York. He had also become a close friend of Wieschhoff, to whom he suggested that in Cape Town Hammarskjöld should be the guest of Paul Sauer, who after the Sharpeville massacre had suggested that the apartheid laws relating to urban Africans might have to be reconsidered, and was therefore one of those Afrikaners thought to be ‘verlig’ (enlightened). Hammarskjöld was taken by car from his hotel in the Gardens to major tourist sites in the city, then to Stellenbosch, Fransch Hoek, where he visited the Huguenot Memorial, and Paarl, where he had a meal at the wine farm of the chairman of the leading wine cooperative in the region. As they looked out over the vineyards, Wieschhoff is said to have remarked to Sauer, with a smile: ‘To think that all this must be ruled by the restless natives of the Witwatersrand’, and Hammarskjöld to have commented that the Cape was more like Europe than Africa (Die Burger 1961; Botha 2011). After his visit to the Congo, it certainly must have appeared that way. The Cape Times noted that he visited no Cape Town townships and that the only non-white area he passed through was the Coloured suburb of Athlone (Cape Times 9 January 1961).

In the talks in Pretoria (see next section), Verwoerd had tried to justify apartheid by reference to the diverse nature of the South African population, and Hammarskjöld had asked him in particular where those of mixed descent fitted into the apartheid jigsaw (Botha 2011). After his ‘day off’, he visited the Parliament buildings in Cape Town (Parliament itself was not in session) and the nearby government offices, where he met members of the Council for Coloured Affairs, an unrepresentative state-appointed body. He was greeted by people holding up placards, some welcoming him but others calling the
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Council members stooges. Reg September of the South African Coloured People’s Congress tried to present him with a letter critical of the fact that he was only meeting those the government wanted him to see. That evening he attended a dinner in his honour by the Administrator of Cape Province, Mr F.S. Malan, where the cultural historian I.D. du Plessis, an apartheid apologist who was then Secretary for Coloured Affairs, tried to persuade him that the Coloured people were a distinct group in South African society. He then flew to Umtata, the chief city in the Transkei, which he knew was the area at the forefront of the implementation of the policy of ‘Grand Apartheid’, and there met state-appointed African chiefs who were members of the Transkeian Territorial Authority, which had been given some powers of local government. These chiefs were headed by Botha Sigcau, who would become the first President of the Transkei when that Bantustan was given its nominal ‘independence’ by the South African government in October 1976.

That evening Hans Abraham, the Commissioner-General for the Transkei, hosted a dinner for Hammarskjöld, and in his welcoming speech chose to follow the line taken by many National Party politicians and launched into a scathing attack on the UN, where he said South Africa had been given a rough passage. An annoyed Hammarskjöld slipped a note to Brand Fourie saying, ‘How long must I endure this, or shall I walk out?’ (Fourie 1991:45). He decided to stay and in his speech spoke of the UN as a mirror of the world where global concerns were reflected, but he was also reported to have said: ‘I admire the spirit in which you do your utmost to help your friends [i.e. the Africans] to achieve the goal which you have set yourselves’. This remark led three leaders of the Liberal Party – Alan Paton, Jordan Ngubane and Peter Brown – to fire off a telegram to him, expressing their ‘great concern’, for they said that such a remark would be taken by many South Africans as approving apartheid, and especially the Bantustan dream of Verwoerd. ‘The hopes of millions of South Africans whose representatives you have not yet met lie in your visit’, Paton told him (Urquhart 1973:499), and the chair of the Pretoria branch of the Liberal Party claimed that the trust of blacks in the UN had been severely shaken by his comment. Hammarskjöld’s staff had then to issue a statement saying he had been misquoted and his speech taken out of context, for, they said, as Secretary-General he could make no
public pronouncements on South African government policies (Contact 1961; Cape Times 12 January 1961).

Hammarskjöld asked to be driven from Umtata into nearby Pondoland, where an uprising the previous year against the imposition of Bantustan policies had left over twenty dead. He drove to Lusikisiki in a car with Kaiser Matanzima, who would become Transkei’s first Prime Minister twenty-five years later, but probably saw no signs of the revolt, which had taken place in mountainous country (New York Times 10 January 1961). From Umtata, he flew back to the Witwatersrand, by which time the repeated criticism that he was not meeting any real leaders of the African people could be ignored no longer. But there were problems. Luthuli was restricted to his home town of Groutville in Natal Province and it was not practical for Hammarskjöld to go there (on his visit in June 1966, Robert Kennedy had the use of a helicopter to take him from Durban to see Luthuli), and when Hammarskjöld told Verwoerd on 10 January that he wanted to ‘meet true representatives of natives and coloured’, Verwoerd replied, ‘These people will interpret such interviews as an arbitration by you on UN instructions, as an appeal by them to higher authority’, adding, ‘We do not … wish you to see representatives of illegal organisations or people under ban for political reasons’ (Hammarskjöld Papers).

Clearly Hammarskjöld thought he could not insist on meeting such people, and only on his last full day in South Africa did he finally meet three leading Africans who had some association with the ANC but were not banned or restricted: K.T. Masemola, the Secretary of the Pretoria Native Advisory Board and a director of companies, William Nkomo, a medical doctor who had been a founder member of the ANC Youth League but was in 1961 distancing himself from his activist past, and Alfred B. Xuma, who as President-General of the ANC had been part of a successful campaign at the UN in 1946 to block a proposed South African annexation of South West Africa, but who had then been ousted as President-General by the Youth League in 1949 and by 1961 was very much a ‘has-been’. The three were hardly, then, the representative leaders that so many had called on Hammarskjöld to meet. But in a meeting that lasted 90 minutes, the three Africans did tell him that leaders like Luthuli should share in the running of the country; that they rejected the division of the country by the creation of
Bantustans; and that ‘there might be a case for outside intervention if South Africa continued to deny human rights to Africans and other non-whites’ (*The Star* 1961; *New York Times* 14 January 1961).

After this meeting Hammarskjöld at last saw a number of African townships. He was first driven to Alexandria township, then south to Meadowlands in Soweto. Though the convoy in which he travelled mostly sped through the various townships in a cloud of dust, he asked to meet some of the inhabitants, and visited five homes in Soweto of people who had been forcibly removed some years previously from Sophiatown. He was ringed by police as he did so, however, and journalists and press photographers were bitter that they could not get near him. When he then visited a gold mine he chose not to go down the mine shaft but instead to meet two Africans in the mine office, with only Wieschhoff and his personal bodyguard, William Ranallo, present. Ephraim Letsoara, the head African clerk, and Cornelius Motyeku told reporters afterwards that he had asked them if they ever saw political leaders, to which they replied that that was not allowed. They also told him that they were well treated, but had to carry passes. Before leaving South Africa, he visited another township outside Pretoria, where he went into a beerhall and talked to Africans in a butchery, a dry cleaning shop and a general store. He had planned to stay two more days, but had to return to New York for another Security Council debate on the Congo (*Cape Times* 13 January 1961; Urquhart 1973:499).

**The talks**

Hammarskjöld interpreted his mandate from the UN as not merely to talk about the situation that had given rise to the shootings at Sharpeville and Langa, but about apartheid in general. This he approached mostly from a general philosophical angle and hardly at all in terms of what it meant for blacks on a day-to-day basis. In his talks with Louw in May 1960 he had first sketched his views on South Africa’s racial policy. He told Louw that he recognised that though ‘both total integration and total and equitable separation may not be objectionable policies from the standpoint of human rights, he doubted that, having regard to the economical [sic] and demographical situation in the Union, policies of complete separation could be regarded as realistic’, and he pointed
out that even in what were called ‘European areas’ there would always be a ‘non-
European majority which … would wish to play a full part in Union’s affairs’. 
Louw made the absurd claim that South Africa’s racial policy ‘had been shaped 
in the best interest of the African people’, but did concede that ‘a new approach 
would have to be taken in respect of the…Coloured population’. Hammarskjöld 
ended his discussions with Louw by asking three questions: ‘in the so-called 
Bantu homelands would the people constitutionally be kept to traditional lines 
or be permitted to take up 20th century constitutional forms with a natural share 
in the responsibility for their country’?; ‘how could economic equity be created 
in view of the exorbitant investments necessary’?; and ‘could it be envisaged that 
the native group in the white regions could be barred from rights given to the 
white population?’ (Hammarskjöld Papers).

Though Hammarskjöld told the Security Council in October 1960 that he 
intended to ‘explore with the Prime Minister the possibility of arrangements 
which would provide for appropriate safeguards of human rights, with adequate 
contact with the United Nations’ (United Nations Security Council 1960), the 
country’s largest newspaper, the Sunday Times, pointed out during his visit that 
Verwoerd had in a sense given his response to Hammarskjöld even before he 
arrived. In his New Year’s broadcast the Prime Minister had said that the UN 
had become ‘a platform where problems are created and aggravated’ and that 
he could not believe that any ‘world organisation…can make any impression on 
our South African thinking or action’, while in another speech he had said that, in 
response to pressure from overseas, South Africa would have to be ‘as unyielding 
as walls of granite’ (Uys 1961). When the two men did finally meet, Verwoerd, 
who could be charming (Kenney 1980), seems to have liked the reserved quiet 
manner of Hammarskjöld, so different from what he saw as the pompous and 
arrogant attitude shown by his visitor of a year earlier, the British Prime Minister 
Harold Macmillan. In a break in the talks, Verwoerd said in Afrikaans to Frikkie 
Botha and the few other South Africans present, in language similar to that Mrs 
Thatcher was to use of Gorbachev, that Hammarskjöld was a person he could 
engage with (Botha 2011).

When his discussions with Verwoerd began at the Prime Minister’s official 
residence in Pretoria on 6 January 1961, Hammarskjöld was told that South
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Africa was very different from the rest of Africa and that ‘the Western Powers should understand what the Union means for the protection of Africa from communism and thus for the safety of Europe’. Integration would mean ‘national suicide’, said Verwoerd, while separation was ‘a good neighbour policy’ and the ultimate goal was ‘a commonwealth of South Africa, including white and black states’. In response, Hammarskjöld made the point that ‘the natives have no saying [sic] in the central Government and its preparation for the future’. While most of the UN would support ‘speedy integration’, he personally was not in favour of that, and he realised that it was politically unrealistic, so the question was whether there was ‘a competitive alternative’ to integration. In further discussions, in another five meetings, Hammarskjöld and Verwoerd explored the practicalities of the ‘Bantu homelands’, with Hammarskjöld pointing out that they would require major investment and much more land to become viable, and he failed to see the likelihood of that. He told Verwoerd that he did not understand South Africa’s racial policy outside the ‘homelands’, and that much of the country’s legislation left him ‘frankly shocked’. Racial discrimination ‘is bound to cast doubt of [sic] the so-to-say rational arguments for segregation’. He pointed out that South Africa had not explained its approach to the world ‘in terms which convinced public opinion’, and that the present slow progress to the government’s self-imposed targets would not work. The African states at the UN would unite on the South African issue. A much bolder approach might ‘catch the wind’ (did he think here of Macmillan’s ‘wind of change’?), but was urgent. It would mean setting aside ‘a sufficient and coherent territory to serve as a basis for the national life of a Bantu state’, and ‘fixed steps at short intervals leading to the establishment of such political institutions as were necessary as a basis for full independence and self-government’. Africans outside the ‘homelands’ must have their ‘human rights’ recognised. He suggested that it might be useful for the government to set up an institution to receive complaints and draw attention to deviations from the sound way to reach the target, as well as to maintain contact with the UN. In response Verwoerd said that his government would ‘try to increase the pace but it is very difficult’; ‘in the meantime we have to maintain the political control in our own hands. Otherwise the natives, with the help of international force, will overwhelm us’ (Hammarskjöld Papers).
Chris Saunders

Though the status of South West Africa did come up (Botha 2011), Hammarskjöld had no mandate to raise that issue, and it was not pursued. At the heart of the discussions, then, was Verwoerd’s concept of so-called ‘grand apartheid’ (to distinguish it from the ‘petty apartheid’ of racial discrimination similar to that of the United States South earlier in the century) or ‘separate development’, which, as he had explained to Macmillan a year earlier, was his answer to the African nationalism then sweeping the continent. As we have seen, Hammarskjöld did not reject out of hand the idea of developing the African reserve areas into self-governing and then ‘independent’ territories, but he explored with Verwoerd what might be done to make this meaningful, and insisted that any such policy should be discussed with those it affected. He knew, of course, that Verwoerd had made clear there would be no change to apartheid per se, and he tried to raise issues of human rights, which Verwoerd deflected by discussions of South Africa’s historical legacy and its diverse population, which he said required policies of separation. Though there was no agreement between the two men, Hammarskjöld did not see this as meaning the engagement could not continue, and both men envisaged that their exchanges would continue at some future date. So Hammarskjöld reported to the Security Council on 23 January 1961 that while ‘so far no mutually acceptable arrangement has been found’, ‘this lack of agreement is not conclusive’ and that the ‘exchange of views in general has served a most useful purpose. The Secretary-General does not consider the consultations as having come to an end, and he looks forward to their continuation at an appropriate time with a view to further efforts from his side to find an adequate solution….The Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa has indicated that further consideration will be given to questions raised in the course of the talks and has stated that “the Union Government, having found the talks with the Secretary-General useful and constructive, have [sic] decided to invite him at an appropriate time, or times, to visit the Union again in order that the present contact may be continued”’ (United Nations Security Council 1961:S/4635).
Assessment

Soon after Hammarskjöld’s visit relations between the South African government and the UN deteriorated again when the UN’s commission on South Africa threatened to visit without visas, but when Hammarskjöld died in September most commentators in South Africa praised him for his quiet diplomacy and integrity. For Hammarskjöld the visit to South Africa, for all its difficulties, must have been a relatively pleasant distraction from the Congo, where he was involved in what he himself called ‘the craziest operation in history’ (Henderson 1969:80). There were numerous demands on him on what was a very short visit, some of them absurd. The South African Tennis Board, for example, wanted him to investigate colour discrimination in sport (Cape Times 9 January 1961). His main task was to talk to a government pursuing policies with which he fundamentally disagreed, but, as we have seen, he made some efforts to speak to others. The delay of over six months for his arrival was, from the point of view of any action being taken against the apartheid regime, unfortunate, though by the time it did take place another seventeen African countries had joined the UN and they would add voice to the campaign against apartheid. Hammarskjöld’s initiative was not continued, for the next Secretaries-General to visit were Kurt Waldheim in 1972 and Pérez de Cuéllar in 1982, and their visits were mainly focused on the South West Africa/Namibia issue.

Could Hammarskjöld have done more? He was in South Africa as a guest of the South African government and he knew he had to be seen as an impartial UN person. The arrangements for his visit, as the Cape Times said, were ‘calculated to frustrate those who had planned demonstrations and hoped for meetings to show him another sides of the picture’ (Cape Times 12 January 1961), but as the newspaper pointed out, he could have stayed in his hotel room and chose not to. The Cape Times believed that the government had received bad publicity from the impression that was created that it was protecting him from anti-government influences. It would have been better, the Cape Times suggested, had the government made clear to the public at the beginning of his visit that he was free to see anyone he wanted to see (Cape Times, editorial, 13 January 1961).
Had Hammarskjöld lived and made further visits, it seems unlikely that he could either have become a strong voice against apartheid or have persuaded Verwoerd to modify his Bantustan policies. At the first press conference he had held after the Security Council resolution of April 1960, Hammarskjöld had asked: ‘How do you go about building bridges? The building of a firm bridge, of course, over which you can pass without any difficulties, may be a long story, but you can at least put the first stones down into the water or get a first piece of wood across the water, a little bit out into it’ (Hammarskjöldblog.com). The South African government expected him to return and wanted to continue the dialogue with him, but in the event his visit led nowhere and the impetus for further action in the Security Council was lost. But Peter Brown, the National Chairman of the Liberal Party, though disappointed in his visit, thought that it might have positive results. If Verwoerd was deaf to Hammarskjöld’s arguments, wrote Brown, ‘the United Nations and the Commonwealth will know that argument is useless and will think more in terms of action … it would be idle to suppose that the rest of the world will sit back and let apartheid flourish [or] that any state can survive in isolation in the Atomic Age’ (Brown 1961). And Hammarskjöld’s failure to achieve anything substantial in his talks with Verwoerd did feed into South Africa’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth two months after his visit. After the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ conference the previous year Kwame Nkrumah had told a branch of the UN Organisation that ‘If the Secretary-General is unable to agree with the Government of the Union of South Africa on such arrangements as would adequately help in upholding the purposes and principles of the Charter, then the Government of Ghana for one would find it embarrassing to remain in the Commonwealth with a republic whose policy is not based upon the purposes and principles of the United Nations’ (Hammarskjöld Papers).

Though Hammarskjöld’s successors were to take up the South West Africa/Namibia issue, and the Security Council was to impose a voluntary arms embargo in 1963 and then a mandatory embargo in 1977, the UN was never to impose economic sanctions on South Africa. On the other hand, the mounting campaign against South Africa at the UN was one aspect of the growing international pressure against apartheid that finally helped bring that
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racial system to an end. Hammarskjöld’s interaction with South Africa was a brief moment in a much longer story (Reddy 2008). It is certainly the case that on South Africa and South West Africa he achieved nothing significant, for apartheid intensified and repression and conflict in both countries grew worse. There was none of the ‘substantial progress’ he had hoped for, however modest. Anti-apartheid activists were naturally disappointed in this, but in the context of the time it may be argued that it was not possible for him to have done more than he did.

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Hammarskjöld and apartheid South Africa: Mission unaccomplished

Tor Sellström*

Abstract

With regard to Africa, the latter part of Dag Hammarskjöld’s tenure as Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN) (April 1953–September 1961) was dominated by the process of decolonisation and the Congo war. His active involvement, leadership and personal sacrifices in favour of national self-determination and peace are here well documented. Less known is that Hammarskjöld also was requested by the UN Security Council to seek ways and means to uphold the principles of the UN Charter and to safeguard human rights in the Union of South Africa. To this end, he visited the country between 6 and 12 January 1961, holding six meetings with Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd. After the visit, he reported to the Security Council that ‘no mutually acceptable arrangement’ had been found, adding that he wished to once again pursue the matter at an appropriate time (Hammarskjöld 1961). The Congo war and Hammarskjöld’s death in Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) would put an end to this ambition. Introduced by comments on Hammarskjöld, the UN and Africa, and with the addendum ‘mission unaccomplished’, this article discusses some aspects of the Secretary-General’s brief stay in apartheid South Africa in January 1961.

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Hammarskjöld, Africa and decolonisation

One of Hammarskjöld’s biographers, the Swedish diplomat Kaj Falkman, has described how Hammarskjöld at an early stage, both as a humanist and an economist, took an interest in African affairs, strongly believing that the UN would become ‘the engine for the new African states’ development to modern societies’ (Falkman 2005:42). As a humanist, he was in this regard inter alia influenced by Albert Schweitzer, the Franco-German theologian, philosopher and medical missionary, founder of the Albert Schweitzer Hospital in Lambaréné (Gabon) and recipient of the 1952 Nobel Peace Prize, with whom Hammarskjöld maintained a rich correspondence. As an economist,¹ he was instrumental in the planning for a UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), which following a decision by the General Assembly was established in Addis Ababa in 1958. In 1958, he also took a firm stand in favour of African self-determination. When Guinea (Conakry) rejected the plans of French President de Gaulle for continued association with France within a larger Francophone Community – opting instead for full independence –, Paris struck back. Overnight, French civil servants were ordered to leave and economic and technical cooperation was brought to a halt. In this situation, and to the French President’s great vexation, Secretary-General Hammarskjöld sent a UN representative to Conakry to mobilise and coordinate international support for the newly independent state.²

The year 1960 – symbolically declared ‘Africa Year’ by the UN – was particularly eventful with regard to the UN’s and Hammarskjöld’s involvement with Africa.

¹ Hammarskjöld held a Ph.D. degree in economics from the University of Stockholm, where, in 1933, he became Assistant Professor of Political Economics. In 1936, he was appointed Permanent Under-Secretary in the Swedish Ministry of Finance, at the same time serving as Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Bank of Sweden. In 1947, he moved to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, where he was actively involved in the launch of the Marshall Plan and in the post-Second World War reconstruction of Europe.

² The French president never forgave Hammarskjöld’s act of defiance. In addition to different positions on Algeria and the Congo, a rift opened between the two. During a visit to New York in 1960, for example, de Gaulle rejected an invitation to meet Hammarskjöld, stating that since the General Assembly was not in session ‘How would I [then] be able to meet [the UN]’? See Guéhenno 2005:185.
In the beginning of the year the Secretary-General went on a whirlwind fact-finding mission to no less than 21 countries and territories on the continent, assessing their needs and shaping his vision for international cooperation. He later said that the trip made him ‘both wiser and more humble, as well as less prone to generalize, since the [countries] had many different problems, attitudes and traditions’ (Falkman 2005:42). In general, however, he was impressed by the African leaders and their quest for socio-economic development.

By 1960, it was becoming evident that the world was changing and that the decolonising territories would soon be ascendant in the UN General Assembly. During the year, no less than 17 newly independent states – 16 of them from Africa – joined the UN, and in December the General Assembly adopted the seminal ‘Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples’, a watershed in the history of colonialism. A draft resolution on decolonisation had been introduced by the Soviet Union – represented in New York by its Premier, Nikita Khrushchev – during stormy assembly proceedings in September/October 1960. Popularly known as the ‘Decolonisation Declaration’, the final Resolution 1514 of 14 December 1960 established that:

- ‘[t]he subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and cooperation’; and that

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3 Hammarskjöld’s African tour took place from 18 December 1959 to 31 January 1960.

4 As vividly described by the Soviet leader’s son and biographer, Sergei Khrushchev, the 1960 UN General Assembly meeting – the last under Secretary-General Hammarskjöld – was marked by a series of extraordinary events. Among them was the famous ‘shoe incident’, where the Soviet Premier punctuated an intervention during the decolonisation debate by waving a shoe. (The shoe had been lost during Khrushchev’s tumultuous entry into the assembly hall. Subsequently found by a UN orderly and placed on his desk, Khrushchev instinctively picked it up during the debate). Of greater significance was Khrushchev’s defeated proposal during the debate on the Congo to replace the UN Secretary-General with a ‘troika’ of representatives from the Socialist, Western and Non-aligned camps and to move the UN headquarters from New York to West Berlin or Geneva. See Khrushchev 2005:64–74.
Also in 1960, however, developments in the formally independent Union of South Africa and in the then recently born Republic of the Congo were to sharply illustrate the complexities of the African peoples’ march towards freedom and national self-determination. On 21 March 1960, the apartheid police killed 69 people and wounded another 180 peacefully demonstrating against the racial pass laws in Sharpeville, South Africa. And four months later – on 14 July 1960 –, in the wake of its independence on 30 June and in a rapid vortex of military mutinies, popular revolts, Belgian intervention and secession by the Katanga province, the Security Council decided to dispatch UN troops to the Congo to restore order and keep peace. As with the struggle against apartheid, this, however, was to be a bloody and drawn out process during which Secretary-General Hammarskjöld on 18 September 1961 was to pay the ultimate price.

Sharpville and the UN Security Council

In response to the Sharpeville massacre, the UN Security Council on 1 April adopted Resolution 134(1960).\(^6\) Initiated by 29 African and Asian member states, it established that ‘the situation in the Union of South Africa … has led to international friction and, if continued, might endanger peace and security’. Deploring the loss of life, as well as the policies and actions of the Pretoria government, the Security Council requested the UN Secretary-General ‘in consultation with the government of the Union of South Africa, to make such arrangements as would adequately help in upholding the purposes and principles of the [UN] Charter and to report [back] whenever necessary and appropriate’

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\(^5\) Resolution 1514 (1960) was adopted by 89 votes to 0, with 9 abstentions. Among the countries that abstained were Belgium, France, Portugal, South Africa, United Kingdom and the United States.

\(^6\) On the UN and apartheid South Africa, see Reddy 2008 and Sellström 2009.
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(Security Council 1960:245). South Africa’s permanent representative to the UN participated in the meeting, strongly arguing that the resolution violated the principle of non-interference in matters falling under domestic jurisdiction of member states.

Over the following days – while the situation rapidly deteriorated in South Africa, on 8 April culminating in the banning of the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) –, Hammarskjöld entered into contact with Pretoria, proposing consultations between the parties. Whereas the Secretary-General after the bloodshed at Sharpeville stated his opinion that the UN was, indeed, entitled to discuss the racial situation in South Africa, adding that ‘[i]n humanitarian terms you need not have any doubts about my feelings’ (Time Magazine 1960), the South African government requested that the proposed deliberations would not ‘require prior recognition from the Union government of the United Nations authority’. Thus representing radically opposing positions, at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference in London in mid-May 1960 Hammarskjöld and the South African Foreign Minister Eric Louw nevertheless reached an agreement that the UN Secretary-General should visit South Africa.

Due to the crisis in the Congo, the visit was re-scheduled. In his interim report to the Security Council in October 1960, Hammarskjöld explained that ‘[d]ue to

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7 In light of its future pariah status, it is ironic that South Africa was among the UN’s founding nations. In June 1945, South African Prime Minister Jan Smuts played an instrumental role in the drafting of the preamble to the UN Charter, which reaffirms ‘equal rights of men and women, and of nations large and small’. Domestically and with regard to South West Africa/Namibia, however, his policies were far from the spirit expressed there. In 1946, only one year later, Smuts ruthlessly suppressed a general strike by black South African mineworkers, as well as demanding Namibia’s annexation to South Africa.


9 Hammarskjöld was careful to always act as an international civil servant. It is, however, possible that Louw’s attitude towards the Secretary-General was tainted by contempt for Sweden and its stand against apartheid. In October 1960, for example, Louw stated in the UN General Assembly that ‘the press of [Sweden and Norway], particularly Sweden, has with one or two exceptions been carrying on a vindictive and malicious campaign against [South Africa]. I should say that the press campaign carried on there is one of the worst of any country in the world’ (Sellström 1999b: 133).
circumstances resulting from the mandate given to me by the Security Council … in connection with the United Nations operations in the Republic of the Congo (Léopoldville), I have been unable to visit the Union of South Africa as envisaged … On four occasions, precise plans were made for the visit, but on each occasion it became necessary first to postpone, then to cancel those plans …”.

Eventually – and despite acute crises in Laos, Algeria and in the relations between Cuba and the United States –, Hammarskjöld visited South Africa from 6 to 12 January 1961, formally as a guest of the Pretoria government. During the short stay, he held six meetings with Prime Minister Verwoerd and made stopovers in Pretoria, Johannesburg, Umtata and Cape Town. Originally, it was his plan to stay two more days, but due to yet another Security Council meeting over developments in the Congo, Hammarskjöld had to cut the visit short.

**African concerns**

Hammarskjöld’s visit to South Africa was the first ever by a UN Secretary-General. As such, it created great expectations within the anti-apartheid opposition, including the then recently banned liberation movements. Although the situation in the country had been steadily worsening – *inter alia* illustrated by the opening of the Treason Trial in 1956 – towards the end of the 1950s the issue of apartheid had largely faded from UN attention. As noted by Enuga Reddy, the Indian national who in 1963 was appointed Principal Secretary of the UN Special Committee against Apartheid, ‘[t]he resolutions of the General Assembly did not reflect the grave developments in South Africa, [nor] the growing international solidarity with the struggle for freedom’ (Reddy 2008:50).

12 In December 1956, 156 leaders of the ANC and allied organisations within the Congress Alliance (see below) were arrested and charged with high treason. According to the state, the anti-apartheid opposition’s programmatic Freedom Charter – adopted by the Kliptown Congress of the People in 1955 – was a communist document designed to overthrow the government. After protracted proceedings, the state’s case was eventually overturned by the Supreme Court and the last 30 accused – among them Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu – were acquitted on 29 March 1961. Thus, the Treason Trial was still in process when Hammarskjöld visited the country.
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This radically changed with the Sharpeville massacre and Security Council Resolution 134(1960), which recognised that developments in the country could endanger international peace and security.

Despite the bannings, the oppression and the squalor, at the time of the visit there was a certain degree of optimism within the South African opposition. Writing about this period in the mid-1970s, Karis and Gerhart commented: ‘Looking back at early 1961 …, it is difficult to appreciate the extent to which African leaders and other radical opponents of the government felt that the trend of events was in their favour. … As South Africa entered the 1960s, morale was boosted by the emergence of black independent states on the continent and the gradual mounting of pressures against South Africa’ (Karis and Carter 1977:359). In this spirit, the anti-apartheid movement made submissions to the UN Secretary-General before and during his visit to South Africa. The ANC-led Congress Alliance also set up a ‘Dag Hammarskjöld Welcoming Committee’.

On the initiative of the ANC, several African leaders met for a consultative conference in Orlando, Johannesburg, in mid-December 1960. Mainly concerned with the issue of unity between the different African political organisations, the conference also discussed the potential role of the UN and the pending visit by

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13 Formed in 1953, the Congress Alliance included the African National Congress (ANC), the South African Indian Congress (SAIC), the Coloured People’s Congress (CPC), the Congress of Democrats (CoD) and the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU). White members of the banned South African Communist Party (SACP) were active within the CoD. In June 1955, the Congress Alliance organised the Congress of the People in Kliptown outside Johannesburg, where the Freedom Charter was adopted. It could be noted that the pro-Moscow SACP did not hold Secretary-General Hammarskjöld in high esteem. In the July 1961 issue of its publication The African Communist, it turned against ‘Mr. Hammarskjold and his lieutenants, who are committed to the hilt to maintain colonialism in the Congo and elsewhere in Africa’, adding: ‘This time it is not merely a question of Hammarskjold going. Go he must, but clearly the whole machinery of the United Nations needs overhauling’. Not surprisingly, instead the SACP underlined ‘the solid merits of the proposals of N.S. Khrushch[e]v for a three-man secretariat, representing the three main groups of countries: the socialist, the imperialist and the neutralist’ (SACP 1961:9).

14 Invitations to the consultative conference were sent out by Chief Albert Luthuli, President-General of the ANC. Luthuli himself was banned to his homestead in Groutville outside Durban and could not attend.
its Secretary-General. The final resolution, dated 17 December 1960, was sent to the UN and to Oliver Tambo, the ANC leader who after Sharpeville had left South Africa to represent the movement in exile. With regard to Hammarskjöld and the UN, it stated that ‘[t]his conference of African leaders welcomes the resolution of the Security Council … and in particular the visit of the Secretary-General, Mr Dag Hammarskjöld, but urges that in order to have a true view of the situation in the country, he should meet African leaders’ (Karis and Carter 1977:628). In view of the situation in Transkei, the resolution, in addition, appealed to the UN ‘to send a Commission of Observers to Pondoland and to use its good offices to curb the alarming military operations against unarmed people, which constitutes a threat to peace in South Africa’ (Karis and Carter 1977:627–628).

The consultative conference also sent a cable directly to Hammarskjöld in New York, in addition to the appeals that he meet with African leaders and that the UN send observers to Pondoland supporting the demand for national independence of South West Africa (Namibia). The text of the brief cable read as follows:


The concerns raised by the African leaders will be discussed below. In the meantime, it could further be noted that the Congress Alliance’s ‘Dag Hammarskjöeld Welcoming Committee’ issued a pamphlet (Dag

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15 Tambo had crossed the border into Bechuanaland (Botswana) at the end of March 1960. From there, he sent a cable to the UN Secretary-General, requesting an appearance before the Security Council to explain the nature of the South African crisis. The request was not granted. Subsequently, he appeared before the UN General Assembly’s Fourth (Decolonisation) Committee in connection with South West Africa/Namibia (Thomas 1996:110–111).
Hammarskjöld Welcoming Committee no date a) to welcome the Secretary-General to the country. Headed ‘Greetings Dag Hammarskjöld’, it expressed the ‘fervent hope’ that he would ‘help to reverse the tide of racial oppression’. Noting that ‘over two thousand political prisoners of all races and many others have suffered months of imprisonment without charge’ since the adoption of Security Council Resolution 134 in April 1960, it called on ‘Dag’ to ‘meet the non-white leaders’, foremost the ANC President-General, Chief Albert Luthuli, and to ‘insist that South Africa observe the spirit of [the] UN’ by ending the state of emergency, releasing [the] detainees, abandoning apartheid and ensuring democratic rights for all.16

Finally, on the day of Hammarskjöld’s arrival in the country the Congress Alliance managed with great difficulty – but also ingenuity – to forward a long memorandum to the Secretary-General. According to the final report by the Welcoming Committee, one of the leaders of the demonstration that received Hammarskjöld in Pretoria ‘tried to hand him a copy of the memorandum, but he refused to accept it. Subsequently, [it] was sent in to him [at the Union Hotel] concealed in a wreath of flowers’ (Dag Hammarskjöeld Welcoming Committee no date b:1).

In contrast to the resolution taken at the African leaders’ conference, the memorandum by the Congress Alliance did not raise concrete, urgent concerns, but described the political and socio-economic situation of the non-white majority in vivid, but general terms. Stating that ‘we are sitting on a volcano due to erupt at any time’, the memorandum continued: ‘An eruption in South Africa would have world-wide repercussions. Whereas the unjust nature of South Africa’s form of government was only of academic interest in the past, it is now a source of great concern to many nations throughout the world. This is because South African tension and violence is recognized as a threat to world peace’.

16 This pamphlet (Dag Hammarskjöeld Welcoming Committee no date a), as well as the ‘Report on the visit of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Union of South Africa in January 1961’ (Dag Hammarskjöeld Welcoming Committee no date b), is stored in the Auden House Collection of the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. The documents were kindly made available for this article by Carol Archibald, Research Assistant at SAIRR.
Turning to the UN Secretary-General, the Congress Alliance concluded: ‘Above all, we hope that your investigations here will bear out our repeated contention that the South African government is a monster imposing its arrogant will on a dissenting people. We hope that you will recognize, as we do, that this government is holding the vast majority of our people down by sheer force and that its policies are contrary to world practice. We hope, too, that you will inform the Security Council that the majority of the South African people are looking to that body for substantial assistance in their struggles for the realization of true democracy in our country’ (Congress Alliance 1961).

**Restrictions**

Little information has transpired from Hammarskjöld’s off-the-record meetings with Verwoerd, or, in general, from his talks with the South African authorities. Reporting to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Stockholm, Eyvind Bratt, the Swedish envoy to the country, noted in a dispirited letter two weeks after the Secretary-General’s departure that ‘[i]n case the ministry has expected particular information from this legation regarding the visit of Dag Hammarskjöld to South Africa, I must at the outset confess that I am incapable of producing anything of the sort’, adding that no foreign diplomat had been invited by the Pretoria government to meet the UN representative (Bratt 1961). In his memoirs, the Canadian diplomat Gordon Brown similarly notes that ‘the visit … seemed to have been designed … to exclude the local diplomats’ (Gordon Brown 2000:69). From conversations held by Bratt and Gordon Brown with South African officials, documents by the Congress Alliance, contemporary press reports and indirect sources, it is, however, possible to distil the most important parts.

When the South African government accepted the visit, it had been agreed that ‘while consultation throughout would be with the Union government, no restrictive rules were to be imposed on the Secretary-General’.17 Although denied by Prime Minister Verwoerd (The Star 1961), the latter, however, was far from being the case. While in South Africa, Hammarskjöld’s movements were severely circumscribed and any contacts with people other than government

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representatives highly restricted. The Congress Alliance later reported: ‘Throughout the visit, the press and the public had great difficulty in obtaining information about his whereabouts and plans. Mr Hammarskjöld’s party was rushed from one end of the country to the other at great speed and in great secrecy. … During [the] stay, he has been accompanied everywhere by officials and shown only what the government could be expected to want him to see’ (Dag Hammarskjoeld Welcoming Committee no date b:3–4).

That this was by design is inter alia evident from Gordon Brown’s memoirs and from the way in which the Pretoria government received Hammarskjöld in the country. In a meeting with one Frikkie Botha at the South African Department of External Affairs one week before the visit, Gordon Brown – quoting from his diary – was told that ‘the South African government is not putting Hammarskjöld in touch with opposition leaders or non-whites other than the Coloured Advisory Council (an unpopular group with most coloureds) and Botha Sigcau, the head chief in the Transkei’ (Gordon Brown 2000:69).

And when Hammarskjöld on 6 January arrived from Léopoldville (Congo), the South African hosts re-directed his plane from the international airport in Johannesburg to the Waterkloof military airbase in Pretoria to avoid the big crowds that had gathered in Johannesburg. In the final event, however, many demonstrators, mostly Africans, managed to turn up outside Hammarskjöld’s hotel in Pretoria, where they ‘produced placards ([which] had been hidden under coats) welcoming him to the police state, asking him if he had his pass and referring to Pondoland’ (Gordon Brown 2000:69).

Despite the government’s efforts, similar scenes would take place throughout the visit. In Cape Town, for example, large crowds of white and non-white demonstrators broke through the security cordons in Parliament Street and outside the Mount Nelson Hotel, calling out to Hammarskjöld that he should ‘Go to Pondoland!’ and ‘Stop seeing the government – Talk to the leaders of the people!’ After the meeting with the Coloured Advisory Council that had been arranged by the government, the popular wrath was directed to the council representatives, who were denounced as ‘traitors and scum’ (Svenska Dagbladet 1961a). On the same occasion, George Peake – one of the original Treason Trialists, later imprisoned on Robben Island with Nelson Mandela
– tried to present Hammarskjöld with a memorandum from the Coloured People’s Congress, but was detained by the Special Branch (Dag Hammarskjöld Welcoming Committee no date b:1).

**Hammarskjöld and Verwoerd**

How, then, did the discussions with Prime Minister Verwoerd go? There were, as noted, no less than six meetings between the two, in accordance with Hammarskjöld’s Security Council mandate aiming at ‘arrangements [that] would adequately help in upholding the purposes and principles of the [UN] Charter [in South Africa]’. As the meetings were off-the-record, there is little information available, but enough to see why the two parties from the beginning agreed to disagree. Basing himself on trusted sources, in his letter to the Swedish Foreign Ministry Eyvind Bratt (1961) noted that ‘Hammarskjöld during his first encounter with Verwoerd very firmly made it clear that since the apartheid [policy] was completely unacceptable to the United Nations, any exchange of ideas in this regard was pointless’. Having shortly before declared that his government would be ‘as unyielding as walls of granite’ in applying apartheid,18 not surprisingly Verwoerd was equally firm in closing the door to any UN-initiated arrangement. On the first occasion thus agreeing to disagree on the very question that had brought the UN Secretary-General to South Africa, it seems that Hammarskjöld and Verwoerd during the remaining meetings discussed other issues, such as the changing political map of Africa, the Congo crisis etc. After their last meeting on 12 January 1961, the South African Department of External Affairs issued a communiqué which through its lack of content reflected the deep disagreement:

> The talks between the Prime Minister and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, which commenced on 6 January, have now been concluded. These discussions were frank, constructive and helpful. The Prime Minister, while recalling that these talks did not imply recognition by the Union government of United Nations authority, took the opportunity of explaining Union policies and their application. The Secretary-General on his side elaborated his

18 Quoted in Karis and Carter 1977:360. Verwoerd’s ‘granite speech’ was held on 30 November 1960.
views and suggestions on questions within his mandate. The Prime Minister and the Secretary-General welcomed the exchange of views. It is the intention of the Prime Minister to inform his cabinet of the substance of the talks and after consultation with his colleagues he will make a further public statement. The Secretary-General will make a report to the Security Council (South African Information Service 1961).

In less private circumstances during the stage-managed visit, Hammarskjöld did manage to put his critical views across. Replying to a toast at a dinner in Cape Town in his honour, given by J.N. Malan, Administrator of Cape Province, the Secretary-General characterised South Africa’s place in the contemporary world as ‘provocative’ when considering the world of tomorrow. Referring to the many new African member states of the United Nations, he said that ‘[s]o much history has been made, and you are living in a world of turmoil…. Our problem [at the UN] is to find, as quickly as possible, the bridges by which these [African] peoples will be able to play their fullest part and render their contribution to the international community. I therefore see in my own way a bit of the problem you have to solve’, adding that ‘[t]he most essential feature is recognition of a common and shared problem’ (Gray 1961:127).

Such views were not always diplomatically received by Hammarskjöld’s South African hosts. To the apartheid government it was anathema to be seen as part of a community with the newly independent African states, which at the UN and elsewhere strongly opposed its racial policies. At another dinner in Hammarskjöld’s honour, this time in Umtata during the visit to Pondoland, it was reported in the local press that Hans Abraham, Commissioner-General for Transkei, had been ‘unpleasant, provoking and downright bad-mannered’ towards the Secretary-General. It was further alleged that Hammarskjöld –

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19 Among the South African government representatives that Hammarskjöld met were M.D.C. de Wet, Minister of Bantu Administration, P. Sauer, Minister of Public Works, D.C.H. Uys, Minister of Agricultural Economics and Marketing, and P.M.K. le Roux, Minister of Agricultural Technical Services.
normally cool and unruffled – had lost his temper and that he ‘gave Mr Abraham back better than he got from him’ (Sunday Times 1961).

\textbf{Arranged meetings, visit to Pondoland and the question of Namibia}

Welcoming the UN Secretary-General to South Africa in mid-December 1960, the ANC-dominated consultative conference urged him to also meet African leaders and visit Pondoland. In addition, the conference conveyed its support for Namibia’s independence.

Before the visit, it had been agreed between the Secretary-General and the South African Foreign Minister that ‘consultation throughout would be with the Union government’. Any meeting that Hammarskjöld might request was thus subject to Pretoria’s approval. This said, on the last day of his stay he saw Dr A.B. Xuma, former President-General of the ANC (1940–49), and Dr W.F. Nkomo, a former leader of the ANC Youth League.\footnote{Present at the meeting was also one K.T. Masemola. Commenting on the African spokespersons, the Congress Alliance’s Welcoming Committee wrote that Xuma ‘was last politically active ten years ago’, Nkomo ‘belongs to no African political organization’ and Masemola ‘is completely unknown in public life’ (Dag Hammarskjöeld Welcoming Committee no date b:3).} Selected as African spokespersons by the government, the two medical doctors had long since outlived their roles as leading representatives of the anti-apartheid movement. In his memoirs, Nelson Mandela later wrote that Xuma ‘enjoyed the relationships he had formed with the white establishment and did not want to jeopardize them with political action’ (Mandela 1994:92). After Sharpeville, Nkomo, similarly, had acted as a mediator vis-à-vis the government and would as a trustee of the Bantu Welfare Trust promote cooperation between black and white South Africans. This notwithstanding, the South African officials must have been dismayed when Xuma and Nkomo told Hammarskjöld that men such as the banished ANC President-General Albert Luthuli and the jailed PAC President Robert Sobukwe were regarded as ‘the real leadership’.\footnote{Callan 1962, quoted in Karis and Carter 1977:360, 378.}
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Following a special request to the South African government (The New York Times 1961a), from Cape Town Hammarskjöld managed to make a detour by air to Umtata, the administrative centre of Transkei in the conflict area of Pondoland. From Umtata, he went 140 kilometres by car through Pondoland to the village of Lusikisiki, one of the main sites of the conflict. As noted, such a visit had been urged by both the African leaders’ consultative conference in mid-December 1960 and by the demonstrators that greeted the Secretary-General in Pretoria and Cape Town.

At the time, eastern Pondoland was an area in revolt. After decades of oppression, in March 1960 – around the time of the massacre at Sharpeville outside Johannesburg – a vast popular uprising had been launched by the Pondo people in the rural areas around Umtata, turning against land dispossession, increasing taxation and Pretoria’s imposition of so called ‘Bantu authorities’. Despite the government’s harsh reaction, notably using military aircraft to bombard villages, killing scores and arresting hundreds of people, the uprising did not abate. As 23 Pondo leaders were sentenced to death and subsequently hanged in Pretoria, in November 1960 the government declared a state of emergency in the area. During the following police operations, nearly 5,000 people were arrested. As a consequence, ‘all semblance of normal life disappeared. Cultivation ground to a halt and families were impoverished as they were forced to sell livestock so as to pay tax defaulting fines’ (Lodge 1983:281).

22 On the way, Hammarskjöld passed through Flagstaff, another hot spot in the Pondo uprising.

23 The epicentre of the uprising was the Bizana district, the birthplace of Oliver Tambo and Winnie Madikizela-Mandela. Nelson Mandela grew up in Qunu, just outside Umtata.

24 In mid-1960, a Mountain Committee (known as Intaba) formed by the Pondo peasants managed to send a memorandum to the United Nations in New York, explaining the situation in the area, listing their grievances and giving a vivid description of the government’s repression. It is not known if Hammarskjöld was aware of the document. Under the heading ‘Pondoland goes to the United Nations’, it was presented in Fighting Talk 1960.

25 During the sittings of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, it was in 1997 decided to locate the bodies and bring them back for re-burial in the Transkei. After delicate excavations in Pretoria, the remains of 13 of the 23 bodies were laid to rest in Flagstaff in June 2003 (Sunday Tribune 2003).
Hammarskjöld’s visit on 9 January 1961 took place at a critical moment. It is, however, unlikely that he was in a position to gather much independent information about the developments as he not only was accompanied by De Wet Nel, Minister of Bantu Administration and largely responsible for the state of affairs, but as African interlocutors had Paramount Chief Botha Sigcau and eight other government-imposed tribal leaders.26 Chief Sigcau, in particular, was the object of popular disapproval. A couple of years earlier, a meeting attended by thousands of peasants had demanded that he should publicly declare whether he was ‘the head of the Pondo tribe or the boot-licker of Verwoerd’ (Mbeki 1984:119).27 And by mid-1960, they declared that ‘[t]he beginnings of the trouble lie in the appointment of Botha Sigcau’ (Fighting Talk 1960).

In the cable sent to Hammarskjöld in mid-December 1960, the meeting of the African leaders had, finally, expressed their support for Namibia’s independence. Albeit without any concrete proposal for action, it was a timely reminder of the world body’s special responsibility for the territory.

The UN had inherited supervisory authority over South West Africa from the League of Nations. The Pretoria government, however, refused to place the territory under a trusteeship agreement, demanding that it be incorporated into the Union of South Africa. In 1946, the General Assembly rejected South Africa’s demands. Pretoria ignored the decision, instead tightening its control. Thus began a drawn out tug-of-war between the UN and apartheid South Africa on the status of South West Africa/Namibia.

On 18 December 1960 – less than a month before Hammarskjöld’s departure for South Africa –, the General Assembly deprecated the application of apartheid by the Pretoria government in Namibia, recognised the territory’s inalienable right

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26 According to a report in The Star newspaper of 10 January 1961, in Umtata Hammarskjöld also met Chief Kaiser Matanzima of Tembuland. By law and custom Nelson Mandela’s nephew, the two African leaders developed a serious disagreement around the Pretoria government’s homeland policy. Siding with the government, in 1963 Matanzima became Chief Minister of Transkei. In 1976 – when Transkei was the first homeland to be declared independent –, he became Prime Minister and in 1979 State President.

27 The classic study South Africa: The peasants’ revolt by the ANC leader Govan Mbeki was first published by Penguin Africa Library in 1964.
to independence and stated that the situation constituted a ‘serious threat to international peace and security’. At the same time, it instructed its Committee on South West Africa to visit the country to investigate ‘steps which would enable the indigenous inhabitants … to achieve a wide measure of internal self-government, designed to lead them to complete independence as soon as possible’. Acting on behalf of the African group at the UN, Liberia and Ethiopia also instituted proceedings against South Africa before the International Court of Justice with a view to legally settle the status of the country, as well as South Africa's obligations to the UN and to the people of Namibia.

In January 1961, the question of Namibia was therefore high on the UN agenda and there was speculation in the media that Hammarskjöld during his stay in South Africa would raise it with the Pretoria government or even request a visit to Namibia (Svenska Dagbladet 1961a). No documentary evidence to that effect is, however, available. As the Secretary-General’s mandate by the Security Council was limited to South Africa proper, and the General Assembly had decided to send its own special committee to the country, it is unlikely that the subject came up for discussion.

**African townships**

In less than a week, Hammarskjöld’s visit took him to Pretoria, Cape Town, Umtata/Pondoland and via Johannesburg back to Pretoria, where he had a last meeting with Prime Minister Verwoerd at the Union Buildings. As noted, the visit was tightly controlled by the South African government. In Johannesburg on the day before his departure, the authorities, however, lowered their guard, for the first and only time allowing the Secretary-General to get into contact with ordinary people.

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28 UN General Assembly Resolution 1568 (XV) of 18 December 1960, quoted in Katjavivi 1988:56. Eventually, the South African government refused the committee entry into Namibia, stating that any attempt by the UN to cross into the country would be regarded as an act of aggression.

29 As Hammarskjöld eight months later would lose his life in an air crash, it could be noted that the Viscount plane that the South African air force put at his disposal had to be replaced before the flight to Umtata due to a crack in one of the wings (Svenska Dagbladet 1961b).
It is not known if Hammarskjöld during his stopover in Johannesburg had made a special request to visit racially segregated areas. In addition to a lunch offered by the Transvaal and Free State Chamber of Mines at the Blyvooruitsig gold mine, that was, however, what the programme amounted to. During the day, he toured the white suburbs of Rosebank and Parktown, followed by longer stops in the African townships of Alexandra, popularly known as ‘Dark City’ due to the absence of electricity, and Meadowlands, where 14 000 families forcefully evicted from Sophiatown had been resettled. According to contemporary press reports, Hammarskjöld surprised his government escort by leaving his car and moving among the people: ‘Mr Hammarskjold went into one of the houses and spoke with the housewife as she was busy with her chores. Hundreds of African children gathered in the street and surrounded [him] when he emerged. He shook their hands and laughed at their excited cries. Altogether, the Secretary-General went into five African homes in his first informal contact with the African people [of South Africa]’ (The New York Times 1961b).

On the day of his departure, Hammarskjöld also visited the African township of Atteridgeville in Pretoria. Albeit briefly, before leaving the country he thus got an impression of residential apartheid and the radically different conditions of the white and black population groups, living in worlds apart. As will be seen below, soon after his return to New York he would in a personal capacity also be involved in a case where the inhumanity of apartheid struck against two people who had dared to cross the racial divide.

**Two reports: Hammarskjöld and the Congress Alliance**

In his report to the Security Council, Hammarskjöld explained on 23 January 1961 that ‘during the discussions between the Secretary-General and the Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa, so far no mutually acceptable arrangement has been found’. He was of the opinion, however, that ‘the exchange of views in general has served a most useful purpose’ and that the ‘lack of agreement is not conclusive’. Wishing ‘to give the matter his further consideration’, the

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30 Also Svenska Dagbladet 1961c.
31 In Pretoria, he also held a meeting with leaders of the Dutch Reformed Church.
Secretary-General stated that ‘he looks forward to [the] continuation [of the consultations] at an appropriate time, with a view to further efforts from his side to find an adequate solution’. In the report, he also quoted Verwoerd, noting that the South African Premier had ‘decided to invite him … to visit the Union again in order that the present contact may be continued’.32

The Dag Hammarskjöld Welcoming Committee of the ANC-led Congress Alliance also produced a report from the visit. The five-page typewritten document was considerably less positive, in particular criticising the UN Secretary-General for failing to ‘make any effort to meet the leaders of [the] opposition political organizations, particularly the [n]on-[w]hites’ (Dag Hammarskjöld Welcoming Committee no date b:2), and for not publicly condemning the apartheid regime. While noting that ‘it should be made clear that Mr Hammarskjöld’s tour was carefully planned to avoid any places and persons whom the government did not wish him to see’, the committee, nevertheless, denounced the Secretary-General’s UN entourage for not following up on offers made to meet the Congress leaders.33 Hammarskjöld’s Africa expert, Heinrich Wieschhoff, was singled out.34 In addition, the committee stated, ‘there was [during the visit] no manifestation of the disapproval which the Security Council feels about [the] Union government’s policies’. Of the opinion that Hammarskjöld ‘should have adopted a more correct and impersonal attitude towards the government and its supporters’, it quoted statements allegedly made by the Secretary-General in favour of the Pretoria regime, adding that ‘[i]f the reported versions are correct


33 According to the report, offers were made by the Welcoming Committee to facilitate an interview with leaders of the Congress Alliance in Pretoria. During Hammarskjöld’s stopover in Umtata, cables were also sent to him from Durban, requesting meetings with Chief Luthuli of the ANC and Dr Naicker of the Natal Indian Congress (Dag Hammarskjöld Welcoming Committee no date b:2). In his report to the Security Council, Hammarskjöld stated that he had ‘unofficial contacts with members of various sections of the South African community’ (Hammarskjöld 1961, quoted in UNDPI 1994:247).

34 Wieschhoff was Director of the UN Department of Political and Security Council Affairs. Holding a Ph.D. in African anthropology, he was the author of a number of books on African cultures and on colonial policies. He died together with Hammarskjöld in the air crash at Ndola in September 1961.
... they merit the strongest condemnation’ (Dag Hammarskjoeld Welcoming Committee no date b:2, 4).35

Through its report, the Welcoming Committee relayed to the leadership of the Congress Alliance the overall opinion that ‘the visit was a great disappointment’, that it ‘meant nothing positive for the majority of the people’ and that ‘there is a fear that the Security Council will not receive an objective report from Mr Hammarskjoeld’ (Dag Hammarskjoeld Welcoming Committee no date b:2, 4). At the same time, however, it underlined that ‘we do not question the motives of Mr Hammarskjoeld in the way in which his visit was carried out, … [but express] disappointment and doubt as to the merit of the procedure adopted by the Security Council’ (Dag Hammarskjoeld Welcoming Committee no date b:5).36

While the Secretary-General hardly could be seen to publicly side with the anti-apartheid opposition and at the same time pursue sensitive consultations with the Pretoria government – a principle every mediator to a conflict must respect –, it is, in addition, difficult from both formal and practical points of view to see how he could have met with leading ANC representatives such as Chief Albert Luthuli, Walter Sisulu or Nelson Mandela. As noted above, a condition for Pretoria’s acceptance of the visit was that ‘consultation throughout would be with the Union government’. To this should be added that the ANC was outlawed, that the Treason Trial was still in process and that Luthuli, Sisulu and Mandela all were either banished, banned or underground.37

For Hammarskjöld, the brief visit in early January 1961 was, finally, only a beginning. His intention to return to South Africa in search of an arrangement

35  The South African opposition press – notably The Star and The Rand Daily Mail – was surprisingly critical of the Secretary-General, often publishing general, non-committal statements as expressions of support for the government. In a meeting with the South African Press Association, Hammarskjöld regretted that he had been quoted ‘out of context’ (Dag Hammarskjoeld Welcoming Committee no date b:4).

36  While rhetorically asking the question ‘Did Dag meet our leaders?’, after Hammarskjöld’s departure the Congress Alliance convened a meeting in Newclare, Johannesburg, on 15 January 1961 (Pamphlet in the Auden House Collection).

37  None of the memoirs by, or main biographies of, the ANC leaders mention Hammarskjöld’s visit to South Africa.

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to uphold the principles of the UN Charter did not, however, materialise. Returning to New York, he was immediately seized with the escalating armed conflict in the Congo, where he tragically was to lose his life eight months later. In the meantime, the Pretoria government under Prime Minister Verwoerd proceeded to consolidate apartheid, breaking away from the Commonwealth and on 31 May 1961 proclaiming the Republic of South Africa.

**Apartheid immorality**

Although heavily occupied with the Congo crisis, soon after his return to New York Hammarskjöld, unexpectedly, was to renew contact with South Africa. Late at night on 3 February 1961, the well-known Swedish novelist Sara Lidman was arrested by the Special Branch in her flat in Yeoville, Johannesburg, together with her friend Peter Nthite, National Organising Secretary of the ANC Youth League, a former Treason Trialist and at the time serving a five-year banning order. Subsequently charged under the Immorality Act\(^\text{38}\) – with a possible penalty of ten lashes and up to seven years’ imprisonment –, the arrest of Lidman and Nthite caused a scandal in South Africa and a national uproar in Sweden. Unbeknown to those involved, behind the scenes and in a private capacity the Swedish UN Secretary-General intervened in the case.

After achieving national fame in the 1950s for her novels about life in the harsh environment of northern Sweden, Lidman was at the end of the decade ‘concerned with the questions of treachery and the supposed excellence of the so called Free World’.\(^\text{39}\) To address these concerns, she decided to go to South Africa. After a short period in Zululand, in October 1960 she came to Johannesburg, where she became friends with the future Nobel laureate for literature, Nadine Gordimer, frequented the multi-racial circles around *Drum*.

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38 The South African Immorality Act of 1950 – expanding earlier legislation from 1927 – prohibited sexual relations between whites and non-whites in an attempt to ensure white racial ‘purity’.

39 Address by Sara Lidman, Arbetarnas Bildningsförbund (The Workers’ Educational Association), Stockholm, 1 November 1996.
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magazine and entered into contact with the ANC.\textsuperscript{40} This drew the attention of the security police, who monitored her movements and eventually burst into her Yeoville flat.

The charge sheet against Lidman and Nthite stated that the couple ‘wrongfully and unlawfully [had] or attempt[ed] to have unlawful carnal intercourse’, or, alternatively, that they ‘wrongfully and unlawfully [had] conspire[d] … to commit or attempt to commit an immoral or indecent act’.\textsuperscript{41} As news spread of the arrest and the accusations, the reactions were intense. In Sweden, ‘the tremendous commotion’\textsuperscript{42} contributed to the sharpening of the anti-apartheid opinion, with calls for action against the Pretoria government. Cultural workers were outraged and the typographers’ union in Stockholm, for example, stated that ‘this incident has in a brutal way made it clear to all Swedes that there must be an end to the unparalleled terror and discrimination that the rightful indigenous inhabitants [of South Africa] are subjected to…. We appeal to [the Swedish trade union confederation] and to other Swedish mass organizations to consider actions that will contribute to forcing the South African government to stop the racial persecutions’.\textsuperscript{43}

Ten days after the arrest, Foreign Minister Louw initiated a series of meetings with the Swedish envoy, Eyvind Bratt, and on 24 February the case against Lidman was suddenly withdrawn. With one of the ‘offending’ parties free, the charges against Nthite were also dropped.\textsuperscript{44}

Without the knowledge of Bratt, the accused or other parties directly involved, the discharge was the result of an intervention by the UN Secretary-General, who had taken an initiative behind the scenes and at the highest level. In addition to his position as the head of the United Nations, Hammarskjöld was a

\textsuperscript{40} Cf. the ANC’s Indres Naidoo: ‘In 1960, there was a very attractive Swedish journalist who came to Johannesburg …. Her name was Sara Lidman. We used to meet her quite often’ (Interview with Naidoo, Cape Town, 7 December 1995, quoted in Sellström 1999a:175).

\textsuperscript{41} Quoted (in English) in Holm 1998:232.

\textsuperscript{42} Letter from Per Wästberg to the author, Stockholm, 9 April 1997.


\textsuperscript{44} While Lidman left South Africa the following day, Nthite was re-arrested on 12 March, this time accused of illegal possession of a firearm.
member of the prestigious Swedish Academy, well acquainted with the literary scene in his home country and had met Sara Lidman on several occasions. As soon as the arrest became known, Jytte Bonnier, a leading figure in Sweden’s cultural life and a personal friend of both Hammarskjöld and Lidman, wrote to the Secretary-General, asking for his assistance. His reaction was swift. On 10 February 1961, he sent a cable to Bonnier, telling her: ‘Have sent personal message to Prime Minister, explaining as well as possible situation and pleading for his immediate personal attention. This, of course, in no way can be given publicity as I have been able to send such message only in personal capacity, anything else being beyond my competence’. And on 1 March, after the South African state’s withdrawal of the case, he noted with satisfaction in another cable to Bonnier that ‘I received message from Prime Minister showing his decisive personal intervention for which you carry ultimate merit’.

It is not known which arguments Hammarskjöld used or how Verwoerd acted against his own apartheid laws. For both of them, the interventions were potentially damaging. It is, however, fair to surmise that the personal contact established between the Secretary-General and the Prime Minister only the previous month made the denouement of the Lidman-Nthite affair possible. It

45 The Swedish Academy awards the Nobel Prize for literature. Hammarskjöld took his father’s seat in the academy in 1954, the year after being appointed UN Secretary-General. It is said that he hoped to become the academy’s secretary once his UN tenure was over.

46 Quoted (in English) in Holm 1998:234.

47 Quoted (in English) in Holm 1998:234.

48 It is of interest to note that the South African Afrikaans-speaking newspaper Dagbreek, a staunch supporter of the apartheid policy, without knowledge of Prime Minister Verwoerd’s personal role strongly criticised Pretoria’s handling of the case (Holm 1998:234).

49 Hammarskjöld’s role as a member of the Swedish Academy had in 1958–59 added to the growing political discord between the Secretary-General and the Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev. In 1958, the Swedish Academy awarded the Nobel Prize for literature to Boris Pasternak, the Russian author of Doctor Zhivago. The decision was seen by Moscow as an expression of support for the dissident movement in the Soviet Union, and Pasternak was forced by the authorities to decline the award. The matter was raised by Khrushchev during a visit to the Soviet Union by Hammarskjöld in 1959. According to Sergei Khrushchev, ‘[u]nder the guise of a literary discussion, the two parties engaged in an ideological dispute, and failed to see eye to eye. They parted civilly, but were not happy with each other’s positions’ (quoted in Ask and Jungkvist 2005:69). See also Wallensteen 2005:30–31.
is also likely that the case weighed heavily on Hammarskjöld’s opinion of South Africa’s racial policies.

**Epilogue: Disaster and Nobel Prize**

After his visit in January 1961, Hammarskjöld never returned to South Africa. His death at Ndola in September and the posthumous Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo in December were, however, to be associated with the country and the anti-apartheid struggle.

The circumstances surrounding the death of the UN Secretary-General and fifteen others in an air crash in Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) have never been convincingly established. Three different investigations were carried out to determine why the plane went down and why there was no immediate rescue operation. In the absence of forensic means to establish the facts, the disaster, however, remains an unresolved mystery. While the simplest explanation – a navigational error – appears to be the most reasonable (Wallensteen 2005:37), numerous theories have over the years been presented. One of them suggests that white mercenaries hired by Western intelligence agencies and fighting for Katanga’s secession from the Congo were behind the crash. It gained new currency in August 1998, when Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Chairman of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, presented documents discovered during the course of the commission’s work. According to the documents, the fatal air crash could have been the result of sabotage against Hammarskjöld’s plane, coordinated by US, British and South African secret services (Svenska Dagbladet 1998).

One month after Hammarskjöld’s death, it was announced by the Norwegian Nobel Committee that Chief Albert Luthuli, President-General of the outlawed ANC of South Africa, had been awarded the Peace Prize for 1960.\(^{50}\) It was the first time that the coveted prize was given to an African. At the same time, the

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\(^{50}\) During the selection process in 1960, the Nobel Committee concluded that none of the nominations met the criteria as outlined in the will of Alfred Nobel. In such a case, the prize can be reserved until the following year. In 1961, Luthuli therefore received the Peace Prize for 1960.
prize for 1961 was posthumously awarded to Dag Hammarskjöld. It was the first time that a posthumous award was made. Although the two champions for global peace, freedom and justice, as well as for self-determination, unity and development in Africa, did not personally meet in South Africa earlier in the year, in Norway in December 1961 their visions combined to inspire millions the world over. While the Nobel Committee emphasised that the two laureates ‘fought for the ideals expressed in the declaration of human rights embodied in the Charter of the United Nations’ (Gunnar 2004:15), in his Nobel lecture on 11 December 1961 Chief Luthuli, simply, described Hammarskjöld as a ‘fighter for peace’ (Luthuli 2004:32).

In his acceptance speech the previous day, the African laureate had portrayed Hammarskjöld as ‘the devoted Chief Executive of the world’. Commenting on the role played by the late Secretary-General, Luthuli (1962) stated:

> It is significant that it was in Africa, my home continent, that he gave his life. How many times his decisions helped to avert a world catastrophe will never be known. But there are many of such occasions, I am sure. [T]here can be no doubt that he steered the United Nations through one of the most difficult phases in its history. His absence from our midst today should be an enduring lesson for all peace-lovers, and a challenge to the nations of the world to eliminate those conditions in Africa, nay, anywhere, which brought about the tragic and untimely end to his life.

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51 In Norway and Sweden, subsequently the leading Western countries in support of the ANC, the awards to Luthuli and Hammarskjöld played a prominent part in the development of broadly based anti-apartheid movements.
Sources


Dag Hammarskjöld Welcoming Committee no date a. Greetings Dag Hammarskjöld – Welcome to South Africa. No place of publication. Published by the Congress Alliance (see footnote 16).

Dag Hammarskjöld Welcoming Committee no date b. Report on the visit of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Union of South Africa in January 1961. No place of publication. Published by the Congress Alliance (see footnote 16).


Tor Sellström


The Congo crisis, the United Nations, and Zimbabwean nationalism, 1960–1963

Timothy Scarnecchia*

Abstract

The United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission in the Congo in 1960–63 is a major chapter in African and Cold War history. The political consequences of the peacekeeping mission, particularly the use of UN troops against Moise Tshombe's secessionist Katanga Province, reverberated in neighbouring African States as well. The contours of the UN's role in the Congo crisis are well known, but this article will consider how UN intervention created a framework for the conflict between white minority rule and African nationalists in Southern Rhodesia. This article suggests that the intersection of Cold War politics and Southern African racial politics helped to create a situation in Southern Rhodesia in which white politicians felt threatened by the UN's intervention, while Zimbabwean nationalists viewed cautiously the role of the UN as pan-African nationalism in the Congo became consumed by Cold War imperatives. The Katanga secession also demonstrated to both white politicians and Zimbabwean nationalists how intransigence and a small fighting force could challenge much more powerful nations in Cold War Africa.

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Introduction

The Congo crisis, as it took shape in 1960 and 1961, centred on the inability of the first elected Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, to retain control after the revolt of the army on 11 July 1960, and the mobilisation of large numbers of Belgian troops to defend Belgians in the Congo. The Katanga Province, the mineral-rich southern province dominated by Belgian mining interests, seceded on 12 July 1960 from the Congo, creating a major crisis for Lumumba. The United Nations moved swiftly in response to Lumumba’s immediate request for assistance, deploying on 15 July a large multinational peacekeeping force, the United Nations Operations in the Congo (UNOC), to assist Lumumba’s government contain the crisis and limit the potential for a larger conflict. In his statement to the Security Council on 8 August 1960, Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld clarified the purpose of UNOC to force the ‘complete withdrawal of the Belgian troops’ in order to protect the sovereignty of the Congo. He also argued that the UNOC mission was to guarantee that the democratic process would ‘be determined solely by the people of the Congo’. Hammarskjöld linked UNOC to another goal: ‘… finally, unanimity would be maintained, among Africans and non-Africans alike, here at the United Nations …’ (Cordier and Foote 1975:71). The importance of the Congo mission was therefore not only for the future of the Congo, but given the rapid growth of new African member states in the United Nations in 1960, UNOC was also a test of the impartiality of the institution.

By September 1960, the intrigues in the Congo’s capital of Leopoldville had pushed Lumumba’s army chief of staff, Colonel Joseph Mobutu, who was advised and funded by the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), to carry out a coup that expelled the Soviets and Lumumba supporters from the capital. The Soviets continued to support Lumumba, however, while the Americans and the Belgians worked to ‘remove’ Lumumba permanently from Congolese politics. After Lumumba’s assassination in January of 1961, the United Nations, under intense criticisms from the Soviets for the handling of the Congo crisis, acted in February to strengthen UNOC’s mission by authorising the use of force in order to avoid civil war and to reunite all provinces into the former Congo. The message of Security Council Resolution 161 (1961) was that Katanga would
not be allowed to secede from the Republic and, if necessary, the UN would use force to push the Belgians out of Katanga. The Soviets, in the meantime, had been supporting Lumumba’s group, now led by Antoine Gizenga in Stanleyville in eastern Congo, and the balance of power in the conflict meant that in order to prevent a war between Katanga and the forces in Stanleyville, the UN forces would have to act in Katanga. They did this in August–December 1961, and the use of force brought Katanga’s leader Moise Tshombe to negotiate, although the end of Katanga’s secession would not come until 15 January 1963.

The historical literature on the Congo crisis is quite large and recent works have done an excellent job of reconstructing the diplomatic relations around the crisis (Kent 2010; Namikas 2002), including the role of the Central African Federation (CAF) in supporting Katanga (Hughes 2003; Stapleton 2009). This article addresses the relationship of the Congo crisis to the Rhodesian crisis occurring at the same time but from the perspective of Southern African interests. Before examining the impact of the Congo crisis on Zimbabwean nationalists’ view of the United Nations, it is useful to explore how CAF Prime Minister Sir Roy Welensky’s support for Moise Tshombe’s Katanga created a specifically Southern Rhodesian interpretation of the Congo crisis and the role of the UN there.

**Strange bedfellows: Tshombe and Welensky**

From the point of view of white politicians in Southern Africa, the 1961 UN military operations against the Belgians and white mercenaries (including many Rhodesians and South Africans) defending Katanga in late August and mid-September were seen as a sacrifice of Western economic interests – control of the Katanga’s mining resources – in return for Soviet support of a negotiated end to the civil war. If the UN could force Katanga back into the Central government, it was argued, the Soviets would stop their support of Antoine Gizenga’s secessionist government in Stanleyville and therefore avoid ‘another Korea’ in central Africa. The open support of Katanga by the CAF Prime Minister Welensky and the

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1 In this article the term ‘Zimbabwean nationalists’ represents African politicians seeking to obtain majority rule in Southern Rhodesia, and therefore is distinct from Southern Rhodesian white politicians – although there was a small minority of the latter in support of the former in this period.
Some possible outcome of the UN’s fighting with Katanga was continued intransigence on the part of Tshombe and the creation of a new political federation including Northern and Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, and Katanga. In the Cold War context of 1960–61, this new coalition of settler states and a new illegal but wealthy pro-Western African ‘state’ was not out of the question. In the midst of this showdown, it was the death of UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld on 18 September 1961 that forced Welensky’s CAF and the South Africans to back away from a more hardline position on Katanga (O’Brien 1962:4).

Sir Roy Welensky and other Southern African white politicians who supported Tshombe rationalised this support by arguing they were creating a ‘buffer’ state in Katanga that could protect them from the growing influence of the Soviet Union in Africa. They also believed the British and Americans would support Katanga should the conflict in the Congo come down to a Cold War conflict. In 1960, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) member states supported Belgian military defence of Katanga, and Welensky believed that CAF support was in line with Western interests. In early 1960, the CIA was suggesting the need to purchase an estimated ‘1500 tons of uranium-oxide’ stockpiled in Katanga as a precautionary measure to prevent it falling into Soviet control (Department of State, U.S. 1992:516). This made the support for UN efforts in Katanga a difficult one for the US and the British in particular, and both were unwilling to fully support the UN’s military efforts until they were convinced that the Congolese central government was sufficiently pro-Western. However, as all the pieces began to fall in place for a reunited Congolese government in August 1961, Welensky’s continued support of Tshombe stood in the way and became an embarrassment for Western interests. As Namikas argues, Secretary-General Hammarskjöld gambled that the use of force against Katanga would work to galvanise American support for the UN mission. Hammarskjöld’s personal role in Katanga negotiations with Tshombe would, however, ultimately lead to his death (Namikas 2002:350). After his death, Hammarskjöld’s strategy succeeded with the Americans and the British supplying the necessary military support and transport for the UNOC operations in Katanga to go ahead.
An interesting source of information about Welensky’s and South Africa’s role in Katanga is found in the South African archives in a series of reports from the South African High Commissioner in Salisbury to the Minister of External Affairs in Pretoria. The South African High Commissioner, H.K.T. Taswell, became a strong advocate for South African assistance to Katanga – including clandestine military aid through the Federation – and of Welensky’s reasoning that such support would ultimately help South Africa and Southern Rhodesia overcome their international isolation brought on by internal political violence in 1960. These official sources offer a unique view of the way the defence of Katanga helped shape white Southern African views of their future role in what they viewed as a common defence against communist and ‘Afro-Asiatic’ control of Africa through the United Nations.

Before the Katanga secession, South African High Commissioner Taswell had sent glowing reports to the Minister of External Affairs about Welensky’s tough language for the British. On 18 March 1960, Taswell reported the ‘growing discontent’ among white politicians ‘with United Kingdom policy in Africa and deep concern at the apparent readiness of the British Government to sacrifice the White people in Southern Africa to black extremism’ (Taswell 1960:1). Taswell reported how Welensky continued to attack the Colonial Office, and how Welensky ‘strongly resented being referred to as a settler’ and claimed that he was a “White African”. Taswell then suggests that Welensky’s message forced British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to soften the language used to describe whites in the CAF. Macmillan is reported to have said in a televised interview, ‘that the problems in the Federation are totally different and that “Hundreds of thousands of our own people live there. They have their rights too. They brought wealth and civilization to darkest Africa. Can’t we approach the whole matter with a little humility, and preferably some knowledge of the facts?”’ Taswell suggested, ‘Perhaps the winds of change in Africa are beginning to blow in the direction of London, too’ (Taswell 1960:2). According to historian Tom Noer, the reports of violence against whites in the Congo did in fact help the political cause of those who claimed independence in sub-Saharan Africa had been ‘premature’, ‘… and gave new credence to the claims of Lisbon, Salisbury, and Pretoria that they were the only safeguards against violence, tribal warfare, and radicalism’ (Noer 1985:57; cf. Dunn 2003).
In early 1961, following Lumumba’s assassination at the hands of Belgian and Katanga forces and with the British signalling that the CAF could be scrapped in order to make way for African rule in Zambia and Malawi, Taswell remained a strong believer in Welensky and made the case that Sir Roy was defending whites in Southern Africa against the growing ‘selling out’ of white interests by the British, the Americans, and the United Nations. Taswell (1961b:1) wrote disparagingly of the British:

The British Government’s policy is strongly in favour of giving much more say to the black man. But whereas United Federal Party policy is essentially a long term go-slow one with no intention of handing over to extremists, the United Kingdom favours a rapid hand-over-now approach. One cannot but detect in United Kingdom policy a feeling of apathy towards the white man in Africa and a strong desire to rid Britain of its overseas colonial responsibilities as quickly as possible.

Events in the Congo continued to fulfil fears among politicians in Southern Africa that they were being abandoned and betrayed for Cold War interests. Following Lumumba’s assassination in January 1961, the 21 February UN Security Council Resolution 161, which authorised the use of force in Katanga as a pre-emptive measure to prevent a civil war in the Congo, increased the sense that the Americans, British, and the UN were now willing to sacrifice the interests of whites in Southern Africa. This resolution confirmed the feeling among Rhodesian politicians that they were under siege from the international community – particularly Western forces that had previously been seen as their natural allies.

Taswell’s letters also confirm that the CAF was supplying weapons and armoured steel to Tshombe’s forces. This was assumed by the British and the Americans, but apparently only confirmed by the British and communicated to the Americans by December 1961 (Hughes 2003:607; Kent 2010:79). Taswell reports that he had learned that ‘the Federal Government takes the view that Tshombe is fighting their battle for them and they have asked him to state what he wants from them in the way of military and other equipment’. Taswell requested that South Africa take seriously Tshombe’s requests, as such supplies could be shipped as mining
equipment and get past the UN troops with the CAF’s help. Taswell (1961a:3) made an appeal for South African aid using the following Cold War and race war logic:

If Tshombe fails, the drive to the south will be on. The Rhodesias, already in a shaky position, may collapse and we will be the main target. Whether or not we have been strictly correct in our supply of material to Tshombe will be of little consequence.

Taswell once again praised Welensky’s efforts to help Tshombe defy the UN, the Americans, and the Afro-Asian nations.

Welensky apparently briefed Taswell on 12 October 1961 about his efforts to support Tshombe during the UN military operations. Welensky had summoned Tshombe to Salisbury to give him advice on how best to respond diplomatically after the UN’s use of force. Taswell describes Welensky’s account of his meeting with Tshombe: ‘While he does not always think too much of the black man as a statesman, Sir Roy said, he was greatly impressed with Tshombe’s ability and sincerity’. Welensky apparently told Tshombe that he couldn’t take on the whole Afro-Asian block on his own, particularly with India’s Nehru so committed to defeating Katanga. Welensky told Tshombe, ‘[t]he Katanga was the first setback the Afro-Asian bloc had suffered in Africa and it was therefore essential that he, Tshombe, should do all he could to capitalise on it. He must play his cards extremely well’ (Taswell 1961c:2). Most of Welensky’s advice was in fact followed by Tshombe – to move extremely slowly in negotiations with Congolese Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula in order to buy time to regroup militarily and then to bring Katanga back into the Republic only on terms that would allow Tshombe to survive politically.

Welensky also told Taswell that he was responsible for ending the UN’s military campaign. Sir Roy claims to have ‘delivered an ultimatum’ that ‘unless the United Kingdom took steps at once to check the United Nations he was ordering the RRAF [Royal Rhodesian Air Force] into action’. Claiming that his ultimatum worked, Welensky told Taswell, ‘While Tshombe and I could not have taken on the world we could have cleared up the U.N. bunch in no time. And that, “he smiled” would really have started something’ (Taswell1961c:2). Welensky’s
threats to use additional force were real. Dayal indicates that Lord Landsdowner, the British Under-Secretary of State, remarked in the British Parliament after returning from the Congo that he (Welensky) had threatened UN Secretary-General Hammarskjöld, insisting that he stop the fighting immediately, and that ‘[t]here was also an implication that Tshombe would be supported militarily from Northern Rhodesia and the United Nations would get bogged down in a war of attrition which would effectively destroy the Organization’ (Dayal 1976:273).

While such tough talk made Welensky popular with the South Africans, it hardly endeared him with the British and Americans. The British military went as far as planning a possible military action against the Rhodesian Royal Air Force because of Welensky’s intransigence over Katanga and the Federation (Murphy 2006).

Reacting to UNOC’s Operation Mothar, Federation politicians spoke out in the Federal Parliament. Included in the more sensational responses was the then future Rhodesian Front Prime Minister, Winston Field, who ‘… accused the British Government for a vacillating policy “at the behest of their American masters.” He urged that a firm stand should be taken in support of Mr Tshombe whom he described as “a friend”’ (Central African Daily News 1961c). John Gaunt, who then represented Lusaka in the Federal Parliament but who would later plot against Winston Field to bring Ian Smith to power in the Rhodesian Front, argued for a state of emergency to be declared in the Federation. Gaunt said in Parliament, ““Legalities can be fixed later…. We have no time; we must act now,” he urged. Describing events in Katanga as “organised pillage”, he said the United Nations – an organization set up for peace – had now become a band of mercenaries. “We must resist them”’ (Central African Daily News 1961c).

**The impact of the UN and the Congo crisis on Zimbabwean African nationalism**

As events in 1961 unfolded, including the assassination of Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba by the Belgian and Katanga forces in February 1961, it became increasingly clear that the Congo presented opportunities for Zimbabwean nationalists to position themselves for financial and military support from Cold War interests. Both the Soviets and the Americans attempted
to influence the Zimbabwean nationalist movement, and in the early 1960s this primarily meant providing financial assistance to the nationalists and trade unions. The Congo crisis provided some leverage for Zimbabwean nationalists to make their case for Cold War support. Vladimir Shubin, in his history of the Soviets in Southern Africa, describes how the Zimbabwean National Democratic Party (NDP) received financial assistance in 1960 from the Soviets, not only because they were seen as “…. the most progressive and mass party”; but also because George Silundika, the NDP’s representative, had convinced the Soviets that the NDP “…. is conducting certain work in the province of Katanga against the government of Tshombe in defense of the lawful Congolese government of P. Lumumba” (Shubin 2008:152). American sources were also providing funds to anti-communist trade unionists, and then in 1961 directly to the nationalists, in hopes of keeping the nationalists from Soviet influence.

On 11 October 1960, Zimbabwean leader Joshua Nkomo made an appeal at the UN for Security Council intervention three months after the Congo crisis had begun and two months after rioting and protests in Southern Rhodesia in 1960. These riots in Salisbury, Bulawayo, and Gwelo were the first time since the late 19th century that Rhodesian police had opened fire on Africans, and Nkomo’s speech attempted to indicate the growing sense that the State was now using deadly force as had happened in South Africa, South West Africa, and the Portuguese colonies in 1960. Nkomo’s goal was to push the United Nations to force the British to intervene:

… There will be no peace in Southern Rhodesia unless the British Government intervenes at this stage and accedes to African demands of a constitutional conference failing which the Africans shall press forth for an immediate suspension of the constitution of the country, so as to give time for the drafting of a constitution that will give power to the people and not to a minority section (Nkomo 1960).²

² Andrew DeRoche has written extensively on the US relations with Central Africa during the Cold War. DeRoche highlighted the warning of the US Consul-General in Salisbury, which echoes Nkomo’s concerns. Following the July 1960 riots in Bulawayo and Salisbury and the Sharpeville massacre in April 1960 in South Africa, ‘Palmer believed that only fundamental political reform instigated by Great Britain combined with significant financial aid from the United States could guarantee stability in the region. Otherwise, the Federation could conceivably descend into chaos resembling that in the Congo’ (DeRoche 2001:36).
If the UN did not intervene, he predicted the beginning of a race war and claimed that the UN needed to act quickly, or else ‘... the U.N. will have failed millions of dependent people who are looking up to it for their hope for the security and peace for which they gave their lives in the last two wars’. He ended his statement by pointing out, ‘... white settlers in Central Africa and in Southern Rhodesia in particular are arming themselves against the African people, and they have gone as far as recruiting white South Africans to assist them in their pending war against Africans’. When placed in the context of the Congo crisis and the UN’s very ambitious commitment to bringing it to an end, Nkomo’s strategy was part of a diplomatic effort to compare the ‘chaos’ in Southern Rhodesia as similar to the rationale used to secure UN intervention in the Congo.

Joshua Nkomo’s 1960 attempt to direct the UN Security Council’s attention to the State-sponsored violence in Southern Rhodesia failed to elicit Security Council action. All subsequent appeals would have the same result. While numerous General Assembly resolutions were passed to try and push the British to take responsibility for the situation in Rhodesia, these were symbolic with little real force behind them. The relative weight of the Southern Rhodesian crisis, in Cold War terms, was far less than that of the Congo crisis. It can be argued, however, that the Congo crisis and the divisiveness of Tshombe’s Katanga, would offer an important framework upon which the Zimbabwean nationalists constructed their strategies in these years.

The strongest criticisms of the UN and the US came after 13 February 1961 as the official news of Patrice Lumumba’s assassination reached Salisbury. The American Consul-General, John K. Emmerson, who had served in Japan during World War II and been an American emissary to the Chinese Communist Party in 1946, expressed concern over the ‘venom being directed against the US’ from even Herbert Chitepo, who he described as a ‘pro US-Southern Rhodesian lawyer’. Chitepo and others were blaming the US ‘for failure [to] support Lumumba and for UN failure in the Congo’. The most vocal criticism of the UN and US came from George Silundika, the NDP’s Cairo representative, who Emmerson describes as having ‘saturated’ himself with the Communist line. In Emmerson’s opinion, the ‘African nationalist movement here could now take on new red-hued complexion’ (Emmerson 1961a). Josiah Chinamano, an important nationalist
leader who was employed at the time by the US Consul-General, reported an interview with Silundika on 17 February, in which Silundika ‘… claimed that the Americans are “very cunning”; in other parts of Africa, particularly in the Congo, they have “bought” a number of African leaders and the NDP would have to be very careful to see that none of its officials were so bought.’ Chinamano concluded that Silundika had been ‘deeply contaminated during his stay in Cairo and his visit behind the Iron Curtain.’ Chinamano noted, on what was to be his last day working for the Americans, that Silundika’s anti-American argument marked ‘… the stage where we can identify for the first time the forerunner of the Soviet effort to penetrate the nationalist movement in the Colony. Things will never be the same’ (Emmerson 1961b). The Lumumba assassination helped to galvanise a nationalist identity in Central Africa based on an anti-imperialist message. While many of the Zimbabwean nationalists continued to work closely with the Americans, and in fact would receive financial support from the Americans to build up their opposition to minority rule, they could not help but take advantage of the organising opportunity offered by Lumumba’s assassination. Here was a Cold War intervention that showed the price nationalists would pay should they go against Western interests. Silundika and Enos Nkala organised seven NDP meetings in all the major urban areas in Southern Rhodesia to attack the US for Lumumba’s death. Nkala even went as far as to reportedly say at the rallies that when the NDP gains power, the Consul-General and his staff would be ‘sent packing’ (Mulcahy 1961). The stage was therefore set to attack Zimbabwean nationalists with open ties to American funding.

Six months later, Zimbabwean nationalists’ reactions to the UN’s active military role in Katanga beginning in August 1961 were more cautious than their response had been to Lumumba’s assassination. Stanlake Samkange noted that if it were true that Welensky and the Federal government were providing assistance to Katanga, such actions would legitimise the intervention of the Congo government in affairs of the Federation, leading to a potential border war (Samkange 1961). George Silundika reportedly sent a cable to the UNIP leadership the day after Operation Mothar began, ‘urging them to see that the N. Rhodesia-Katanga border is searched for any fugitives, including Mr Tshombe and Mr Munongo …’ and to ‘… see that that no Katanga political refugee is allowed into Northern
Rhodesia’ (Central African Daily News 1961c). The African press was also cautious in their response to UNOC military actions in Katanga since they could not condone intervention to put down a secession, as it was well known that Dr Hastings Banda, the nationalist leader in Nyasaland, was threatening to secede from the CAF.

There were stronger public criticisms following the death of UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld on 18 September 1961 as part of his personal diplomacy to end the Katanga secession. A joint statement issued by Joshua Nkomo and Kenneth Kaunda, the ‘Zambezi Declaration’ of 22 September 1961, called for majority rule in both Northern and Southern Rhodesia. Coming four days following Hammarskjöld’s death, the Zambezi Declaration commented on the incident, as the Central African Daily News (1961d:1) reports:

The joint statement blames the death of Mr Dag Hammarsjoeld [sic] on international intrigue and conspiracy which also led to the death of Mr Patrice Lumumba. It views with grave concern the interference in the internal affairs of the Congo by the British Government, the imposed Federal Government, and the Verwoerd Government. ‘In S. Rhodesia African people have been killed for calling for majority rule; in N. Rhodesia some are dying now; and thousands of our followers languish in detention camps and prisons. Yet’, it charges, ‘these perpetrators of political crime against humanity are arming Tshombe to the tooth to fight his way out of the Congo Republic – not because they like Tshombe, but because they want to extend the hold of colonialism and imperialism’.

By October 1961, the UN’s campaign against foreign mercenaries in Katanga drew stark lines among regional leaders. On the one hand, Welensky continued to publicly deny any involvement. The American Consulate-General’s office telegraphed to Washington Welensky’s 10 October press conference where Welensky claimed the ‘GNR [Government of Northern Rhodesia] has always maintained strictest neutrality RE use [of] force in Congo and taken “considerable pains” [to] prevent arms and military equipment [from] crossing border. GNR also has refused [to] let such traffic pass through its territory’ (Emmerson
On the other hand, the hatred of Tshombe helped to forge closer ties between Nkomo, Kaunda, and Dr Hastings Banda in Nyasaland. For Central African nationalists, therefore, the key events and personalities of the Congo began to take a life of their own as they hoped to bring international attention to the real crisis in the Rhodesias, not just in the Congo. The combination of international lobbying and internal factionalism led Zimbabwean nationalists to adopt the language, and even the logic, of the Congo crisis for their own struggle. The primary form of this was the use of Tshombe as the archetype of the ‘sellout’ politician, while the martyred Lumumba became the archetype of the pure pan-Africanist. The increasingly oppressive Rhodesian state during the early 1960s, particularly given the voting into power by a minority electorate of the extremist Rhodesian Front in 1962, meant that hopes of negotiated majority rule decreased over time. Faced with white political intransigence and repression, the nationalist movement turned to creating popular opposition to the Rhodesian state through general strikes and acts of violence and sabotage. In 1961, when Joshua Nkomo was told by the British that Southern Rhodesia’s industry and economy were too important to turn over to Africans, Nkomo vowed to ‘destroy’ Southern Rhodesia’s industry and make the country ungovernable. The Rhodesian state responded with more arrests and detentions and the banning of the NDP.

By May of 1962, Nkomo and others in the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) – which had been formed in December 1961 to replace the banned NDP – were calling for a general strike to create ‘chaos’ in Southern Rhodesia. Part of the motivation for this general strike was to help put Southern Rhodesia on the agenda of the UN General Assembly’s special session in June (Geren 1962). The strike was largely a failure, resulting in the arrests of more nationalists and for

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3 Welensky’s capacity to maintain a lie continued with his 25 October statement where he described the allegations from the UN that he was supplying Tshombe’s troops with materials as ‘irresponsible hysteria’. Welensky stated, “‘Let me say again in simplest terms that the Federal government has not supplied military equipment or mercenaries to the Katanga forces’”. He concluded, “‘I recognize, however, that denials by me will have little effect on such people and that baseless and quite unsubstantiated rumours about Federal actions will continue to be quoted as the truth by those who subscribe only too obviously to the Nazi doctrine that the truth does not matter in world affairs; what counts is only what lies you can get away with’” (Emmerson 1961d).
the first time, the firing of thousands of African workers who participated in the strike. The use of general strikes to gain the attention of the United Nations in 1962 was one part of a larger divide in the nationalist movement, one that had to do with the continued independence of the African trade union movement from ZAPU control.

The main target of the NDP and then ZAPU was the leader of the Southern Rhodesian Trade Union Congress (SRTUC), Rueben Jamela. Jamela had previously risen to the leadership role of the SRTUC after Joshua Nkomo and others had taken leadership roles in the nationalist movement. Jamela had helped form the nationalist movement and saw himself as a nationalist, but he defended the independence of the SRTUC from the nationalists because he believed if they were to fall under one leadership, the Rhodesian state would ban the SRTUC. With 30,000 members, the SRTUC would be unable to continue working for African workers and the nationalist movement. Throughout 1961 and 1962, George Silundika and Robert Mugabe were the most vocal critics of Jamela’s American and European funding. Making matters worse, Jamela jealously guarded his financial ties to American and European trade union funding (Scarnecchia 2008:111–116).

As Jamela refused to relinquish control of the SRTUC to ZAPU, a rival African trade union was formed by ZAPU to pull members and international funding away from Jamela. This new African Trade Union Congress (ATUC) attacked Jamela in the main rhetorical form available, as a sellout. The ATUC’s ‘Personal Letter to Jamela’, published in the Workers Voice of March 1962, indicates how much of the then recent events in the Congo shaped the political language within the Zimbabwean nationalist movement. The letter first compared Jamela to the failed Northern Rhodesian nationalist Harry Nkumbula who had accepted funding and vehicles from Tshombe (see Macola 2010:86). The letter warned Jamela, ‘Your sell-outism is known by all the workers it does not matter how many cars you may buy’. The letter then commented on a speech Jamela had made to workers and responded to the possibility that Jamela would start a competing African political party.
You said to them according to what you understand that political freedom in Zimbabwe cannot be won by politicians but by trade unionists when you gave an example of the Congo where Lumumba the son of African [sic], you said failed and that because Adoula who is former trade unionist has got the reigns of Government the Congo not going to fail, in any way? Do you think you the Adoula? We can assure you that you will never put your foot in parliament on the ticket of the workers the African but on the ticket of your own political bosses...Why don’t you come to your senses and realise things. We won’t support a sell out of your type (Workers Voice 1962:7).

The ATUC was less successful in organising the May 1962 General strike, and this helped Jamela regroup. Soon after, however, as the war of words and the sellout accusations turned into deadly battles between his supporters and ZAPU, Jamela fell out of favour with his American and European supporters. Geren notes that by early 1963 Jamela’s ‘standing among Africans’ was regarded ‘as having fallen to a level only slightly higher than that of Tshombe’ (Geren 1963a). The ZAPU leadership succeeded in weakening Jamela’s power over both a large rank and file membership and international funding. In 1963, however, this process would be repeated within ZAPU itself as a leadership split led to the breakaway formation of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) by August 1963.

The ZANU-ZAPU split also demonstrated the use of Congo-related rhetoric as both parties claimed to be the true pan-Africanist organisation in the tradition of Lumumba, while portraying the other party as Tshombe’s – those who would sell out Zimbabwe to the highest bidder. Again, both ZAPU and ZANU were receiving financial support from numerous sources, ZAPU from the Soviets and the Americans, and ZANU from the Chinese and the Americans. Joshua Nkomo and those who remained with ZAPU immediately charged that ZANU was an American-inspired splinter group created with assistance of the US Ambassador in Tanzania, William Leonhart. ZAPU leaders such as Nkomo, Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, Herbert Chitepo and others had been to Washington DC and New York City to raise funds for ZAPU from American mining companies while also petitioning at the United Nations. After August 1963, Reverend Sithole,
Chitepo, and Robert Mugabe were leading ZANU and Nkomo carried on as leader of ZAPU, and both parties continued to request and receive American funding, mostly in the form of direct contributions from mining companies. Nkomo expressed his concerns that Sithole and ZANU would use American funding to ‘sellout’ the country’s resources, and invoked afresh the memory of Lumumba’s death in a speech he gave at Fort Victoria a month after the ZAPU-ZANU split. A newspaper account records that

Nkomo said the United States will ‘help us get the whites out’ but with the aim afterwards of exploiting the country’s mineral resources. Nkomo said that while he was in New York a few months ago he had visited the offices of an American mining company engaged in operations in Rhodesia. Nkomo said, ‘The minerals are here, but so is the cheap labor…PATRICE LUMUMBA died because he refused to sell the Congo to America…’ Nkomo added, ‘It does not matter about Sithole or Nkomo; but who is going to get our country back and not sell it to someone else.’ He asked the crowd if they wanted money from Britain, America or Russia, to which the crowd roared: ‘No’ (Geren1963c).

The American Consul-General, Paul Geren, asked ZAPU’s publicity secretary, Willie Musururwa, whether or not this was what Nkomo had said. Musururwa claimed it had been taken out of context but, added that ‘Fort Victoria has been the scene of the Sithole group’s [ZANU’s] greatest success to date, and it thus was not surprising that Nkomo would pull out the stops on the United States, to whom he has branded Sithole a “sellout”’. The Americans tried their best to give support to both ZAPU and ZANU after the split, but it proved increasingly difficult to justify in light of the anti-American rhetoric both sides used to gain support – given the Tshombe-Lumumba rhetoric already in place before the split.

In September 1963, American Consul-General Paul Geren asked ZANU leader Ndabaningi Sithole to comment on an anti-American statement made in China

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4 Ellipses in original.
by ZANU’s representative Tranos Makombe. Sithole responded by saying it was difficult for him and others in ZANU, who the US viewed as ‘safe’ given their pro-American views, to receive as much funding from the Americans compared to those who were more likely to be supported by the Soviets (in this context, ZAPU). Sithole told Geren that ‘Officers in the Department of State talk big and with encouragement but when it comes to acting to help a cause like Sithole’s they cannot deliver’. Sithole also criticised the US for choosing to abstain at the UN on votes that were designed to force the British to take more responsibility for bringing majority rule to Rhodesia. Sithole remarked,

Africans observe that the Soviet Union supported Southern Rhodesia’s case at the Security Council and in the General Assembly while the United States merely abstains. The African public concludes from this that the United States does not in fact support the Southern Rhodesian nationalists while the Soviets and the communists do support them (Geren 1963d).

An American diplomat at the meeting told Sithole ‘… that threats of communist blackmail are not a successful method for winning American friends nor assistance from the United States government’. Geren then explained that the US abstentions at the Security Council did not mean the US was ‘against Southern Rhodesian nationalists rather it meant that we saw no good purpose to be served by the resolution. … our action must be of a kind calculated to encourage the most helpful response from the UK’ (Geren 1963d).

American Consul-General Geren was closer to Robert Mugabe than to Sithole. Geren had travelled to Dar es Salaam to meet with Mugabe a few days after Sithole and Mugabe formerly launched ZANU. Geren noted that Mugabe’s views of the usefulness of the United Nations had changed after the split, given that Nkomo

5 Makombe reportedly had said on Chinese radio: ‘“To all oppressed people, the Chinese revolution offers the best example of how to struggle against imperialism and colonialism and for national liberation…An example of this is the recent statement by Chairman Mao Tse-tung condemning racial discrimination against Negroes in America. The Chinese people are also firmly opposed to imperialism and modern revisionism”’ (Geren 1963d). Ellipse in original.
Timothy Scarnecchia

and George Silundika had made very good use of the UN for ZAPU’s recognition, and ZANU had yet to be recognised there. Geren observed:

Mugabe considers there is little point in additional UN resolutions on Southern Rhodesia. So far as the Security Council is concerned, Mugabe said: ‘Southern Rhodesia is not a threat to world peace. In fact there is no threat to the internal security of Southern Rhodesia’ (Geren1963b).

Mugabe’s attitude toward the UN apparently changed a few months later after having had the opportunity to go to New York City. Returning to Dar es Salaam in November 1963, Mugabe told US Ambassador William Leonhart that ZANU needed assistance in financing a permanent representative in New York, which Mugabe called the “‘single most important location in the world’”. It was Tanzanian politician Oscar Kambona who organised and accompanied Mugabe on his first trip to the UN in order to counter ZAPU’s representative, George Silundika (Leonhart 1963).

Even though Mugabe was excited about having a ZANU representative at the UN, he remained cautious about the potential influence the UN could have on Southern Rhodesia. Mugabe told Leonhart that little was likely to come from the UN or the Secretary-General’s ‘good offices’. Mugabe thought that both the British Government and the Rhodesian Front Government were ‘too mistrustful of UN initiatives in Africa and would not wish [to] see [the] UN receive any credit for S[R]o[u]thern[R]hodesia progress’ (Leonhart 1963). Despite the efforts of Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah to force a Security Council Resolution requiring the British to block the turning over of the CAF’s military to Southern Rhodesia in 1963, the UN failed to push Britain to take more immediate action on the Rhodesian crisis (Hubbard 2011:348). If anything, the series of General Assembly resolutions passed to pressure Britain to take a stronger stance on Rhodesia majority rule helped to galvanise white minority rule and justify stronger measures against the nationalists. As Frank Clements observed, resolutions such as Resolution 1760 (XVII) (31 October 1962) calling for the British to suspend the Southern Rhodesian constitution and immediately grant majority rule, helped to build up resistance to outside pressures within white politics. ‘Britain would find that
they [Rhodesians] could be just as threatening and just as defiant as any black nationalists’ (Clements 1969:187). In this sense, the Katanga experience had shown how a small minority with control over the police and military could survive the onslaught of UN opinion. This lesson was not lost on either side of the Rhodesian conflict.

**Conclusion**

The Congo crisis helped to shape the rhetoric and intransigence of African nationalism in Southern Rhodesia. It also helped shape the relationships of African nationalists toward Cold War and mining interests in the region. The historical contingency of having such a major Cold War conflict occurring at the same time as the Zimbabwean nationalists struggled with Rhodesian state repression meant that Zimbabwean nationalists could turn to American, Soviet, and Chinese financial assistance. Not one of these powers, however, viewed Southern Rhodesia as strategically important relative to the ongoing Congo conflict. The role of Federation Prime Minister Sir Roy Welensky in publicly supporting Moise Tshombe in the Katanga hurt the reputation of the Federation but this was countered by the perception in the United States and elsewhere that the violence in the Congo originated in African ‘chaos’ and not from the myriad external interests competing over the Congo’s strategic resources. Equally important, the continued Anglo-American alliance guaranteed that the United States was not going to vote against the UK at the UN over Rhodesia (Hubbard 2011).

The largest impact of the Congo conflict, particularly the Western power’s role in the assassination of Patrice Lumumba and support for Mobutu and Tshombe, was on internal Zimbabwean nationalist competition. The deployment of ‘sellout’ politics, which at one level paralleled white political views of Western interests in the region, worked to give a rhetorical edge to those who could make greater claims to an authentic pan-African position. The debate over pan-African authenticity made more sense when fashioned as a choice between the ‘Tshombes’ and the ‘Lumumbas’ in the struggle. In shaping this debate, the contradictions of nationalists and trade unionists seeking funding from all sides of the Cold War were more or less resolved through a violent code of conformity. What couldn’t
be debated at the level of ideology or strategy was decided through factional violence. There is some indication that in the early years, at least, Nkomo and others hoped to mobilise strikes and riots to gain the attention of the United Nations in hopes that the Security Council would intervene. When the prospects for intervention seemed less likely, the United Nations became viewed more as an important site of legitimation for different nationalists rather than as an institution that was likely to intervene on the behalf of the nationalists.

What then was the legacy of the UN’s intervention in the Congo in 1960–61 for Southern Rhodesia and the Zimbabwean nationalists? Most importantly, Sir Roy Welensky’s over-confident view that the CAF could, with South Africa’s assistance, defend Katanga against the Congolese government and the United Nations signalled the end of confidence in CAF politicians to dictate regional politics. There were too many contradictions in the overlapping of racial and Cold War politics. However, the common belief in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia that the UN’s intervention was part of an American attack on whites in Southern Africa persisted. Therefore it can be argued that the Congo crisis helped to push Southern Rhodesia and South Africa closer together, as expressed in Taswell’s often hyperbolic praise of Welensky’s Katanga strategy.

While the Congo crisis helped to further divide racial politics in Southern Rhodesia, contemporary readings of Dag Hammarskjöld’s death were not necessarily divided along racial lines. African leaders and newspaper editors viewed his death as a tragic loss and blamed Welensky for creating the political situation leading to his death. But a popular feeling persisted, and was encouraged by the messages from nationalist leaders, that the Secretary-General and the UN were doing the bidding of the Americans and Western nations, which continued to insinuate blame on the UN for Patrice Lumumba’s death. As an example, on 7 October 1961 – the day before a major riot in Salisbury – the African press reported on a NDP rally in Bulawayo where ‘One of the speakers, Mr K. Ncube was booed when he called for a minute silence for the late Secretary-General of the United Nations’ (Central African Daily News 1961e). The rhetorical logic of Zimbabwean nationalism, to the extent that it was increasingly defined in relation to imperialism, did
not allow Hammarskjöld’s contribution to be understood outside of the racial imperialism trope that dominated the conflict in Southern Rhodesia.

The NDP’s publication Radar had promoted this ‘common sense’ view in December of 1960, a month before Lumumba’s assassination:

When Africans invited the United Nations to come to the rescue of a Belgian-betrayed Congo, they never intended to introduce cold war politics into Africa. Africans have learnt now the folly of entrusting the freedom of a country to an organisation that is controlled by one big imperialistic country. … Conflicting interests plus the unwillingness of the Western Block to follow out policies that will free the Congo have been responsible for the deadlock at the United Nations. In Africa all trouble comes from conspired and planned subversion of African States by one or other of the Western Alliance (Radar 1960:8).

While nationalist leaders expressed their condolences for Hammarskjöld and blamed his death on Welensky and others who supported Tshombe with weapons and mercenaries, it was not clear at the time of Hammarskjöld’s death that Tshombe and Katanga had in fact been completely defeated. If Tshombe, with Welensky’s assistance, could renegotiate his role in the central government, the Katanga lobby would have succeeded in their goal of keeping the mining interests of Katanga, Northern Rhodesia, and Southern Rhodesia under their continued control. The lesson from the Katanga conflict for Zimbabwean nationalists was to keep future Tshombes from coming to power. It was better to deal with them beforehand. This would be the strategy Mugabe and ZANU would use moving forward, and after 10 years in prison and detention, this helps to explain Robert Mugabe’s and ZANU’s advantage over other Zimbabwean nationalists starting in the mid-1970s. This Cold War lesson seriously limited the room for political moderation in nationalist circles, leaving a destructive legacy in post-independence Zimbabwe. The other lesson learnt from the Congo crisis, and Zimbabwean nationalists’ unsuccessful appeals to the UN Security Council for intervention, was that a fighting force –
even a small one with 300 odd white mercenaries and one fighter plane as in the case of Katanga – was an absolute necessity in order to be taken seriously by Cold War interests and, not insignificantly, by the United Nations.

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Dealing with injustice:
Dag Hammarskjöld and the
international community today

The continuing significance of the life of Dag Hammarskjöld
for peace and development in our world*

Henning Melber**

Abstract

What can be done when governments and leaders in states do not abide to
internationally codified norms and values? The Westphalian order allows
regimes to claim their domestic sovereignty over and above minimum standards
of universally established normative frameworks, not least with regard to human
rights. Is such a protective shield more legitimate than externally initiated
interventions when basic norms are violated? Or is it not a matter of conscience
and loyalty to fundamental human values if not a form of solidarity to take a
stance against such injustices in the absence of any legitimacy of such forms of
rule among the own people in these countries? The role of the United Nations,
advocating a Responsibility to Protect and representing the most advanced form
of institutionalised global governance, is hereby critical. This article discusses the
options at hand when confronted with crimes against humanity. It pays special

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attention to the understanding represented by Dag Hammarskjöld as second Secretary-General, his view of the international civil servant and the obligations of the United Nations to advance rights for people, at times against their rulers.

**Introduction**

Reflecting on the significance of the life of Dag Hammarskjöld for peace and development as a legacy for our world today is a worthwhile exercise, as it is anything but backward oriented, nor – as it seems – considered as politically irrelevant.¹ Like many others, Hammarskjöld stood for values and norms, which are as relevant now as they used to be then. In an address to the American Jewish Committee in New York on 10 April 1957 the second Secretary-General of the United Nations, defined a still relevant interconnection between peace and development:

> We know that the question of peace and the question of human rights are closely related. Without recognition of human rights we shall never have peace, and it is only within the framework of peace that human rights can be fully developed (Falkman 2005:154).

As then, we are today in search of the best ways of reducing violence and protecting human rights as essential prerequisites for any meaningful and sustainable development. Unfortunately, these are not more peaceful times than those of half a century ago. But while justice remains a remote goal locally, nationally and globally, jurisdiction and the instruments of international law have been strengthened. The question remains how we deal with injustice and how to act in a globally responsible way through the international community today. This also touches on the notion of solidarity (cf. Kößler and Melber 2007).

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¹ I already had the privilege to share similar thoughts on Hammarskjöld and the challenges in our world of today with participants in the third Conference in this series (Melber 2007), though my presence at the event was then prevented by the decision of the Zimbabwean authorities, denying me entry to the country. That was one of the many frustrating but at the same time encouraging examples that even highly armoured and repressive totalitarian regimes continue to acknowledge that the pen might be mightier than the sword.
Global responsibility and solidarity

Heinous crimes against the people – committed by warlords, militias and terrorist organisations, and also by the institutions of states and governments – continue to challenge the moral and ethical consciousness of those who base their firm beliefs on fundamental human values, as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Genocide Convention, adopted at the same time, is despite all its limitations increasingly a normative framework – if only instrumental in its use – in the prosecution of the perpetrators of mass violence and crimes against humanity.²

The International Criminal Court (ICC) and the UN War Crimes Tribunal represent new means of dealing with culprits. Gone are the days when perpetrators merely had to be in a high enough political position to automatically get away, literally, with murder.³ These efforts are not easy, and responses are divided. The controversies surrounding the indictment of the Sudanese president are the tip of the iceberg. Taking legal action in this way puts to the test the commitment of those members of the international community who sign up to normative multilateral agreements without necessarily paying them the respect that this adoption by ratification implies. But they also touch on the unresolved issue of how best one can pursue decision-making processes and implement results without compromising the legitimate desire for a fair representation of all members of the community of states. The power of definition, with its consequences as to who is prosecuted for what and who is not held accountable for any crimes against humanity, remains a difficult and contested issue.

² See, for a variety of historical and contemporary reflections on genocide as a contested framework, Development Dialogue no. 50 (Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation 2008). Two chapters in this volume focus especially on the case of Zimbabwe at different stages of its post-colonial development (cf. Ndlovu 2008 and Phimister 2008). Like all recent publications of the Foundation this volume is also accessible on our website: <www.dhf.uu.se>.

³ See a variety of reflections on and contributions to these new trends of implementing normative global frameworks and the specific challenges these meet in Development Dialogue, no. 53 (Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation 2009) and no. 55 (Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation 2011). Parts of this paper are based on my various introductory contributions to the volume no. 53.
But at the end of the day the case for R2P [Responsibility to Protect] rests simply on our common humanity: the impossibility of ignoring the cries of pain and distress of our fellow human beings. For any of us in and around the international community – from individuals to NGOs to national governments to international organizations – to yet again ignore that distress and agony, and to once again make ‘never again’ a cry that rings totally empty, is to diminish that common humanity to the point of despair. We should be united in our determination to not let happen, and there is no greater or nobler cause on any of us [that] could be embraced (Evans 2008).

Such a view, noble and honest as it is, nonetheless does not solve the core problem of such forms of solidarity, namely when and how empathy with the suffering of people justifies intervention free of (counter-)hegemonic interests. Unfortunately, all too often there remain doubts about the intentions of those arguing for or against specific cases of intervention (and their particular forms), as the example of Darfur (but to a certain extent also Zimbabwe) prominently illustrates. Not surprisingly, the most common concern expressed by member states during the General Assembly debate at the end of July 2009 was the danger of double standards and selectivity. As some of the states pointed out, however, ‘it would be wrong to conclude that because the international community might not act everywhere, it should therefore act nowhere’ (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect 2009:2).

**Enter Hammarskjöld: Morality and politics**

The United Nations’ second Secretary-General summarised his guiding principles, values and norms most impressively in the radio programme ‘This I believe’

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4 The military intervention as endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 1973 of March 2011 with regard to the untenable situation in Libya is the most recent case in point. The verdict is pending, but it is noteworthy that security council resolutions 1970 and 1973 clearly created a new quality of normative frameworks adopted and implemented, both with regard to the role of the International Criminal Court and the Responsibility to Protect. It remains to be seen how much this can enhance the legitimacy of such interventions.
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broadcasted in 1954. Faith, Hammarskjöld then insisted, ‘is a state of the mind and the soul’. And the belief he inherited was

that no life was more satisfactory than one of selfless service to your country – or humanity. This service required a sacrifice of all personal interests, but likewise the courage to stand up unflinchingly for your convictions (Falkman 2005:58).

In the same text, which Hammarskjöld wrote for the radio, he translates the living of such convictions, the active practising of these values, into the word Love. Love, defined as an overflowing of the strength filling individuals when living in true self-oblivion, as an unhesitant fulfilment of duty in an unreserved acceptance of life – no matter if it offered toil, suffering, or happiness (Falkman 2005:59). Hammarskjöld shows us that a strong belief in fundamental values transcends narrow political ideologies and translates into almost revolutionary perseverance when lived consequently. This is maybe most spectacularly documented in his famous statement delivered on 3 October 1960 in the UN General Assembly in reply to the Soviet Union’s demand to resign:

The man does not count, the institution does. A weak or nonexistent executive would mean that the United Nations would no longer be able to serve as an effective instrument for active protection of the interests of those many Members who need such protection. The man holding the responsibility as a chief executive should leave if he weakens the executive; he should stay if this is necessary for its maintenance….

It is not the Soviet Union or, indeed, any other big powers who need the United Nations for their protection; it is all the others. In this sense the Organization is first of all their Organization, and I deeply believe in the wisdom with which they will be able to use it and guide it. I shall remain in my post during the term of my office as a servant of the Organization in the interests of all those other nations, as long as they wish me to do so (Falkman 2005:85 and 86).
His morality and religion was political and translated into politics, which set the norm for every Secretary-General following him. When Hammarskjöld understands the United Nations as an ‘instrument of faith’, then this must be understood as a commitment to fundamental human values and norms guiding the struggle for a better life for all. It is a deeply secular agenda that cannot be seen detached from his spiritual signposts guiding his mission. A mission indeed it was. For his own understanding of the role of an international civil servant – a concept he shaped, which lasted until today as the ultimate criterion for the service in the United Nations system – he already insisted in an address at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore on 14 June 1955, that ‘many ethical problems take on a new significance and our need to give sense to our lives exceeds the inherited standards’ (Falkman 2005:64). He points to the need that inherited and conventional ideas will not protect us to live lazily:

Intellectually and morally, international service therefore requires the courage to admit that you, and those you represent, are wrong when you find them to be wrong, even in the face of a weaker adversary, and courage to defend what is your conviction even when you are facing the threats of powerful opponents. But while such an outlook exposes us to conflicts, it also provides us with a source of inner security; for it will give us ‘self-respect for our shelter’ (Falkman 2005:65).

Already then, two years into office, he mapped out what he continued to practise as an international civil servant: the virtue of uncompromising integrity in the execution of the mandate and the pursuance of the course. During the Suez crisis, he stated on 31 October 1956 before the Security Council in no uncertain terms that in his view ‘the discretion and impartiality … imposed on the Secretary-General … may not degenerate into a policy of expediency’ (Falkman 2005:120–121). He then already articulated what he reiterated in his introduction to the Annual Report of the UN for 1959–1960:

It is my firm conviction that any result bought at the price of a compromise with the principles and ideals of the Organization, either by yielding to force, by disregard of justice, by neglect of common interests or by contempt for human rights, is bought at
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too high a price. That is so because a compromise with its principles and purposes weakens the Organization in a way representing a definite loss for the future that cannot be balanced by any immediate advantage achieved (Falkman 2005:71).

Throughout his eight years in office Dag Hammarskjöld lived what he put into a final legacy on ‘The International Civil Service in Law and in Fact’ in his address at Oxford University on 30 May 1961 – not much more than a hundred days before his untimely death. As he stated then:

… the international civil servant cannot be accused of lack of neutrality simply for taking a stand on a controversial issue when this is his duty and cannot be avoided. But there remains a serious intellectual and moral problem as we move within an area inside which personal judgment must come into play. Finally, we have to deal with the question of integrity or with, if you please, a question of conscience (Quoted from Corell 2009).

And he continued:

… if integrity in the sense of respect for law and respect for truth were to drive him into positions of conflict with this or that interest, then that conflict is a sign of his neutrality and not of his failure to observe neutrality – then it is in line, not in conflict with, his duties as an international civil servant (Quoted from Corell 2009).

Since his first years in office Dag Hammarskjöld obtained respect and recognition for being a mediator, guided by such integrity. He was suspicious of any justification of expediency. He strongly believed in humanity and dialogue among opponents based on mutual respect and the search for common ground, but resisted the temptation to opt for a pragmatic and easy pseudo-solution devoid of the fundamental values that ought to be respected. In this context his exchanges with Martin Buber are revealing.5 These days we might call it the recognition of

5 See Marin 2010, who pays attention to this important aspect of Hammarskjöld’s ethics and convictions. See also Fröhlich 2008:103–116 and 2002:192–211.
otherness in a world of diversity. But at the same time he also felt strongly that otherness does not prevent parties to find a shared basis for a sustainable future of mankind.

Hammarskjöld was guided by efforts to bring more justice and less violation of human rights to this world within the institutionalised framework of a UN system, which seeks to enhance the meaning and practical relevance of the different charters for the implementation of a variety of human rights. Already half a century ago he shared the commitment to use the global governance framework for the promotion of the well being of the people and not their rulers.

In the footsteps of Hammarskjöld

Since Hammarskjöld’s time, mediators have – also in cultivating his legacy – been unsparing in their efforts to contribute towards greater justice – and reduce the suffering of so many ordinary people – by exploring compromises that might lead to a negotiated settlement between parties in conflict, who would otherwise continue to fight, at the expense of the innocent. Mediators face enormous tasks, not least in the demands made of them, and their own values and ethical norms, when they seek to avoid wrecking the boat in what are at best rough waters.\(^6\)

Their search for a way of reconciling the legitimate rights of sovereign states with their people’s essential entitlement to a safe existence acknowledge both the potential opportunities as well as the risks involved in such endeavours. Such efforts seek to bring about a less unjust world order, in which perpetrators are not protected through the immunity of a statehood that suits only them but not their citizens. At the same time, we remain confronted with the difficulties of avoiding

\(^6\) The Swedish diplomat Jan Eliasson, once president of the United Nations General Assembly and foreign minister, served as special representative of the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan on several difficult missions. As he recalled in a conversation held with Kofi Annan and others, broadcasted in Eliasson’s honour live by the Swedish TV channel 1 on 26 September 2009, the greatest personal conflict for him was to seek a compromise on the basis of mediation with the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein shortly after the latter had ordered the use of chemical weapons and toxic gas with the intention of eliminating the Kurdish population in the country, with devastating consequences for hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians.
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inappropriate intervention and interference, where those powers that intervene are pursuing their own agenda rather than solely executing a responsibility to protect.

The second Secretary-General of the United Nations was aware of the long road towards a global contract, which would not only formulate but also execute and implement a shared responsibility over matters of general human concern. In an address on 1 May 1960 at the University of Chicago he made a sobering but realistic assessment, which reflects political realities within the system of the not so united nations up until today:

Those who advocate world government, and this or that special form of world federalism, often present challenging theories and ideas, but we, like our ancestors, can only press against the receding wall which hides the future. It is by such efforts, pursued to the best of our ability, more than by the construction of ideal patterns to be imposed upon society, that we lay the basis and pave the way for the society of the future (Falkman 2005:164).

The way is long and winding. It requires patience, perseverance and many more virtues to handle the setbacks and disappointments without capitulation or resignation. Dag Hammarskjöld, who embodied many of these virtues in his personal beliefs, was aware of the time required for this endeavour to bear fruit. As he stated in his address at New York University on 20 May 1956:

… we are still seeking ways to make our international institutions fulfill more effectively the fundamental purpose expressed in Woodrow Wilson’s words – ‘to be the eye of the nations to keep watch upon the common interest’.

I have no doubt that forty years from now we shall also be engaged in the same pursuit. How could we expect otherwise? World organization is still a new adventure in human history. It needs much perfecting in the crucible of experiences and there is no substitute for time in that respect (Falkman 2005:67–68).
Fifty years after these words, we still have not reached the desired goal. Let’s hope that time is not running out. We have certainly entered a stage in the reproduction of the human being, which requires even more urgent measures to secure a future for men, women and their children on this earth. Dag Hammarskjöld then had faith in the future of mankind, as he had trust in the moral compass of people. As recorded in the transcript of extemporaneous remarks at the UN Correspondents Association Luncheon in his honour on 9 April 1958 he maintained a ‘belief and the faith that the future will be all right because there will always be enough people to fight for a decent future’. He also believed firmly that ‘there are enough people who are solidly engaged in this fight and who are strong enough and dedicated enough to guarantee its success’ (Falkman 2005:51–52).

This firm belief in the good of mankind did not remain pure, however. Towards the end of his life, Hammarskjöld’s firm convictions in the good of mankind succumbed to the harsh world of experiences, which confined efforts and commitments in the service of the well being of people to remain a noble goal instead of becoming a reality. The artist Bo Beskow, who maintained a close relationship with the Secretary-General until his untimely death, used to regularly enquire whether Hammarskjöld still believed in people. In the summer of 1961 he admitted in his reply, that ‘I never thought it possible, but lately I have come to understand that there are really evil persons – evil right through – only evil’ (Beskow 1969:181, quoted in Fröhlich 2008:191).

Among the participants in this conference are those who have gathered because of their respect for and activism in the spirit of the late Dag Hammarskjöld and his vision of a better world. A world, he did not see happen. A world, we have to promote against all odds and the evil embodied at times also in rulers and governments who constantly violate the oath they took when entering office (provided they did take an oath), namely to act responsibly in the public interest and for the sake of the people they claim to represent.

Much to our comfort, they will not end in the history textbooks as the respected ones, but will be remembered as an insult to humanity and the values of freedom and liberation, for which at times they originally stood themselves (cf. Melber
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2009). A year before his appointment as the United Nations’ second Secretary-General, Hammarskjöld penned in his private notebook: ‘It is easy to be nice, even to an enemy – from lack of character’ (Hammarskjöld 1993:70). One could have added also: from lack of empathy and solidarity with those who are victimised by those abusing the power they seized or – worse – were entrusted with to serve the people. Hammarskjöld was on the side of the oppressed. So should we be.

Sources


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Dealing with injustice: Dag Hammarskjöld and the international community today


Disarming war, arming peace: The Congo crisis, Dag Hammarskjöld’s legacy and the future role of MONUC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

It is when we all play safe that we create a world of utmost insecurity.
Dag Hammarskjöld

Abstract

Only recently, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) celebrated fifty years since the territory gained independence from Belgium. But the truth be told, Congo is not yet free. In more ways than are easily fathomable, the country continues to be buffeted by various reincarnations of greed and chaos – some externally driven, others internally motivated. This paper begins with a historical contextualisation of the conflicts in the DRC, before proceeding to take stock of the organisation’s balance sheet thus far as it grapples with imminent peacekeeping, peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction challenges in the country. Successes achieved by the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) (now MONUSCO, the UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC) are then pitted against setbacks in this regard. Finally, a prognosis of the UN’s future role in the territory is built

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on the template of the political, social and economic realities prevalent in the territory.

Within the present dispensation in the Congo, how can the UN play a more effective role in disarming the country’s conflicts, while arming its capacity for lasting peace and security? In what ways can the broader international community muster its leverage more robustly in stemming the troubling tide of ‘conflict resource hunting’ in the Congo? How can we look backward in order to see forward, or, in other words, what lessons can we draw from Hammarskjöld’s leadership in the first Congo war, and apply in current attempts towards the pacification of the Congo?

1. Introduction

In his eulogy to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN), the pioneering social thinker Walter Lippmann (1961) summed up Dag Hammarskjöld’s legacy in this tribute:

Never before, and perhaps never again, has any man used the intense art of diplomacy for such unconventional and such novel experiments. The biggest experiment, for which in the end he gave his life, was to move the international society of the United Nations from having to choose between very difficult police action … to sole reliance on debate and verbal expression. He moved the UN onto the plane of executive action without large-scale war … [a] … movement from words to deeds, from general resolution to intervention …

Looking back at Dag Hammarskjöld’s well documented achievements and eventual sacrifice, Lippmann’s assessment is not so much a feat of brazen idolisation after all; and it is difficult to denude Hammarskjöld of his place in the pantheon of distinguished international service in the 20th century without downplaying the very mettle of the man, and his considerable work for humanity. Of course, and rightly so in line with traditions of objectivity, his contributions to world peace and security continue to be scrutinised – pitted against emerging critical voices attempting to sieve through the grains of his legacy. This is by no
means unexpected of a complex historical figure of his stature – a man whose life in the international spotlight, just as his death, remains shrouded in much debate, myth and contortions (Gibbs 1993; O’Brien 1962). Notwithstanding, fifty years have passed since his tragic demise, and it is perhaps prudent timing to undertake a rather ‘pious audit’ of his vision for world peace especially in the Congo\(^1\) – the still daunting Aegean stable at the heart of Africa for the attempted cleaning of which he eventually gave his life. An endeavour of this dimension is especially germane now when the UN stands taunted at the crossroads, painfully bogged down by serious and intensifying security challenges, alongside a growing credibility deficit resulting from controversies surrounding its work.

2. The Congo’s conflicts in historical perspective

The Congo’s current profile paints a sorry portrait of one of Africa’s most richly endowed countries, painfully reduced to what Chabal and Daloz (1999) have described as a ‘political economy of disorder’. Mobutu Sese Seko, for instance, might have been more known for introducing the Stalinist apparatus of repressive secret policing to sub-Saharan Africa, but he did much more to damage his country’s standing. Under Mobutu’s reign, the Congo effectively descended into a kleptocracy. Throughout his 32 years in charge of then Zaire, Mobutu did his best to put into practice this rather depraved philosophy of economic mismanagement through spirited embezzlement and siphoning of state funds, often in dimensions that took on a rather compulsive character. By the end of his reign, the strongman had lewdly ‘amassed a fortune estimated at $4 billion, [excluding] an array of grand villas in Europe and multiple palaces and yachts’ (Hochschild 2011). Today, the Congo’s weak and considerably inept central government stands woefully inadequate in the face of a growing need to correct deep-seated political, social and economic governance deficits. In the meantime, the country continues to crumble under the weight of endemic corruption. The virtual collapse of the formal economy and decaying state of infrastructures in the country is so staggering that it has been wryly said

\(^{1}\) The Congo, DRC, DR Congo, Zaire are used interchangeably in this article to refer to the same territory. Zaire is preferentially used in segments where events are recounted that occurred in the course of Mobutu’s reign.
James-Emmanuel Wanki

that it is considerably easier to start a rebellion than a business in the Congo (Aljazeera 2010).

This section attempts to provide a descriptive historical context of the multiple conflicts that have embroiled the Congo since the country gained independence. By virtue of the sheer pervasiveness of its involvement with the territory, Belgium stands out as a prime mover in any critical examination of the historical continuum of the Congo’s political and economic history. In fact, as Auma-Osolo (1975) has tartly argued, ‘for 85 years, the Belgian colonial rule in the Congo perpetuated slavery and abuse of the Congolese people in repudiation of articles VI and IX of the Berlin General Act of 1885…[and as a consequence violated] international law’. Consequently, judging from the profound social, economic and political legacy of Belgian colonialism on the Congo, it seems fair to state that what DR Congo is or is not today, is to a considerable extent, a function of what Belgium did or did not do to the country. Belgian economic exploitation in the Congo, perhaps only matched by scant investment in social, educational and institutional structures, as well as the politics of repression and divide and rule, meant that Belgium was effectively designing the Congo to fail (Wanki, forthcoming). To this extent, any lucid attempt to develop a historical contextualisation of the Congo’s conflicts should logically begin with the genesis of Belgian imperialism over the territory. Belgian patronage over the Congo began as a King’s personal affair. Henry Stanley, on the behest of King Leopold II, enticed about 400 illiterate African chiefs along the Congo River to append their marks on a document ceding their lands to his trust (Anstey 2006:40). This began the establishment of a ‘personal colony’ for Leopold II, who duplicitously invoked humanitarian considerations to justify his hold on the territory, effectively warding off other European imperialist ambitions, and legitimising his ownership in the course of the Berlin conference of 1884–1885. In the following two decades, Leopold would exact an unholy order in the Congo enforced through systematic terror, forced labour and summary executions. His ruthlessness paid bounteous economic dividends and the Belgian monarch was able to amass for himself quite a sizeable fortune in rubber and ivory – unfortunately, at the cost of an estimated 10 million lives lost (Hochschild 2006:234; Anstey 2006:40). By 1908, the ensuing revelations about
institutionalised brutality in the Congo Free State forced the Belgian king to hand over his territory to the administration of the Belgian state, a year before his death. The territory was simply renamed the ‘Belgian Congo’.

Unfortunately, the Belgian state opted to sustain Leopold’s pedigree of coercion, and escalated its ruthlessness over the Congo. Meredith (2005:96) reports that Congo was managed *de facto* by ‘a small management group in Brussels representing an alliance between the government, the Catholic Church and the giant mining and business corporations, whose activities were virtually exempt from outside scrutiny’. Huge investment in industrial development flourished, and the industrial productivity index rose from 118 to 350 between 1948 and 1958, and productivity effectively trebled over this period (Anstey 2006:41). To be fair, the buoyant industrial performance translated into some commendable social investments in the territory, and together with missionary bodies, a network of clinics and schools were established across the country (Meredith 2005). However, a *prima facie* reading of these developments could be very deceptive, especially since there was very little opportunity for indigenous people to progress academically beyond the echelon of primary education (Bokamba 1986; Anstey 2006). Effectively, dismal Belgian underinvestment in the intellectual, social and political preparedness of the Congolese people shone out dramatically. At the Congo’s independence, there were practically no Congolese doctors, officers or school teachers in the military (Meredith 2005:19; Anstey 2006; Bokamba 1986), and just between six and thirty African college graduates in the territory (Van de Walle 2001:129). For a colony that had almost single-handedly fed Belgian economic growth for many years, the utter neglect of the Congo could only be conveniently described as sinister. By 1960, Belgium messily stepped out of Congo, granted ‘nominal’ independence to the colony and remained in the background where it continued to play an active role in the spectacle of chaos that prevailed after its departure.

But the Congo’s predicaments were also significantly catalysed by the rudely complex realities of Cold War politics. By the time of the Congo’s first democratic elections in 1960, charismatic Patrice Lumumba’s scathing denunciation of Belgian colonialist ideology in the Congo propelled him into the limelight both as the uncontested voice of the Congo’s troubled masses, and as prime enemy
of Belgian and capitalist interests in the territory. The victory of his National Congolese Movement, and his ascendancy to the office of Prime Minister (along with Joseph Kasavubu as President), meant that the Belgians had reasons to worry aloud. Inspired by his tirades against colonialism, and by deep-seated grievances resulting from continuous Belgian domination of the military high command and civil service, a group of black soldiers in Leopoldville (present-day Kinshasa) mutinied, toppling their white commanders and engaging in violent attacks against Europeans and other Africans of different tribal or ideological persuasions. Belgium violated Congolese sovereignty five days later, dispatching Belgian troops into the Congo on the grounds that it was attempting to restore order. UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld joined a growing chorus of international critics in condemning Belgian intervention as aggressive behaviour, and as ‘a threat to peace and order in the region’ (quoted from Anstey 2006) – effectively responding to the Congolese Central Government’s appeal for assistance.\(^2\) Lumumba, initially resisting pressure from the mutineers to purge the military top brass of Belgians, eventually gave in as the situation became more acrimonious. On 8 July 1960, the Congolese Prime Minister sacked all Belgians from the military, appointing former Sergeant Victor Lundula to General of the Army staff, and Joseph Mobutu, Chief of Army Staff, by 10 July 1960. Moise Tshombe, a mercurial renegade and Premier of the mineral-rich Katanga region, took advantage of the civil chaos, and with unconditional Belgian support, declared the unilateral secession and independence of the Katanga region on 11 July 1960 (Nugent 2004; Anstey 2006). Barely a few months into its independence, fledgling Congo had found itself lurching into full-scale chaos.

The events that followed represent one of the darkest chapters of Congolese history. Backed by the United States, Joseph Mobutu organised a military coup on 14 July 1960, placing himself at the helm of the Congolese state (Adebajo and Landsberg 2000). Hunting down Patrice Lumumba became his chief priority, and by 17 January 1961, he handed the former Premier over to Moise Tshombe. With direct Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Belgian involvement, Patrice Lumumba was assassinated. Empowered by American support and the loyalty of

\(^2\) UN Doc. S/4382(1960).
the military, Mobutu set out to consolidate his rule under the *régime d'exception* (equivalence of a state of emergency); riding roughshod over freedoms and civil liberties, and eventually establishing a brutal dictatorship which unleashed upon the backs of the Congo’s people for three decades, what Basil Davidson (1992) has termed ‘the curse of the nation state’.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, the United States cancelled its ‘blank cheque policy’ to its African axis of capitalism, presaging what Bryden, N’diaye and Olonisaken (2008) have aptly described as ‘a corresponding shift in internal order of many African states’. This deprived at least some among the repressive African regimes of the financial and military wherewithal to crack down on dissent, and subsequently created space for budding clamour towards democratisation. Long overdue revolts against the status quo across Africa were fast-tracked, emboldening movements for freedom from Cairo to Cape Town.

In the case of the DRC, the force that initiated cracks on Mobutu’s 32 years-long reign of terror came from a rather inauspicious angle. As the simmering ethnic hatred between Hutus and Tutsis boiled over in the form of genocidal violence in Rwanda, the spillover reached Kivu province in the eastern parts of the Congo, such that ‘in a matter of days in October 1996, a large swathe of eastern Zaire erupted into an orgy of violence’ (Lemarchand 1997:173). As the Rwandan horror unfolded, the Hutu militia, *Interahamwe*, used Hutu refugee camps in Congolese territory as launch pads for a Tutsi massacre. In response, the Tutsi-led *Armée Patriotique Rwandais* invaded Zaire by October 1996 to put an end to the Hutu onslaught, and in the process, provided support to a coalition of internal Congolese armed dissidents (*Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre*, AFDL) led by Laurent Désiré Kabila (Anstey 2006).

Nelson Mandela attempted to broker a peace agreement, which foundered, and by 17 May 1997 Kabila’s forces had toppled Mobutu’s regime and forced him out (Anstey 2006). Declaring himself president, Kabila abrogated the Transitional Act altogether, effectively outlawing political opposition to his rule. He was soon to make a fatal mistake by expelling the Rwandan and Ugandan contingents which had propelled him to victory, and this plunged his fragile administration once again into civil war (Apuuli 2004). Partly benefiting from Angolan,
Chadian, Sudanese, Zimbabwean and Namibian support, Laurent Kabila managed to hold on to power, maintaining control over Kinshasa and indeed a sizeable patch of western Congo. The splintering of numerous armed factions, ex-Mobutu loyalists, and foreign troops rendered negotiations on the Congo’s conflict a complex labyrinth to chart. Expectedly, a second South African-led mediation attempt was scuppered.

The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement reached on 10 July 1999 ushered in a momentous breakthrough, and the United Nations Security Council expeditiously passed Resolution 1279 (S/RES/1279) of 30 November 1999, sanctioning the deployment of the Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo (MONUC) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to strengthen the ceasefire. Supporting the government of the DRC and administered by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the mission comprised four phases: establishing peace; supervising ceasefire; DDRRR (disarmament, demobilisation, reinsertion, rehabilitation, and reconciliation); and support to the DRC’s political transition and organisation of elections. The mission initially included 17 030 troops, 760 military observers, 391 police instructors, and 750 members of constituted police units. UN Resolution 1756 (S/RES/2007) of 15 May 2007 extended the mission until 31 December 2007, which has recently been re-mandated as MONUSCO to emphasise the stabilisation component.

This resolution originally provided useful breathing space for the battered country to stand on its feet again. Rather ironically, Laurent Kabila’s assassination in January 2001 by a bullet from his bodyguard’s rifle proved somewhat beneficial to Congo’s peace process as his more compromising son, Joseph Kabila, who took after him demonstrated more verve in the pursuit of meaningful democratic transition for the country (Anstey 2006). This new found tenacity to move forward beyond the prevalent political logjam yielded dividends, and the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) was subsequently held at Sun City, South Africa (25 February to 19 April 2003).

Joseph Kabila would subsequently go on to win the presidential elections in 2006, although their results failed to mark new beginnings for the Congolese nation. The DRC continues to be ruffled by various dimensions of insecurity.
ranging from pockets of violence across the country to full-scale war in the east. Cabals of warlords and spoilers continue to derail the country’s return to peace (Adebajo and Landsberg 2000) with campaigns of violence and brutality against unarmed civilians. Like most modern African wars, the perimeters of the Congo’s battlefields have extended to villages and communities where men, women and children are caught in the crossfire. In these attacks, the frequency of rapes and sexual violence – and the impunity with which such acts have been perpetuated against women – in places like Ituri and Kivu, have attained sub-human dimensions (Amnesty International 2007). Consequently, in ways that are tragically telling, women’s bodies have become the battlefields upon which the Congo’s wars are being fought. Even the strong UN presence has not dissuaded the dastardly human rights violations.

3. Dag Hammarskjöld, the UN and the Congo crisis

As the foregone historical contextualisation has demonstrated in somewhat greater detail, the Congo’s current predicament is more or less the sour verdict of a long-storied process of virulent external interests and internal imbalances which continue to cast long shadows on the country’s future. But the Congo has also been the site of immense lessons for the international community. The territory is the place where the UN cut its teeth and tested the strength of its ‘world society’, and, unfortunately, the reason for which the organisation lost its ebullient Secretary-General. Whether the topical Congo crisis measured Hammarskjöld as a man of inexorable grit and unperturbed tenacity, or as a rebellious maverick determined to chart his own path for the UN, is still open for debate. But what is certainly indubitable, is the fact that the first Congo crisis – as complex as it was – provided Hammarskjöld with the world’s podium to articulate a set of ideals and embark on a course of actions that would forever set him aside in a league of his own among the statesmen of his time. He might have himself (along with Patrice Lumumba), been one of the greatest symbolic casualties of the Congo war, but his handling of the conflict reveals important lessons for the UN’s work in the territory.

In many respects, as the UN commemorates 50 years since Hammarskjöld's passing, its current mission in the Congo (MONUSCO) has potential lessons to
learn from the false starts and successes of the first deployment (MONUC) in 1960/61. This is all the more important in illuminating the path forward, even though the present context of international security, just as the UN’s work, has been tremendously transformed in our time; not the least by the ubiquitous forces of 21st century globalisation. There are many reasons why history should be kind to Dag Hammarskjöld. He built a reputation, even amongst his fiercest critics (Zacher 1970; Gibbs 2000) for routinely venturing out of the carapace of institutional comfort into the political minefields of practical action. As David Gibbs (2000:361) further stresses: ‘The Congo operation was the main substantive contribution of Hammarskjöld … and given the substantial scale, duration and scope of its activity, the operation was several decades ahead of its time … [Consequently, it is Hammarskjöld] more than any other single figure, who is cited as the principal inspiration to present-day peacekeeping efforts.’ It is easy to see him as a martyr for the course of collective human security, especially as he lost his life actively trying to attenuate a potential bloodbath in the Congo. In fact, much of his legend derives from these two sources, and it frankly amounts to little surprise when one of his successors, Kofi Annan (2001), lifts him up to the very quintessence of leadership in the UN.

On 12 July 1960, the United Nations confronted a seminal moment in her young history. Invoking article 35, paragraph 2. under chapter IV of the United Nations Charter, which recognises the right of ‘A state which is not a member of the United Nations … to bring to the attention of the Security Council or General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party …’, President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, on behalf of the Central Government of Congo, dispatched a cable to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, requesting assistance to ward off ‘Belgian aggression’. It read:

The Government of the Republic of Congo requests urgent dispatch by the United Nations of military assistance. This request is justified by the dispatch to the Congo, of metropolitan Belgian troops, in violation of the Treaty of Friendship signed between Belgium and the Republic of the Congo on June 29, 1960. Under the terms of the treaty, Belgian troops may only intervene on the express request of the Congolese government. No such request was ever made by
the Government of the Republic of Congo and we therefore regard
the unsolicited Belgian action as an act of aggression against our
country … The essential purpose of the requested military aid is
to protect the national territory of the Congo against the present
external aggression which is a threat to international peace. We
Stress the extremely urgent need for the dispatch of United Nations
troops to the Congo.3

A considerable amount of criticism has been levelled against Hammarskjöld
and the United Nations regarding the handling of the first Congo crisis, which
has generally vacillated between too much pro-activity on the part of the
Secretary-General, sometimes beyond the bounds of his authority as sanctioned
by the Charter, and too little initiative to act in the interest of peace. Auma-
Osolo (1975), for instance, criticised Hammarskjöld and the UN for being ‘too
soft’ in condemning Belgian aggression after the receipt of the first cable from
Lumumba and Kasavubu on 12 July 1960, even though barely two days later (14
July 1960), the UN Security Council (UNSC) unanimously adopted a resolution
sanctioning the deployment of military aid to the Congo, while formally asking
Belgium to pull out her forces from Congolese territory. Conversely, some
scholars have rather maintained that in effect, Hammarskjöld actually moved
the UN to act too soon; stating that in many ways, the Secretary-General actually
went beyond the limits of constitutionality in his intervention in the first Congo
crisis. E.M. Miller (quoted in Auma-Osolo 1975) contends that ‘neither …
[the first] resolution nor any subsequent resolutions … expressly provided
for a United Nations force …’, stressing that none of the resolutions explicitly
authorised the Secretary-General to compose, and dispatch a UN force to the
Congo. To whatever degree one chooses to consider these arguments, it rests
solely on the body of evidence available. Nevertheless, both arguments reveal
important clues about Hammarskjöld’s ‘pro-activeness’, and to a considerable
extent, his impartiality and neutrality. Empowered by article 99 of the Charter
‘which allows the Secretary-General, on his own initiative, to bring matters to the
Security Council’s attention when in his view they may threaten the maintenance

of international peace and security’ (Annan 2001), Hammarskjöld, as a seasoned European, pushed for more robust action against another European country, for the sake of collective security and justice. Consequently, on 18 July 1960, Hammarskjöld was pleased to report the arrival of 3,500 troops to the UNSC, and promised to send more.4

As Zacher (1970) points out, ‘Dag Hammarskjöld stressed the importance of an impartial and objective UN Secretariat, whose personnel would be able to adopt a truly international perspective’. This was very much evidenced in the composition of the UN peacekeepers for the First Congo Mission. Fully aware of the need to develop a more holistic and encompassing orientation for peacekeeping that went beyond just putting troops on the ground, Hammarskjöld effectively directed the UN towards establishing a UN Civilian Operations Programme in Congo, massively deploying hundreds of UN technocrats and specialists to assist the Congolese Government in areas of health, education, transport, emergency food relief and natural resources governance (UN 1985, UN 1961, cited in Gibbs 2000:364). For this, he unknowingly nurtured the complex process of multidimensional peacekeeping, the so-called peacebuilding approach, which typifies a bulk of the UN’s work today. As Lippmann (1961) further comments about the man he knew very well, ‘Dag Hammarskjöld … was not an innovator because he had an itch to change things. He was a political innovator because there was no decent alternative. He saw no alternative to intervention by the United Nations in a crisis where there was a bitter confrontation in the Cold War’.

It is very hard to squeeze down the leadership and legacy of a global figure like Hammarskjöld into a few pages; which is why many dimensions of his influence on the body politic of international relations and the UN’s work have not been addressed here. There is also a lurking possibility to consider the foregone discussions about his legacy as deprived of a solid critical dimension which could do more to engender the man’s shortcomings. That too, would not be entirely false! Indeed, the crux of this article is a ‘pious audit’ of Dag Hammarskjöld’s legacy; an appreciative enquiry, in a manner of speaking, of his contributions

4 See UN Doc. S/4389 (1960).
to the UN and to the Congo question, not a critical analysis of his leadership in the course of the first Congo war. Highly critical volumes of intellectual contributions already abound, with respect to Hammarskjöld’s leadership. Not so many contributions, however, show how the current UN mission in the Congo could harness positive lessons from Hammarskjöld’s legacy in the Congo, in charting the way forward toward sustained peace and security in the country. 

4. The Congo today: Assessing the UN’s track record

The Congo is arguably the scene of the biggest human tragedy since the dawn of the 21st century, and with more than four million dead, it is easy to understand why many have described the conflicts there as the ‘third World War’ (Nugent 2004; Anstey 2006). The largest ever UN peacekeeping force in history with an annual budget of $1 billion, the approval of the UNSC Resolution 1756, on 15 May 2007, placed five core functions at the heart of MONUC’s mandate: guaranteeing the territorial security and integrity of DRC; assistance towards strengthening and consolidating democratic institutions and the rule of law; ensuring the protection of humanitarian personnel, civilians as well as the UN infrastructure and country personnel; the conduct of security sector reform; and the organisation of disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration/repatriation operations (de Carvalho 2007). The UN’s multidimensional force has played a crucial role in stabilising the country’s troubled security outlook, and in paving the way for eventual development.

Major advances have been made towards the de-gunning and pacification of the country (Rouw and Willems 2010; Amnesty International 2007; Onana and Taylor 2008), and although significant challenges still obscure the efficient overhaul and reform of the Congolese security sector (Amnesty International 2007; Onana and Taylor 2008), the UN at least, deserves a pat on the back for continuing to engage and fund the process. Less than a decade ago, the DRC was the laboratory of dangerous regional military experimentation, and at one point, Congolese soil provided barracks to the boots of at least eight regional armies occupying the country. Today, the UN has largely succeeded in cleaning the slate, forging much needed regional cooperation towards the stabilisation of the territory. In the area of DDR+, the country reaped some positive dividends,
especially linked to the repatriation of foreign fighters from the Congo, and the substantial reduction of armaments. These are laudable achievements within the current troubled context of the country; and the organisation’s decision to upgrade the mandate of its mission with a stabilisation component (MONUC to MONUSCO) as from 1 July 2010, is testament of its assessment of more propitious times ahead. Recognising the new phase reached by MONUC, the UNSC unanimously agreed that MONUC should become MONUSCO (United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the Congo) as from 1 July 2010. MONUSCO, authorised initially to stay in the Congo until 30 June 2011, will experience a drawdown of up to 2 000 UN military personnel from areas where security was deemed to have improved, to allow such withdrawal. The UNSC further decided that MONUSCO be comprised of additional appropriate civilian, judiciary and penitentiary components, a maximum of 760 military observers, 19 815 military personnel, 1 050 personnel of formed police units and 391 police personnel. Importantly, it authorised the mission to allocate a standby force ready for rapid re-deployment elsewhere in the country, while focusing the attention of its military capabilities in the unstable eastern part of the country.

4.1 The Congo’s Security Sector Reform (SSR)

The military has always played a central role in Congolese life (Onana and Taylor 2008; Amnesty International 2007). Consequently, complementary to the DDR process in the country, reforming the security sector is a matter of utmost priority, if the fledgling security gains are to be consolidated (de Carvalho 2007). MONUC, the Congolese government and other national and international partners displayed remarkable foresight placing DDR operations alongside SSR aspirations, since there is a profound nexus between both processes. However, the SSR process, just like the DDR, has been afflicted by a conundrum of setbacks, some of which are directly related to the chequered history of the Congolese army, while other are linked to serious misjudgement on the part of the national and international partners involved. Waves of defection from the army, for instance, especially in the two Kivu provinces and in the Northern part of the Katanga region which act as strongholds of the Mai Mai and RCD-Goma, have proven to be quite problematic. Furthermore, elements of the Congolese
army have been accused of perpetrating human rights abuses including rape, theft and harassment, and killings (Amnesty International 2007). Consequently, local people harbour serious distrust of the army’s role as guarantor of security, and by extension, MONUC’s. The SMI (Military Structure for [Re-]Integration) process too, was assailed by shortcomings, especially those linked to failures and compromises in the vetting process of former ex-combatants, before their reintegration into the army (Amnesty International 2007). As a result, there have been accusations that certain individuals who committed serious acts of human rights violations have simply received legitimisation through the military, and that the UN has done nothing to redress this.

Key to the Congo’s SSR process is the development of a national army that is truly inclusive, disciplined, professional, human rights-based; and which can eventually serve as an instrument of enhancing the country’s security, defending its territorial integrity, hence creating conducive space for peace and development to flourish. These expectations are well grounded in the Congolese Ministry of Defence’s Operational Plan and the Law on the General Organisation of Defence and the Armed Forces (Amnesty International 2007). Unfortunately, endemic corruption, coupled with poor pay packages, has simply forced many soldiers to use their weapons in making a living. Also, the thorny issue of the Garde Présidentielle is setting a worrying precedent. This guard is an elite force trained by Angolan forces and charged with presidential security. However, elements of the presidential guard consider themselves a special army within the Congolese army, above the law, and have consequently resorted to acts that terrorise the masses. For this, they have earned the notorious appellation ‘ampicilline’ (the name of a medicine) by the inhabitants of Kinshasa. MONUC is currently under pressure to influence the redress of such conduct. Finally, General Nkunda’s obstinacy, as well as the refusal of his renegade forces to be part of the national army, exacerbated the difficulties currently facing MONUC and the government with respect to setting up a unified and well-trained army. Many armed groups still have child soldiers within their ranks, and the arduous task of completely relieving the Congo’s children of the burdens and brutality of wars, is at the moment, still a bridge too far for the UN to cross.
4.2 The Congo’s elections

Elections are crucial to the process of democratic consolidation and renewal, and they serve as vital instruments for enhancing the transition from conflicts to post-conflict dispensations. However, the Congo’s experimentation with the enterprise of democratic elections has not always countenanced positive outcomes in terms of democratic consolidation; and the country’s own chequered history stares brutally right in the face of good governance.

Notwithstanding this troubled context of elections organisation, the United Nations earned wide acclaim for mustering international attention and support towards overcoming the colossal logistical requirements of free and fair elections in the Congo in 2006. Some 269 parties, 33 presidential candidates and roughly 9 700 parliamentary aspirants throughout 25 provinces amounted to the largest UN investment ever in a project of the calibre. An estimated 15 500 peacekeepers were deployed across the country for several years, including 324 civilian police, 520 UN military observers, and 2 493 civilian staff. Over 200 000 electoral staff and 45 000 police were involved, with 90% of the voting population turning out to cast their vote. Whether or not the impetus and political capital generated in the course of the last elections have actually translated into meaningful progress on the ground is open for debate. The country currently stands at the cusp of yet another election of mammoth proportions, announced for November 2011, in the face of mounting security challenges and growing uncertainty over the UN’s future in the country. In eastern Congo, Nyambura Githaiga (2011) recently reported that the ‘elections agenda has been eclipsed by recent [tragic] developments in the mining sector ...lingering insecurity, and underdevelopment’. The present angst over the prospects of free and fair elections in the DRC and the political and security implications of its aftermath are justified. By virtue of its sweeping presence in the political life of the Congolese state, it is almost certain that the UN Mission in the country will have axes to grind with many critics should things go wrong.
4.3 Enforcing an arms embargo, territorial security and civilian protection

The Congo still harbours a significant number of foreign fighters and mercenaries serving various interests, ranging from illegal resource mining to engagement in actual military campaigns. This has encouraged the influx of arms across the DRC border, in violation of the arms embargo there, and MONUC troops have been implicated in some of the arms flows, especially in the east of the country (de Carvalho 2007; Boshoff and Vircoulon 2004), in areas like Kivu and Ituri. The arms embargo has once again been extended, although there is little evidence that it is realistically stemming the tide of illicit arms flow into the DRC.

Another grave challenge is the issue of civilian protection. Ultimately, the success or failure of MONUC’s mission in Congo will be judged against progress made in protecting civilian populations from physical and psychological harm. The recurrence of grave human rights violations, and the impunity with which they are committed, has provoked an international outcry and consternation. Arbitrary executions of civilians by various armed groups are rife, brazen extortion is common, and of course, the serious issue of rape (de Carvalho 2007). Unfortunately, an alarming number of reports from victims of these violations point embarrassingly to certain elements within the Congolese national army (FARDC) and police; as well as militiamen and rebel groups locked in armed confrontation with the Congolese government, especially in places like Kivu, in the east. To be fair, MONUC continues to play a key role in investigating and reporting such allegations, although it is difficult to exact justice to perpetrators, since many government officials are often allegedly involved in such violations (de Carvalho 2007). Importantly, MONUC must endeavour to put its own house in order. Many allegations implicating United Nations civilian and peacekeeping personnel in illegal mineral mining transactions (de Carvalho 2007) grossly shame the mission’s credibility as a point of reference in the country.
4.4 The Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme

The importance of the DDR process to any quest for lasting peace in the DRC has already been abundantly espoused in academic literature and by facts on the ground (Wanki forthcoming; Amnesty International 2007; Anstey 2006; Rouw and Willems 2010). The 1999 Lusaka ceasefire agreement set the framework for the implementation of the Congo’s DDR process, and the extremely complicated context of the Congolese conflict led to the implementation of a DDR+ (see Centre for International Cooperation and Security 2006; Hanson 2007; Bouta 2005; Douma and Van der Laar 2008, Willems et al. 2009).

Backed by UN guidance and support, a national commission for the implementation of the DDR process in Congo (CONADER) was eventually established by a series of presidential decrees (December 2003), and ultimately charged with the administration of the national DDR programme (PNDDR), which was adopted by another presidential decree (May 2004). This effectively created a nation-wide legal framework under the supervision of the Congo’s UN mission. Recognising the link between DDR and SSR (Onana and Taylor 2008), a military component was created alongside (Structure Militaire d’Integration, SMI) charged with the military dimension of the process (World Bank 2009). The joint PNDDR/SMI process commenced work with a caseload figure of approximately 300 000 ex-combatants, and making provision for about 150 000 ex-fighters which included 30 000 child soldiers. Generally, the commencement of DDR programmes in the Congo was met with widespread enthusiasm, despite serious security risks confronting combatants as they streamed to MONUC/CONADER-run Centres de transit et d’orientation (CTOs, disarmament and demobilisation centres) to hand in their weapons (Amnesty International 2007).

4.4.1 Miscalculations about Disarmament

A major flaw with the Congolese disarmament process was its hyper-focus on guns, and perhaps, in comparison, relatively limited focus on the combatants themselves. It is understandable that owing to the bouts of violence and human rights violations prevalent in eastern Congo, MONUC was mandated...
to prioritise the de-gunning of the region. Consequently, combatants were strictly required to present their weapons in order to be granted access to the PNDDDR-run CTO. Many combatants who could not present weapons were summarily sent away (Rouw and Willems 2010; Van Puijenbroek et al. 2008), and given limited options of joining a crash UNDP-supervised manual labour-for-cash scheme. There are two pitfalls with the gun-in-the-hand prerequisite for disarmament. The first derives from the fact that not all combatants own guns; in fact more than twenty combatants, especially those from the Mai Mai, could share a single rifle while in the jungle (Rouw and Willems 2010). The second has to do with specific choice of instruments for violence. Nowhere has it been pre-ordained that being a militiaman requires one to only possess a gun. Machetes (which by the way are designed to be agricultural implements) have equally been used repeatedly before in African warfare to inflict tragedies in proportions that have been quite dispiriting, as was the case in the course of the Rwandan genocide. Mai Mai militiamen, for instance, armed with armes blanches who were turned away simply resorted to stealing the identity cards of demobilised people to secure benefits (Rouw and Willems 2010). All together, the above considerations point to a quintessentially myopic misreading of the local context of the Congolese war, which could most probably have been avoided had MONUC and its partners actively involved local actors in their planning.

In another respect, the DDR programme in Ituri – whose chief aim was to disarm combatants, reduce the proliferation of weapons and pacify the region – initially set out to handle a targeted caseload of 15 000 elements of armed groups who had endorsed the Acte d’engagement de Kinshasa. By June 2005 when the programme ended, 15 811 combatants had been demobilised, unfortunately with only an estimated 20% of firearms being secured. In the Eighteenth Report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the Situation in the Congo, he highlighted the prevailing potential for re-escalation of violence in the region, given that ‘70% of the 6,200 weapons collected were defective and not in a serviceable condition’ (quoted in Amnesty International 2007), and hence there was a strong possibility that ex-combatants might have gamed the system. Insecurity continues to ruin lives, rapes are common, and young people continue to experiment with deadly armed brigandage (Van Puijenbroek et al. 2008; Bouta 2005:28).
4.4.2 Missed opportunity: Local grassroots intelligence

By failing to address the marginalisation of local peoples in the DDR process, MONUC missed a golden opportunity to harness local grassroots intelligence on weapon stockpiles, rebel activity as well as strategies for encouraging more voluntary disarmament and demobilisation of members of armed groups. Local communities have better knowledge of the activities of their constituent members; are well aware of those members who own firearms illegally; and possess key information on weapon caches within their communities that will remain unknown to any foreigner, the urban expert, or the MONUC disarmament specialist. This wealth of knowledge could be useful for effective disarmament as well as following up community demobilisation processes. However, as Rouw and Willems (2010:27) once again submit, ‘this function of the community seems largely untapped’, owing to the marginalisation of grassroots involvement in, and ownership of, the DDR process. A Congolese community, in the course of a recent research exercise, asked a telling question as ‘to whom they should go right now, with their knowledge of illegal firearms; the FARDC or MONUC?’ (Rouw and Willems 2010:27)

4.4.3 The Demobilisation Process: A litany of broken promises

The numerous documented accounts of public agitations in the Congo as a result of problems associated with the conduct of demobilisation operations (Amnesty International 2007; Onana and Taylor 2008; Van Puijenbroek et al. 2008; Bouta 2005; Rouw and Willems 2010) behoves us to take a more nuanced look at the process. On 21 May 2005, 50 demobilised men delegated by their fellow colleagues stormed the CONADER office in Bunia, venting their grievances and denouncing the snail pace of the demobilisation process.

Anger over unpaid dues became viral, spreading to places like Kasenyi, Mahagi, Kwandroma and Aveba, where many hundreds of demobilised ex-combatants effectively demonstrated against delays in the payment of filet de sécurité. But disappointment over delays in the payment of dues is just one facet of a contagion of local distracts with respect to the demobilisation process, which threatens the

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5 ‘Security net’ – money paid to cover initial living expenses immediately after demobilisation
centre core of the entire process. Promises made to locals, especially those linked to the bliss of reintegration are yet to be fulfilled many years after, and local Congolese have justifiably begun pointing fingers of distrust at UN officials. In cases where reintegration assistance was provided, the feedback received has not been encouraging. For instance, where vocational career kits have been provided, they usually did not match the professional orientation, needs and desires of the demobilised (Rouw and Willems 2010). The growing perception is that the national agency, CONADER, was riddled with serious and systemic administrative and mismanagement issues, largely as a result of ineffective UN oversight. This led to the siphoning of significant amounts of ex-combatants’ resources into private pockets (Rouw and Willems 2010).

Local communities too feel that while they are not being consulted in the DDR process; that the ‘demobilized are just dumped into their communities while they still have the esprit of the military’ (Rouw and Willems 2010). One community member climaxes this resentment thus: ‘They first went out to loot and steal, and now they receive support through DDR. They gain twice while the communities suffer’ (Rouw and Willems 2010). There is consequently an urgent need for MONUSCO to sensitise local communities and traditional leaders on the need to be more receptive to these returnees, and the benefits of helping them integrate effectively to the overall peace process.

4.4.4 The marginalisation of local contexts

Reintegration is easily the most complicated and controversial of the three DDR phases. Actually, quarrels over the DDR process begin right at the semantic level where there are cries to clearly problematise and conceptualise the meaning of ‘R’ in the DDR. While in the English acronym ‘R’ denotes ‘Reintegration’, the French ‘R’ stands for Réinsertion, which is not the same.

The semantic debates aside, MONUC-run reintegration activities have been criticised for disregarding the local context within which ex-combatants live in the rush to secure peace (Centre for International Cooperation and Security 2006), even though there are clear guidelines prescribing that reintegration be regarded as a long-term process. Local people have also faulted the process for
not taking their views into account in DDR implementation. Rouw and Willems (2010) highlight a multiplicity of instances where the UNDP and its partners got the priorities of local Congolese people wrong, such as: training people in electrical skills even though they came from communities and villages without electricity, and donating an electricity-powered grinding mill to a community that had never been connected to electricity supply.

The search for durable employment opportunities for ex-combatants is a key issue inhibiting their holistic reintegration into normal civilian life. In light of this, it is easy to see how wanting in scope and relevance the *UNDP three days course in preparation for civilian life* conducted in Ituri, in 2007, was. As Marriage (2007, in Rouw and Willems 2010) further explains, each ex-combatant was provided with $50, and with a month’s food supply for their families. One Nationalist and Integrationist Front (FNI) spokesman struck a vital nerve when he questioned whether such little assistance was expected to transform their *esprit de la guerre* (emphasis mine; cited in Bouta 2005:28). There have consequently been calls for the UN to establish community-based support centres to help ex-combatants continue updating the productive skills acquired at transit centres.

### 4.4.5 Who’s in, who’s out?

The cumbersomeness of the DDR funding and implementation contracting chain in the Congo is outrageous (Douma and Van der Laar 2008; Willems et al. 2009:6). For example the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) operates in Congo’s DDR process with two US-based profit organisations – ARD and MSI – who, through other chains, function with international non-governmental organisations (NGOs), who in their turn, now collaborate with, and fund the works of local NGOs (Rouw and Willems 2010). This complicates the implementation chain, and alienates local grassroots based NGOs many layers away from the actual design, execution and monitoring process of the programme (Van Puijenbroek et al. 2008:16–17). This encourages corruption and excessive profiteering amongst the international players involved with post-conflict development and makes international partners vulnerable to serious mistakes linked to the understanding of the local context. A recurrent complaint amongst local chiefs, NGOs and even some international partners
in Ituri, was that the UNDP routinely provides incorrect lists of ex-combatants and, consequently, often selects ineligible beneficiaries for their projects.

The truth of the matter is that most international organisations currently face a credibility deficit in the eyes of the local Congolese. The general feeling is that these organisations spend huge sums of money footing the cost of their personal comfort, at the expense of actually carrying out the development tasks for which they have been deployed. To corroborate this position, a UN official in the Congo recently admitted that about a third of MONUC’s budgetary allocations were dedicated to transportation costs alone (Rouw and Willems 2010), and many other international partners spent at times exorbitant sums on chauffeurs for their staff. These could be used in supporting local NGOs to carry out DDR work (Caramés and Sanz 2008). In contrast, the local peoples’ orientation of the UN Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) articulates the necessity of prioritising local involvement and needs in total 698 times throughout the entire volume (Rouw and Willems 2010).

4.5 Rape, rape, and re-rape: Giving meaning to the words ‘Never again’

Few events have embarrassed the UN’s mission and questioned its credibility more than the revelations of systematic rape and sexual violence, especially in places where UN forces were supposed to be exacting oversight (Pflanz 2010). Rape is being deployed as a weapon of war. As Carlsen (2009:1) points out: ‘The eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is home to some of the world’s most horrific documented cases of sexual violence against women’. The scale, and the dehumanising dimensions which these take, clearly corroborates the assertion that women’s bodies are the battlefields on which the Congo’s wars are fought. Rape is more than just non-consensual sex – the bodily harm (e.g. fistula), and psychological sequelae associated with violent rapes tend to haunt the victims for the rest of their lives. Accompanying this, the stigmatisation intensifies the brunt of misery and hardship. In a recent study (Vinck et al. 2008) one-third of respondents reported that they were not ready to admit victims of sexual violence into their communities. The UN mission is sufficiently mandated by UNSC resolution 1325 to take all steps necessary to halt the perpetuation of rape. However, the alarming recurrence of sexual violence in the country,
especially those committed in areas under the jurisdiction of UN forces, poses telling questions about the mission’s credibility. There are justified doubts regarding MONUC’s capacity to live up to its expectations, and give meaning to the words ‘never again’ with respect to the rape of Congolese women.

5. Hammarskjöld’s legacy and the future of MONUSCO

MONUC, now MONUSCO, is still confronting a barrage of challenges it has to overcome in order to fulfil its mandate while improving the country’s security, peace and development outlooks. Like most countries emerging from histories of intractable conflicts, the DRC’s risk of relapsing into violence is high (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). The UN is facing rising peacekeeping demands in the face of supply that cannot keep pace. Renewed violence in other places puts the UN system under increasing pressure to ration resources. Consequently, MONUSCO will have to be flexible in the discharge of its functions, adapt effectively to the changing political, economic and social context of Congolese society, and learn to be innovative. The recent decision to keep a standby rapidly deployable brigade of peacekeepers from which the mission can call, in the protection of civilians, is a laudable innovation. Furthermore, MONUSCO will have to learn to adapt more effectively to the local context of Congolese society and partner more effectively with local actors in correcting some of the programming deficits of the DDR and SSR processes.

As Dag Hammarskjöld succinctly declared, the ‘[United Nations] should be the eye of nations, to keep watch upon the common interests, an eye that does not slumber, an eye that is everywhere, watchful and attentive’ (quoted from Falkman 2005). It is clear that MONUC slumbered in many areas where the organisation was supposed to be alert. For instance, while Congolese women were being raped systematically; while some of its officials and peacekeepers indulged in the trafficking of conflict minerals; and in the DDR and SSR implementation processes. MONUSCO must now learn to be pro-active, versatile and robust, especially in protecting civilians, disarming child soldiers, and guarding women against rape and sexual violence. It should now live up to its chapter VII mandate, and prioritise the safety and security of the Congo’s people above all else.
The Congo war, like conflicts in other African countries, has not received the same measure of attention accorded by the international community to conflicts elsewhere; even though it has produced more tragic consequences and tended to be more brutal. The UN Charter recognises the fundamental equality of all human beings and all member states, and dedicates itself to defending the same. It is safe to contend, with the historical evidence available, that in attending to the serious security challenges facing the Congo in 1960, Hammarskjöld displayed a profound dedication to the principles of equality of all states and peoples, functional neutrality in the discharge of his duties, and impartiality in the pursuit of world peace and security. The UN’s role in places like Rwanda, Darfur, and the Congo continues to raise eyebrows on the organisation’s true commitments to protecting African lives and ensuring security in the continent. American, British, Chinese, French and Belgian economic interests (all of these countries but one being permanent members of the security council) currently make huge amounts of profit from the Congo’s conflict-causing resources; which in turn, are fuelling human rights violations and holding the country’s progress down. If Hammarskjöld were alive today, there is no doubt that he would call on these countries to be sincere in their intentions, support the UN’s mission wholeheartedly, and stop playing ‘games of blood’ in the Congo.

6. Conclusion

More than half a century ago, in the introduction to his Annual Report to the United Nations (1956–1957), Dag Hammarskjöld professed that ‘the greatest need today is to blunt the edges of conflict among nations, not sharpen them’. He went on to add that, ‘if properly managed, the United Nations [could] serve a diplomacy of reconciliation better than other instruments available to nation states’. While today’s world has changed with the spectre of a nuclear war between superpowers far faded from our memories, violent conflicts continue to haunt mankind, often on scales and depths that are too horrific to savour. The patterns of our wars have changed – from mostly interstate conflicts as they used to be in Hammarskjöld’s time – to intrastate conflicts today. But if he were alive, he would not be too myopic to our new trends of intrastate wars, since he gave his life trying to attenuate the first Congo War – a classic case of intrastate conflict,
feeding on systems of internal and external interests. Yet, Hammarskjöld would evidently be distressed by the fact that the Rwandan genocide was allowed to occur; and that genocides, such as those in Darfur, still shame the conscience of humanity. Even worse, that the Congo – the land for which he gave his last full measure of sacrifice – continues to be harrowed by various incarnations of internal and external greed, complacency, corruption and misrule. He would definitely rebuke the UN for not playing a role robust enough in steering the country’s drive towards peace and security, even as he would not hesitate to give up his life again for a more sustainable peace, security and development for the Congo. But since Hammarskjöld cannot be here, we must endeavour to learn from his legacy and then perhaps, build a more secured and peaceful Congo worthy of his great sacrifice.

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Abstract
With ever increasing urgency, the United Nations (UN) has worked to develop the budding security relationship between itself and regional economic communities (RECs) in Africa, especially the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). In conflict resolution efforts in Southern Africa, this relationship has sometimes featured competition and tension, with more than one organisation vying for the lead, or in other cases, trying to pass the blame for failures. Since the UN’s early peace mission in

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the Congo under Dag Hammarskjöld, achieving peace and stability in Africa has been a monumental task. This article explores whether new regional partnerships can help facilitate this goal in Southern Africa and whether the current principles of cooperation between the UN and regional organisations are sufficient for the task at hand. This article takes lessons from the conflict resolution efforts in Madagascar, Zimbabwe, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to illustrate recent examples of cooperation and/or competition as they are unfolding in the present, with an emphasis on analysing the institutional relationship between the UN, AU and SADC in Southern Africa. This article concludes that there are still major limitations on the successful regionalisation of conflict management efforts in Southern Africa and that the UN and its partner organisations need to clarify and improve their working relationship to improve their chances of facilitating successful peacemaking.

Introduction

Africa’s regional economic communities (RECs) are playing an increasingly important role in peace and security. The RECs were originally established with mainly economic goals in mind, including enhancing economic integration, trade, and development; more recently, they have added peace and security agendas as such matters have become increasingly pressing and unavoidable. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) made this clear link when it concluded that the community could not pursue its economic and social objectives without first consolidating peace, hence requiring the Community’s focus on this issue in its first security related protocol in 1978 (ECOWAS 1978). The process of RECs building security instruments is still taking place today. Indeed, these institutions, their governing rules and their relationships are still taking shape (Adetula 2008). It has become clear, however, that there are tensions and inconsistencies in the strategies and working relationships between the UN, the African Union (AU) and regional communities, which are, in certain circumstances, undermining the likelihood of successfully managing conflict resolution efforts and establishing peace.
While security scholars have been more likely to focus on the role of regional organisations in military peacekeeping, these organisations can and do play a role in non-military peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts, which remains the subject of fewer academic inquiries and intergovernmental strategies. This article explores the role of regional organisations in the non-military functions of peace and security, including preventative diplomacy, peacemaking, and mediation, considering the role of the UN and AU in cooperating with such efforts at the regional level. While all of the sub-regions of Africa face similar quandaries, each sub-region also has its own peculiar challenges and differences in the level of development and cooperation on peace and security issues. The focus here is on Southern Africa with potentially relevant conclusions being drawn for other regions.

The tension and resultant competition between the UN, AU and regional organisations, and among regional organisations themselves, have limited the potential success of conflict resolution efforts and of establishing lasting peace. This problem is acute in Southern Africa, where the highly political Southern African Development Community (SADC) comes into conflict with the UN and/or the AU. In Zimbabwe, Madagascar and the DRC, this tension and lack of cooperation have been problematic and visible in conflict resolution efforts. Lessons from these cases make this point. In order to better manage peacemaking efforts and help facilitate more lasting peace, international and regional organisations need to clarify and improve upon their working principles and stop disagreements and the lack of coordination from hindering peacemaking.

**The regionalisation of peace and security**

The UN has promoted the *regionalisation* of peace and security, heralding it as a necessary shift and an effective way to manage certain types of conflict. The organisation envisions a two-tiered conflict management system with regional organisations playing the on-the-ground role and the UN serving a coordinating role from above (Jackson 2000), as outlined in the then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 *Agenda for Peace*. Malan (1999) has dubbed this a ‘peace pyramid’ with the sub-regional organisations...
and the OAU/AU acting as the initial respondents to the armed conflict, while
the UN contributes more to peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction
at the top of the pyramid. Since the debacle in Somalia in 1994, Western
countries have become more unwilling to directly intervene to end conflicts
in Africa; there is therefore, a real and undeniable need for African states to
find their own solutions to the continent’s conflicts (Adebajo 2008). In 1995
the UN report Improving preparedness for conflict prevention and peace-keeping
in Africa further argued that ‘sub-regional organizations sometimes have a
comparative advantage in taking the lead role in the prevention and settlement
of conflicts and to assist the UN in containing them’.

The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was the first regional organisation
in Africa to deal with peace and security issues. However, the OAU shied
from involvement in disputes within Member States, establishing that the
organisation’s most fundamental stance was one of non-intervention and
the prioritisation of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs (Van
Nieuwkerk 2004; Okoth 2008). However, in 1993, at a conference in Cairo,
the OAU established a Mechanism for conflict prevention, management, and
resolution which served as a signal of the continent’s renewed interest in
peacemaking. In regard to the RECs, the declaration tentatively explained
that the OAU was to ‘coordinate its activities with the African regional and
sub-regional organizations’ (Organisation of African Unity 1993: Section 24).
Since the OAU established its sub-regional structures in 1972 (Organisation
of African Unity 1972), there has been an implied OAU position that the
organisation may intervene in regional matters under certain conditions: when
regional efforts were exhausted or the sub-regional organisation’s credibility
was lacking, or where conflict spilled into other regions (Mwanasali 2003). Yet
a 1999 study, commissioned by the OAU on the functioning of cooperation
between the OAU and sub-regional organisations in the realm of conflict
resolution, found that the unclear division of labour and responsibilities and
the lack of an institutionalised arrangement for conflict management between
the organisations was limiting their effectiveness (cited in Mwanasali 2003).

Moreover, responses by sub-regional organisations in Africa have usually
been ad hoc because there was a lack of institutionalised structures at the
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sub-regional level to deal with conflict management and resolution activities, especially non-military activities (Malan 1999). The OAU took a case-by-case approach in its early peacemaking efforts which became the norm for the continent, relying on political leaders and individual countries to make security decisions instead of a collective supranational body (Imobighe 2003). Furthermore, when the RECs started to engage more directly with peace and security matters in the 1990s, there was no effective continental framework or mechanism to harmonise these efforts or coordinate relations with them and the OAU and the UN. The OAU’s failure to reach out to the growing group of sub-regional actors who were becoming active in peace operations allowed the OAU to eventually become irrelevant as an organisation (Abass 2010).

The principle of ‘subsidiarity’ was supposed to govern this relationship. It implies that regional arrangements or regional institutions should make ‘every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes’ before referring them to the Security Council, as originally enshrined in Chapter VII of the UN Charter (1945). The norm also preceded the Charter in other emerging international organisations (Møller 2005). Laurie Nathan (2010a), however, holds that there is no consensus on how subsidiarity is to be applied to the task of peacemaking, and no consensus generally on its application within the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Neither the AU nor the RECs have specifically defined or clarified how subsidiarity would be implemented in non-military peacemaking efforts. This lack of a definition from the organisations is a significant omission on their part, illustrating that despite support for regionalisation, the governing principles of this relationship remain unclear and insufficiently considered.

Regional organisations can help bring the resources and leverage required to sustain a successful peace process, but must also determine a way to manage the interests and demands that emerge from local and international actors (Khadiagala 2007). Supporters of a regional approach contend that regional actors’ familiarity with the region, including the cultural, social and historical factors, can make them more effective on the ground. Geographical proximity should facilitate quicker and less expensive responses. Additionally, sub-regional organisations should also be more committed to seeing out
enduring conflict resolution in their region having such a strong stake in creating peace in their neighbourhood and avoiding the negative effects of conflicts, such as cross-border refugee flows. As Franke (2006) argues, the comparative advantages of the international (UN) and regional level can be combined for the most efficient response to conflicts. However it must be cautioned that peacemaking efforts led by a regional organisation, rather than a simple unilateral or bilateral team, require greater levels of coordination and cooperation to harness these potential advantages.

The regionalisation of peacemaking in Africa will obviously be closely related to the continued evolution and development of the AU, where the RECs have been considered ‘building blocks’ of the APSA (African Union 2002). Mwanasali (2003:206) contends that the success of the AU will ‘depend, to a large extent, on the ways in which [RECs] and regional security arrangements will merge into the AU’. It was planned that these necessary relationships and cooperative structures would be defined in the protocol relating to the establishment of the AU’s peace and security body and later legal frameworks.

** Principles of the regional organisation relationship in Africa **

While the regional conflict management relationship has been revived and revitalised by the transformation of the OAU into the AU in 2002, its early principles were defined in the UN Charter (1945). Chapter VIII of the Charter briefly describes the relationship between the UN and regional organisations. Article 33(1) calls for Member States to attempt to resolve their members’ disputes through diplomatic means and/or through regional arrangements. These provisions appear to create a sense of duty on the part of regional organisations to intervene first and organise peacemaking operations in their own regions whenever possible, even though the UN is still primarily responsible for international peace and security.

The establishment of the AU included better defining the relationship with the UN and the RECs. At its inaugural summit in 2002, AU members established the Peace and Security Council (PSC) that would oversee and arrange possible
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interventions under ‘grave circumstances’ such as war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity (African Union 2002: Art 4(h)). In the PSC Protocol (African Union 2002) the drafters emphasise ‘the need to develop formal coordination and cooperation arrangements between these Regional Mechanisms and the African Union’. Article 16 also states that peace, security and stability activities need to be harmonised, coordinated and developed through an effective partnership between the organisations. Further, under Article 16(1)(b), it establishes that ‘the modalities of such partnership shall be determined by the comparative advantage of each and the prevailing circumstances’. The principle of comparative advantage recognises the fact, *inter alia*, that some of the sub-regional organisations were actually more advanced or more competent in peace operations than the AU was at the time (Abass 2010).

Further details on the framework for the peace and security relationship between the organisations were also laid out in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security which was signed in June 2008 between the AU and eight of the RECs (African Union 2008a). The MoU, a binding legal instrument, obliges the parties to ‘institutionalize and strengthen their cooperation and closely coordinate their activities,’ signalling the strong commitment to moving beyond informal collaboration and politicking. Under Article VII – Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution – the MoU calls for the parties to cooperate specifically in peacemaking activities to resolve conflicts that have occurred and prevent their recurrence through the means of ‘good offices, mediation, conciliation, enquiry and deployment of peace support missions.’ This signals that the agreement does not just cover military operations.

The MoU explains that the principles of ‘subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantage’ will guide decisions to optimise peace operations. Under Article IV (ii), however, the MOU also recognises and respects ‘the primary responsibility of the Union in the maintenance and promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa’. The Modalities section (Article XX) of the MoU clarifies that:
Without prejudice to the primary role of the Union in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa, the RECs and, where appropriate, the Coordinating Mechanisms shall be encouraged to anticipate and prevent conflicts within and among their Member States and, where conflicts do occur, to undertake peace-making and peace-building efforts to resolve them, including the deployment of peace support missions.

It is significant to note that there is no clause that requires a REC to obtain explicit approval for a peacemaking or peacebuilding mission before it undertakes one, allowing for possible conflicts over which an organisation has jurisdiction or the lead role, or allowing organisations to pass blame if they choose not to act.

One problem is that both the UN and the AU claim primacy in the handling of peace and security issues. Under the UN, it is the UN Security Council (UNSC) which has the ‘primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security’. On the other hand, Article 16 of the PSC Protocol (African Union 2002) states that the Union has the ‘primary responsibility’ for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa. It is still unclear how this clash of principles is interpreted by the AU and even further, under the RECs which are the ‘pillars’ of the continental peace and security architecture. While all of these organisations are ostensibly working towards the same goals, reconciling their cooperation and working relationship is proving difficult, especially over certain conflict resolution and peacemaking methods.

The language of ‘subsidiarity and complementarity’ is gaining a foothold in AU thinking, with the AU Commission, the organisation’s secretariat, also stating that it will be guided by the operating principles of ‘subsidiarity and complementarity with other Organs, Member States and RECs (African Union 2010). Yet this simple statement leaves much open to interpretation. Clearly there is a desire for enhanced partnership and cooperation between the UN and all of the African regional mechanisms, but there is a contradiction, or at least tension, between the ‘primary responsibility’ of the UNSC, the ‘primary responsibility’ of the Union, as noted in the PSC Protocol, and the principle
of subsidiarity, emphasised in the MoU and by the Commission. This tension is an obstacle in the establishment of a clear, institutionalised working relationship between these organisations when it comes to cooperation on peacemaking. Rather than clearly institutionalising a decision-making process on who takes the lead in peacemaking and mediation efforts, it is excessively flexible, leaving room for high politics and/or personal and national interests to become crucial factors in initiating peacemaking efforts. Without specifying who has the decision-making power or what the decision-making process will be, decisions may be taken in an *ad hoc* manner, beholden to the power politics of the region or of the regional organisations that are potentially involved.

**Challenges in implementing the working relationship**

The UN *Report of the high-level panel on threats, challenges and change* (United Nations 2004) recommended that authorisation from the UN Security Council (UNSC) should be sought in all cases for regional peace operations, recognising that in some urgent situations, authorisation may be sought after such operations have commenced (cited in Zwanenburg 2006). However, no such authorisation would be needed for a peacemaking effort that does not entail the use of force since this falls squarely under pacific means in the UN Charter. Therefore, there is no mandate for the UN to oversee or coordinate the response on a typical peacemaking operation. While the AU has sought to establish itself as the coordinating and mandating organisation for the continent, there is similarly no requirement for peacemaking authorisation within its Constitutive Act, and the sub-regional organisations often do act independently.

The UN Secretary-General has noted the cooperation that has taken place between the AU, sub-regional organisations and the UN in ‘nearly every mediation effort in Africa’ (United Nations 2008). While the Peace and Security Department of the AU is charged with elaborating the mechanisms for effective cooperation and harmonisation of peace and security policies with the sub-regional organisations (African Union n.d.), in reality, this cooperation is not so obvious. In practice, it is atypical if there is first deference to the relevant regional organisation, then to the AU, and then only to the UN, if both of the
lower levels have failed to resolve the local dispute. In most cases, a whole variety of organisations clamour to get involved. With some AU personnel believing that the Union has absolute primacy in all African cases, they show no deference to any other body. Yet each regional organisation is composed of and led by sovereign states which have their own decision-making forums that are not deferential to other bodies and may craft independent policies in response to a conflict in their region (Nathan 2010a). Furthermore, regional organisations such as SADC and ECOWAS, which established their regional security mechanisms before the AU was formed in 2002, feel that they have more experience and expertise in their region than the AU. For this reason, they will not always follow AU recommendations, despite the fact that it is supposed to be the coordinating organisation (Adebajo 2010). This mixed collection of beliefs and practices means that subsidiarity is clearly not being consistently applied, leading to acute tension and competition between the organisations.

The concept of ‘comparative advantage’ has become dominant in the literature and in the protocols of the UN and the regional organisations, including the Statement by the President of the Security Council on relations between the UN and regional organizations, particularly the AU (United Nations 2007). Yet what has proven elusive is the clear definition of each regional organisation’s comparative advantages, and the determination and application of these advantages in each unique conflict situation. Possible ‘comparative advantages’ for regional organisations may include previous experience in peace management in the region, already established mechanisms for conflict management, and proximity, which leads to better understanding of the conflict and/or more legitimacy in the political realm (Bogland, Egnell and Lagerström 2008). Effective third-party mediation is also dependent on ‘the mediator’s capabilities and leverage ... the linkage between the third party and the conflict and the extent to which the mediators see themselves as stakeholders’ (Crocker, Hampson and Aall 1999:32). On the other hand, proximity may also jeopardise the neutrality and acceptability of a regional organisation (Bogland, Egnell and Lagerström 2008). These factors balance
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against one another, making a sub-regional organisation more or less well-suited to take a lead peacemaking role.

Comparative advantage infers that some organisations, and thereby some mediators, are better qualified to lead a peacemaking process, depending on the given circumstances. Establishing a general rule that stipulates that the lead mediator should always be the AU, the UN or the relevant REC, goes against this common sense notion. Rather, some criterion for being best suited as the lead mediating organisation might include: ‘the organization’s unity and cohesion in relation to the conflict; its acceptability to the parties; its knowledge of the conflict; the resources at its disposal; and personal relations with party leaders that would be helpful to peacemaking’ (Nathan 2009:25).

Problematically, there are no clear criteria such as these currently approved and there is no agreed decision-making process to debate these qualifications between the organisations. None of the documents say who will be determining which organisation or actor has comparative advantage and how the decision will be made on which organisations, and which mediation team, are the best equipped to lead the effort. Putting such decision-making clauses in the passive tense, without an executing agent, allows for such decisions to go unmade and for no one to be held accountable to carrying out the decision (Nathan 2010a).

The UN (2009b) recognised that while comparative advantage is often mentioned in statements regarding division of labour, these advantages are rarely identified and organisational activities are seldom aligned to any significant degree with presumed or actual comparative advantages. Moreover, an exclusive focus on comparative advantage remains difficult for international organisations as they are driven as much by political interests as by their mission and mandates (United Nations 2009b). Although the level of sharing and collaboration between the UN and African regional organisations has been increasing, this analysis establishes that there is still a large lapse in effective and professional cooperation based on the comparative advantage principle and that the principle is failing to be implemented at least partly due to the continuing politicised nature of African regional organisations.
Moreover, the field of mediation specifically remains, in many ways, unprofessionalised and under-capacitated. While the UN has worked to improve its professional mediation capacity, as noted in the *Report of the Secretary-General on enhancing mediation and its support activities* (United Nations 2009a), its partner regional organisations have not made the same strides. No specific institutional rules for mediation have been made or approved within the AU or the RECs. A deficit of trained human capacity for mediation, continuing financial limitations, and the lack of an adequate framework or mechanism at the AU to oversee mediation, often means that ‘mediation processes have still taken an improvised or reactive approach, rather than an institutionalised approach’ (Govender and Ngandu 2010:11). It is for this reason that the world of international mediation has been characterised as ‘idiosyncratic and *ad hoc*, overly determined by power politics, deadlines and organizational tussles’ (Nathan 2010c:3). Instead of approaching an impending or active conflict with the best suited mediation team, the best suited institution in the lead, and a clear plan of action for the management of the conflict, other political variables and arbitrary events are often allowed to determine how a conflict will be managed by concerned actors and institutions.

Furthermore, this pressurised and unregulated environment often leads to what has been termed ‘competitive peacemaking’ or ‘crowdedness’. In many current cases in Africa, including Zimbabwe, the DRC and Madagascar, mediators have had to act in parallel with or even against other state, non-state and multilateral actors that are also trying to involve themselves in the peacemaking process. Being unable to clearly and quickly select a lead organisation or individual, would-be mediators attempt to coordinate their efforts. In some cases, they have created a Joint Mediation team (as in Madagascar), but this has been put into practice with limited success (Whitfield 2010). Potential mediators can be played off against one another by the parties, delaying progress and creating new complications in the conflict (United Nations 2009a). At the present, this crowdedness or lack of coordination remains as a substantial and unresolved challenge in African peacemaking.
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Sub-regional weaknesses and political obstacles – SADC in peacemaking

Each of the sub-regional organisations has its own unique dynamic that affects its ability to carry out successful peacemaking and to cooperate with the AU and UN on joint efforts. An organisation’s effectiveness in peacemaking is dependent on whether the member states truly have the political will to make the organisation effective and whether enough political cohesion exists to create a lasting and sufficiently strong consensus on peace and security in the region. There must be more than just a simple external consensus that peace in the region is worth pursuing. For intra-regional peacemaking to be successful, states must share an internal logic with a normative consensus that allows them to operate with close political cooperation on a set of shared and enforceable norms (Nathan 2010b). Such common values are indispensable to help states overcome their disputes, build trust and act with a common purpose when confronted with a conflict. This section explores the absence of common values and unity in the Southern African region, resulting in less effectiveness of regional conflict resolution efforts.

Many academics and policymakers have provided detailed and compelling critiques of SADC as an organisation. This article focuses on the specific limitations that hinder the partnership it has with the AU and UN in carrying out effective peacemaking. Firstly, SADC solidarity politics, and the liberation legacy’s taboo on making censure or disagreement publicly known, bog down the organisation and create serious obstacles to progressive SADC leadership in peacemaking (Hull and Derblom 2009). SADC has established strong protocols on security cooperation and safeguards on democracy and human rights, but continues to operate on the pillars of absolute sovereignty and solidarity (Hammerstad 2005). There is even an understanding that member states have kept the SADC secretariat weak in order to avoid the creation of an interventionist bureaucracy that could interfere in their sensitive security issues (Adebajo 2010). With these limitations on political will and capacity, the AU and UN will certainly continue to encounter tension in their attempted cooperation with SADC.
Divisions among leading states – between those disposed towards military solutions (namely Zimbabwe) and those disposed towards diplomatic efforts (South Africa) – created paralysing tension in the 1990s (Adetula 2008). These divisions were evident in SADC’s 1998 intervention in the DRC, where it acted as a ‘bipolar’ entity, adopting two incompatible strategies led by the two sub-regional powers (Williams 2005). The SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security had been, by some accounts, manipulated to justify the aims of Zimbabwe in the DRC and later, to legitimise South Africa’s intervention in Lesotho. With continuing distrust of South Africa resulting from the apartheid legacy, South Africa must make clear its desire for real cooperation if it wants to counter hegemonic alliances and deepening divisions (Adebajo and Landsberg 2003). This has created a less enthusiastic stance on interventions in SADC and tempered the political willingness of SADC countries to realise their peace and security aims (Adebajo 2008). The distrust created by these interventions has lasted to the present, and will likely continue to manifest itself in declarations of the importance of sovereignty and the traditional norm of non-interference.

While SADC reformed its ‘Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation’ in 2001 and came out with a new Strategic Indicative Plan in 2004 (Southern African Development Community 2004), the organisation may still be considered a tool for achieving the national interests of Member States rather than an organisation endowed with political decision-making powers (Van Nieuwkerk 2006). Moreover, since both the principles of sovereignty and the possibility of intervention coexist within the AU’s Constitutive Act, the principles will likely be applied on a case-by-case basis ‘depending on political processes and interests’ (Bogland, Egnell and Lagerström 2008:34). It is hence likely that in the SADC, the continuing lack of trust and dearth of common values among member states will forestall consensus, delaying any rapid response possibility or positive cooperation with the AU and UN.

SADC’s wide membership is also proving problematic. Having included the DRC in 1997, the organisation was tied into a conflict that is more strongly related to conflict dynamics in Central Africa. The two states that invaded the DRC in 1998, Rwanda and Uganda, are not member states of SADC and
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hence largely outside its influence. While Mandela apparently thought that SADC could play a positive role in conflict management in the DRC, helping to prevent a regional conflagration of instability (Khadiagala 2009), the organisation proved it was not up to this challenge, partly due to its limited scope of influence in the Central African region. The problems of unclear sub-regions and overlapping membership in multiple regional organisations, therefore, make regional conflict resolution efforts further complicated.

On the one hand, SADC has remained united enough to largely keep the UN and other international players out of the recent conflict in Zimbabwe, where South Africa has taken a lead in peacemaking and tried to prevent much external interference, painting it as a Western anti-Zimbabwean crusade (International Crisis Group 2010c). On the other hand, the UN and AU have been more involved, at different levels, in the conflicts in the SADC Member States of the DRC and Madagascar, attributable to the lower levels of political interest in these conflicts and/or the higher demands of these very involved and long-lasting peace processes that rely upon international resources. In reality, while SADC calls itself a regional organisation and aims toward the building of a functioning security community, norms of cooperation, trust and rule enforcement are not yet consistently followed by Member States. Given the at times dysfunctional nature of the sub-regional organisations in Africa, it is clear that the principle of subsidiarity cannot be consistently relied upon nor can ‘comparative advantage’ be consistently determined.

Lessons from Madagascar, Zimbabwe, and the DRC

While the conflict in Madagascar is, relatively, the shortest-running and perhaps least historically troubling among conflicts in Southern Africa, the relationship between the UN, AU and SADC in its conflict resolution efforts on the island has been tension-filled and problematic. Confusion and an absolute lack of coherent leadership undermined the mediation process that was initiated after the 2009 coup d’état. At least six mediators from different organisations were quickly sent to Madagascar and it was unclear who would take the lead (Zounmenou 2009). The SADC communiqué issued on 12 July 2009 (Southern African Development Community 2009) included collaboration
with the AU, UN and International Organisation of la Francophonie (IOF), as well as ensuring Malagasy ownership of the process, in the mandate of the SADC mediation effort. This, however, was never really accomplished. Despite the establishment of a ‘contact group’ that first met 30 April 2009, and the mandate of AU Special Envoy, Ablassé Ouedraogo, to take the lead in overseeing the peacemaking efforts, the mediation of the Joint Mediation Team was dominated by SADC’s mediator, Joaquim Chissano (International Crisis Group 2010b). Even the contact group extended uncertainty of leadership, saying that the next mediation would be ‘under the auspices of the AU’ while also taking place ‘under the leadership of former President Joaquim Chissano, assisted by the SADC Mediation Team’ (International Contact Group on Madagascar 2009). This lack of clarity undermined the seriousness of the peacemaking process among the parties.

The AU-UN relationship in 2009 was characterised by rivalry, which contributed to ending the UN’s mediation mandate in 2010, leaving African figures to take the lead. Relations between the AU and SADC were also tense in the first year of mediations and the AU stepped back to let SADC take the lead in 2010. Rather than clearly leading, however, the next phase was characterised by a lack of unity and cooperation among the international community, including the appearance of political interventions by France, which maintained an active diplomatic role. Chissano’s leadership was no longer welcomed by all the parties in 2010 and France urged President Zuma to take a lead, while South Africa was still trying to support SADC leadership (International Crisis Group 2010b). The failure of the last international attempt created the impetus for a more national, home-grown solution. But as the national solution has also failed to formulate a plan of action that is acceptable to all the parties, SADC is left to try its luck again and attempt to organise successful elections that would, once and for all, restore political order and a semblance of democracy (McNeish 2011). It is obvious that this lack of coordination and diplomatic infighting has complicated, rather than facilitated, the peace effort.

Zimbabwe further highlights the difficulties of international cooperation in Southern Africa and the difficulty of utilising the principles of subsidiarity and comparative advantage. Shortly after the June 2008 presidential run-off
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elections in Zimbabwe, the AU Assembly Summit took the events under consideration, but shied from condemning ZANU-PF’s electoral tampering and political violence (African Union 2008b). The resolution expressed the AU’s support for SADC facilitation, and recommended that SADC continue to carry out the mediation process by establishing a local mechanism to speed a negotiated end to the crisis. Certain voices within the AU, however, did call for stronger action in the face of ongoing stalemate. By December 2008, Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga called for an AU ousting of President Mugabe, specifically requesting that the then AU Chair, Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete, should implement a solution to the Zimbabwean crisis (Okumu 2008). Privately, a diplomatic battle ensued between Kikwete and Mbeki, with Presidents Kikwete, Mwanawasa of Zambia and Khama of Botswana urging an expanded mediation team and a more robust UN role. The efforts were strongly resisted by Mbeki (International Crisis Group 2008).

SADC has deferred to South Africa to take the lead on the Zimbabwe issue. In turn, SADC and South Africa have desired to keep the AU and the UN far from the Zimbabwe crisis, despite the reality that they have not initiated any meaningful interventions themselves. Scepticism has been widespread about the effectiveness of SADC mediation, but the main local actors were able to point to the process to show that they were doing something to handle the situation (IDASA 2008). The SADC Heads of State, who ultimately retain political power in the region, maintain that Zimbabwe’s sovereignty should preclude any other external intervention, despite their own guidelines against unconstitutional changes of government. SADC members ‘closed rank’ and were able to maintain this relatively coherent and unified stance throughout the crisis (Nathan 2010a). Opposition candidate Tsvangirai even appealed for AU or UN intervention in April 2008, citing a lack of progress through SADC, but to no avail (Security Council Report 2008). This highlights how international bodies can be sidelined when the principle of subsidiarity is championed by interested regional neighbours.

SADC’s military intervention in the DRC in 1998 has already been widely discussed and criticised as an illustration of SADC’s lack of unity, dearth of cooperation and ability to be hijacked by national interests (Williams 2005;
Nathan 2002; Van Schalkwyk 2005). Despite criticisms that the subsequent peace process was not sufficiently inclusive, South Africa, the OAU and the UN played a more positive role facilitating in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue that followed the 1999 Lusaka Agreement (Khadiagala 2009). While the UNSC exerted pressure on both internal and neighbouring parties (Rwanda and Uganda) and established a UN peacekeeping operation, the dialogue led to the 2002 Pretoria Agreement for a transitional government. However, ethnic-based conflict continued in Eastern DRC and political delay postponed the inauguration of the transitional arrangement until 2003 (Apuuli 2004). Political instability and conflict continued throughout the rule of the transitional regime.

South Africa did play a substantive role in supporting the country’s first democratic elections in 2006 and acted as a successful mediator for the AU when President Kabila’s challenger contested the results (Khadiagala 2009). The UN force of nearly 20 000 military personnel which remains in the country, has, however, been criticised as ineffective and has often been unable to stop atrocities (Terrie 2009). Yet on a more fundamental level, the real problem is that the national consolidation of democracy is stalled, Eastern Congo is still facing insecurity and instability, while the Congolese government is calling for the withdrawal of the UN, citing concerns over their sovereignty (International Crisis Group 2010a). While the Great Lakes Region has also set up regional initiatives, and SADC has pledged to cooperate with this initiative (2008), SADC is obviously less concerned with maintaining its position in the implementation and consolidation of the peace initiatives South Africa helped broker, leaving that largely in the hands of the UN. While the UN has attempted to harness the possible advantages of working with regional actors, the AU and SADC have largely withdrawn due to the extensive commitments and resources that this conflict management process has required. SADC’s early intervention, in any case, certainly tainted its reputation and credibility in dealing with the DRC, preventing it from being a reliable partner for the UN in the region.
Conclusion – Limitations on regional peacemaking solutions in Southern Africa

The examples discussed here add strength to a tentative conclusion that the uncoordinated efforts carried out by SADC, the AU and the UN, may, in certain circumstances, have actually complicated or prolonged certain aspects of the conflicts in the region. While deference to local ownership of a peacemaking process can facilitate some comparative advantages, when local partners and organisations are not united and are unwilling to uphold principles of good governance and consolidating peace, they do not make good partners in this relationship. This, however, does not stop these organisations from claiming their right, in light of the principle of subsidiarity, to involve themselves in regional peacemaking.

The first conclusion that may be drawn is that regional peacemaking efforts are still limited in their success due to the strong devotion to national sovereignty held by Africa’s leaders. Anthoni van Nieuwkerk (2004:46) argues that ‘redesigned structures will not make any difference to Africa’s security if Africa’s ruling elites do not develop the political vision and will to effectively promote human security on the continent’. Leaders must move away from a vision that promotes state security and sovereignty, towards one that promotes human rights and freedom from insecurity for all citizens. Although shifts in thinking are taking place, the continuing defence of sovereignty and unity in African politics, especially in Southern Africa, cannot be ignored when considering the (in)effectiveness of regional peacemaking.

Secondly, the lack of consensus on the importance of good governance, and the absence of true commitment to regional solutions on peace and security issues among states in Southern Africa, continues to limit what SADC can contribute to the AU and UN relationship. Especially given the correlation between conflict and democratic transitions and elections in Africa, it is important that regional organisations have a united stance on challenges to these principles. Some consensus on democratisation and good governance is a precondition for any sustainable regional cooperation (Fawcett 1995). Yet sub-regional peacemaking is often aimed at stopping immediate violence, and
does much less to solve the underlying governance problems and ensure long-
term stability, as seen in the regional efforts in Madagascar, Zimbabwe and the
DRC. Without consensus on upholding these principles, they have been unable
to consolidate lasting peace and to act as credible partners in peacemaking.

Finally, this lack of willingness contributes to the fact that responses by regional
and sub-regional organisations in Africa are usually *ad hoc* and reactive,
rather than proactive. This reflects the lack of institutionalised structures and
decision-making processes to deal with non-military conflict management
and resolution activities. The unclear and contradicting principles governing
the relationship between the UN, AU and RECs worsen this problem, despite
attempts to formalise roles under the AU. Whether the UN or AU has the
ultimate responsibility and coordinating role in Africa has not been clarified,
nor has the scope of the principle of subsidiarity in regional peacemaking.

The UN and its partners must reconsider and strengthen the principles of
their relationship and the shared decision-making process for peacemaking
in Southern Africa. The process currently allows too much room for personal
and national interests to dominate peacemaking processes, rather than
ensuring that the best suited strategy and mediation team, as determined by
the principle of comparative advantage, is actually put in place. Achieving
peace in Southern Africa has been for many years a hard-to-attain goal. While
there is a lot of potential for creating effective partnerships that leverage the
advantages of the UN together with local partners, they are currently not
effectively realised.

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Sarah Ancas


The effectiveness of regional peacemaking in Southern Africa


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Abstract

This article problematises the nascent relationship between the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU) in African conflict management. Constructing the EU as a security actor, including its validation through the UN, is not a process solely based on the normative claims inherent in the EU as a sui generis actor, but more importantly such claims are grounded in the EU as offering greater capacity and efficiency in African conflict management. In light of this argument, many studies have analysed this relationship in terms of inputs and outputs in field missions undertaken under this framework. While the EU-UN relationship can be viewed a priori as a process driven by ‘African needs and requirements’ as an end security consumer, the development of the

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In light of the above-mentioned, the EU-UN question is surprisingly un-problematised and has received little critical attention in this context. By putting the EU-UN relationship into focus, this article shifts attention to the increasing complexities and potential uncertainties that this type of institutionalisation and coordination can generate on the development of Africa’s infrastructure and narratives of conflict management.

Introduction

The UN Charter has sufficient provisions in Chapter VIII (articles 52, 53 and 54) for meaningful collaboration and cooperation with regional organisations. Despite the stated aims of devolving responsibility to regional organisations in matters of peacekeeping operations, however, these provisions did not find concrete expression until after the end of the Cold War. The impasse was not only the result of great power rivalry, but, in part, also the consequence of differing interpretations regarding the primacy of the UN or regional organisations in the resolution of disputes. These differences had their roots in the then prevailing schools of thought preceding the founding of the UN after the collapse of the League of Nations. Two schools of thought were at the centre of this debate – the United Kingdom (UK) expressed a view in favour of regional organisations becoming the bedrock of the post-war security infrastructure, while the United States (US) insisted on the primacy of the UN as the primary organisation in matters of peace and security. Views in Washington won the day when the US-inspired Durban Oaks proposals formed the basis of the San Francisco Conference in 1945. However, it was Latin America that argued in favour of regional security arrangements as a precondition for accepting the UN Charter (Jonah 2004). Notwithstanding the failures of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in African conflicts on the basis of the sovereignty norm, there is since the end of the cold war widespread acceptance for regional organisations to take leadership in solving conflicts. An important tabula rasa had been established.
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over the past two decades for regional organisations to coordinate meaningfully with the UN, as well as among each other.

After a retreat in the 1990s, there has over the past decade been a resurgence of the UN and various international actors, including the EU, the AU and African regional organisations, all of them playing increasing roles in peacekeeping activities in Africa (Bellamy et al. 2004:75–92). They have as such been advocating for a strong and institutionalised partnership that would give credence to the view of ‘African problems, African solutions’. The UN and the EU have been insisting, at least at the level of rhetoric, on the complementarities of the twin approaches of subsidiarity and African ownership. What is however interesting to note is the silence of the Charter with regard to the responsibility of regional organisations when it comes to security outside their immediate geography. In African conflicts, this makes the EU an exception deserving a different take.

Ontologically the EU is an actor sui generis, and on that basis it is not formally a ‘regional arrangement’ in the sense of Chapter VIII of the Charter. However, its relationship with the UN, oppositional and complementary, is more advanced than that of any organisation. This aspect makes the EU a unique conflict manager in the African environment.

This paper provides a short overview of the development of the current pattern of EU-UN cooperation and its institutionalisation in both the political and military realms. It argues that the involvement of the EU in African conflicts through the validation of the UN Security Council (UNSC) is not only a process driven by Franco-British requirements for conflict management in Africa, but one necessitated by Africa’s own resurgent demands for security. The paper will provide a brief explanation for this argument by looking at the changing notions of security within Europe toward the end of the 1990s. Looking at crisis management on a continuum involving conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding – combining military and civilian aspects of crisis management – it is argued that a more comprehensive and coherent approach, within both the UN and the EU, would allow for greater efficiency. The article problematises the EU-UN relationship in African conflicts as one that looks at Africa as a
liability and not necessarily an actor. Such a view potentially undermines the development of Africa’s own conflict management and security infrastructure. The study concludes with critical reflections concerning both the limits and opportunities of future EU-UN cooperation on the development of Africa’s security infrastructure. Our reflections aim to encourage immediate and medium-term effects on structural changes in the political and institutional environment. While such changes may be difficult to achieve, their necessity is nonetheless argued for in this paper.

Discourse on and institutionalisation of the EU-UN relationship

Article 53 of the UN Charter (United Nations 1945) states:

The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.

Inspired partly by the provisions of the UN Charter, the Amsterdam Treaty of the EU insists, among its five principal axes, on the strengthening of EU security as an objective of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which received a decisive boost at the Franco-British Summit at Saint Malo in December 1998. Even if some had considered Saint Malo as irrational since it goes against French and British preferences (Gégout 2002), it gave practical expression to the construction of common EU policies in African conflicts. While the initial
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objective was to consolidate bilateral cooperation in Africa, Saint Malo had the unintended consequence of constructing a security identity for the EU.

The EU created, in line with this desired identity, security structures whose raison d’être was to respond to security threats. Such capacities had been validated by the international community, including African actors. The idea of closer cooperation with the UN had therefore become more urgent. After all, calls for closer and effective cooperation between regional organisations and the UN in conflict management were seen as in line with expressed goals of the Charter. However, such calls for closer cooperation do not imply the cooperation of the UN and regional organisations acting in concert toward solving conflicts in other parts of the world. Furthermore, such provisions are by definition vague, for a supranational organisation such as the EU. If various EU member states have contributed significantly to UN peacekeeping operations over the years, the relationship between the EU and the UN had been declaratory in nature and did not include military tools.

Nevertheless, in peace operations, with a new dimension assumed by the codification of the ESDP, the EU-UN relationship had witnessed important advances since 2000. The EU became, with the authorisation of the UNSC, a fully-fledged security actor in African conflicts. Important initiatives to cultivate a meaningful security relationship with the UN were only undertaken during the Swedish Presidency of the EU from January to June 2001. This new relationship, it was argued would be anchored in the mutualisation of approaches in conflict management, while ensuring that the EU would add value to the existing tools of the UN in the area. An exchange of letters between the Swedish Foreign Minister, Anna Lindh, and the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, endorsed the following specific areas of focus and procedural plans for intensified interaction with the UN:

- Conflict prevention, in particular ensuring mutually reinforcing approaches.
- Civilian and military aspects of crisis management, in particular ensuring that EU's evolving military and civilian capacities provide real added value for the UN.
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- The EU-UN dialogue will chiefly focus on the Western Balkans, the Middle East and Africa.
- The EU-UN dialogue will be strengthened through regular high-level meetings focusing on crisis management issues, and also through more frequent contacts at expert level (Permanent Mission of Sweden to the UN 2001).

The exchange of letters was further deepened by the EU Göteborg declaration in June 2001, which validated and laid out a framework for EU-UN cooperation in conflict management. The Göteborg Conclusions of the EU Council included that:

- Cooperation between the EU and the UN will be done on a case by case basis.
- The EU will not intervene automatically in crises.
- The EU will retain political control of the operations through its Security and Political Committee (Council of the European Union 2001).

If the EU remains willing to intervene in Africa under international law, these base principles provide the terms and limits. What deserves emphasis here is the insistence to maintain the monopoly of dealing with violence within Europe. Obtaining a UN mandate for ESDP operations does not appear to be a requirement as long as these operations are deployed in Europe with the consent of the host state, and are of a non-coercive or civilian nature. A few examples illustrate this trend. In Europe, the examples are the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Operations Concordia and Proxima in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. These were not created by UNSC resolutions. Outside of Europe, the three civilian operations in Georgia (EUJUST THEMIS), Kinshasa (EUPOL KINSHASA), and Iraq (EUJUST LEX) provide other examples of such missions without UNSC resolutions.

In principle, such provision in the EU declaration goes against Chapter VIII, Article 53 of the UN Charter. This shows that the choice of the EU-UN cooperation could be explained through the normative and sociological legitimacy that the UN confers on states and organisations in matters of peace.
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and security (Keohane 2006). However, it also shows that the EU seeks to carve out exceptions to the rule in line with its own interests.

Practice shows that the relationship between the EU and the UN is the consequence of a real need on the part of the UN to provide a substantive framework for solving African conflicts. But such a relationship also has important specificities. These specificities are not necessarily driven by African or UN requirements, but more by the spatial expectations of the EU. Such a view illustrates the complexity of the institutional framework. It is further accentuated through the absence of coherence with regard to initiating peace operations.

The debate about the EU-UN cooperation is as a consequence not just a simple debate about peace missions and the relationship of the UN with regional organisations in this issue area. It is far more complex as a result of the unique character of the EU (Ginsberg 2001; Soeterdorp 1999). In terms of the UN Charter, all matters relating to international peace and security are primarily the domains of action of the UN, most notably of the Security Council in which France and the UK are permanent members. If the EU has continued to underline the centrality of the UN in African conflicts, it has also used such platforms to carve out a place for itself in the African conflicts through the codification of an institutional relationship with the UN regarding Africa.

From institutional codification to the African conflict terrain

Following the first communication with regard to African conflicts in 1993, the EU launched its first military operation outside the European geographic space in 2003 in the form of Operation Artemis (Mace 2003) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). This shows that since the formalisation of the EU-UN relationship in 2001, cooperation has gained in substance when the EU assumed operational responsibility in 2003 within the European perimeters. What is interesting to observe is that operations on the ground were followed by institutional deepening of the EU-UN relationship through joint declarations and statements, whose objective was to refine capabilities and capacities for effective conflict management in Africa.
It is interesting to note that the Artemis operation was carried out on the basis of an expressed request from the UN Secretary-General. But this was in the final analysis not much more than a request to France to lead an intervention in the name of the EU. Nevertheless, at an empirical level, the Artemis operation brought the institutionalisation of EU-UN cooperation many steps further, with the signature on 24 September 2003 of the 'Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management' by the UN Secretary-General and the EU presidency (Council of the European Union 2003). The declaration took note of the recent developments in EU-UN cooperation and identified four areas where further cooperation should be explored: planning, training, communication and best practices. A ‘joint consultative mechanism’, named Steering Committee, was established at working level to enhance coordination in these four areas and to follow through with the implementation of the Joint Declaration (Council of the European Union 2004).

2003 was thus defining for the role of the EU in African conflicts. These empirical advances accompanied by concrete field experiences of the Artemis type led to the redefinition and fine-tuning of the framework of cooperation in military crisis management. After the field experience of Artemis and several others, mostly in Europe, a joint conflict management exercise was held in 2005 under the code EST 05 in order to test the practical modalities of cooperation. Apart from the intergovernmental pillar leading cooperation in conflicts at the UN, the European Commission also released an important Communication on EU-UN relations offering in-depth analysis of the EU’s general posture vis-à-vis the UN. In addition to calling for a renewed EU commitment to multilateralism, the Communication also put forward recommendations on how to maximise EU benefits in a wider EU-UN partnership, going far beyond traditional peacekeeping issues (European Commission 2003). Through these declarations and statements the EU has not only consolidated a position as an important interlocutor in African conflicts, but it has also potentially transformed the conflict management environment in Africa. This shows that there has been consistency on the part of the EU between the empirical, declaratory and normative frameworks of its relationship with the UN in Africa.
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There now exist regular meetings between officials of the EU and the Secretary-General of the UN. In particular, the Under-Secretary-General of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) appears at least twice a year in Brussels in front of the Political and Security Committee of the EU. Such practices and interactions embedded over time transformed the context in which major states such as France and the UK react to African conflicts at the UN (Hengari 2006). Their interventions in the UNSC refer to EU positions and actions in matters of peace and security. To a certain degree, the EU-UN cooperation not only has an impact on relations between the two actors, but also has a broader impact on other states being socialised into the EU – a desirable situation for resolving African conflicts.

The hierarchical framing of Africa as a problem deserving EU-UN coordination

The EU has taken important steps in the African conflict management environment since 1993. If the initial communication was merely at the level of a statement on African conflicts, the EU had become a fully-fledged conflict management actor, deploying both civilian and military aspects in African conflicts. Rosemary Foot, Michael Mastanduno and S. Neil MacFarlane (2003) and Duncan Snidal and Kenneth W. Abbot (1998) provide various reasons why states act and cooperate with formal institutions: firstly to advance policies; secondly to advance national interests; thirdly to share risks and burdens; and finally to advance certain values. EU-UN cooperation could be explained in terms of a shared value system that both actors seek to advance, and the normative and social legitimacy that the UN confers. However, these explanations do not go far towards understanding a complex process, involving dynamics that escape analyses about cooperation between the UN and regional organisations.

If EU conflict management tools, mandated or not by the UN, should be taken for granted for an actor that is as atypical as the EU, African conflict management represents a new specialisation. Certainly, the EU argues cooperation with the UN in terms of the normative provisions.
In part II, dealing mainly with the Strategic Objectives, the European Security Strategy (ESS) highlights effective multilateralism as one of its strategic objectives, with the UN being a key and validating partner. It underlines its relationship with the United Nations in the following manner:

The EU should support the United Nations as it responds to threats to international peace and security. The EU is committed to reinforcing its cooperation with the UN to assist countries emerging from conflicts, and to enhancing its support for the UN in short-term crisis management situations (European Union 2003:7).

Outside the formal framework and rhetoric about Africa as a security consumer, the presence of the EU in African conflicts can also be explained historically. This history explains the transformation of the EU identity in Africa, including its perception of threats and of how to deal with them. In addition to historical factors, the new geopolitical climate in Africa with international actors such as China and the US as well as other emerging middle power countries playing a more prominent role also provides an explanation for a more robust and UN-validated role in African conflicts (Franke 2007; International Crisis Group 2009). As a consequence, through the social construction of Africa as a problem, Africa is seen as a European problem.

The choice of cooperation on the part of the EU and the UN is a result of the African environment and the limits of national and international policies in dealing effectively with African conflicts. Cooperating and acting in concert is therefore seen as a positive development for both the EU and the UN. This is particularly so because Africa is the continent that is most affected by conflict. The factors explaining European interest in dealing with conflict in Africa, and by extension those of France and the UK are rather varied – both moral and material. Spatial, political and historical arguments explain the specificities of the EU and its quest for deeper institutionalisation with the UN in Africa. It is Africa where the majority of conflicts occur. In 2009, over twenty African countries were affected by armed conflict. Out of 14 peacekeeping operations under the UN DPKO, Africa has the highest concentration with six out of the
total 14. The UN deployments to Africa increased by 445 per cent over the past decade, while force generation problems and capacity constraints continued to affect these operations (Soder 2010). For a problem to become a foreign policy problem, it must be stated and framed in those terms.

Africa is a European Foreign Policy problem because European states framed the continent within a European security mindset. Bruno Charbonneau (2009:551) reinforces this point when he argues: ‘Within this mindset, it is better to “transfer” or bring security into the space of insecurity than to have security “escape” into the space of security’. Two issues arise out of framing Africa in a manner in which Africa becomes a recipient of EU preferences and not necessarily an active framer of its own security needs. First, the development of EU tools in Africa do not point to a linear process, at least in the initial phases, but rather to improvisation and reflex reactions by default as a result of member states’ preferences. Constructing a partnership with the UN implies a framework largely driven by national requirements. This could prove problematic in the long run when national requirements are projected as EU requirements and these are framed within a UN multilateral framework.

Second, the relationship seems to have been driven by the demand side on the part of the UN, stemming from the latter’s capacity constraints. However, evolving notions of security within the EU have also driven it. The EU strategy attaches particular importance to the conflicts in Africa as an extension of its own security. The development of the ESDP and the African problem logically led the EU to revisit its relationship with the UN, both as a legitimising body and as the main peacekeeping implementer. The convergence of these two mutually reinforcing trends has led to an institutional rapprochement in line with the Brahimi report and resulting processes.

The EU security and coordination roles are carried on the basis of what the African environment generates in terms of conflict, including the consequences of such on Europe. It is why the EUSS argues that Africa as a potential source of instability in Europe. This implies that the EU becomes, out of necessity and for survival, a security actor in African conflicts. This is not only because Africa
needs security, but also because Europe can safeguard its security by providing security in Africa. The EU quest for normative legitimacy through the UN in African conflicts, therefore, seeks to explain itself in terms of what the EU represents as a global actor – an actor who is in favour of peace in the world, and is willing to take the challenge of providing peace in its own neighbourhood by acting in far-away places. Therefore, institutionalising its relationship with the UN, as well as maintaining its involvement in African conflicts represents a form of continuity of what the EU actually is.

This position is informed by the hierarchical and perhaps instrumental perspective that the EU has of the UN in matters of peace and security. Such awareness, informed by the EU’s understanding of the limits of the UN when it comes to peace operations, has had important implications for the EU vision in African conflicts. However, it shows that the EU-UN relationship as a response to African conflicts is constructed in a manner that is strategic, but at the same time imprecise and based on improvisation. In such framing, coordination is therefore logical in order to ensure greater coherence and efficiency.

**A logical relationship deserving coordination in Africa**

Increasing cooperation is part of a new panoply of developing narratives (at times competing) in the African conflict environment, including the AU-UN need for coordination and the difficulties inherent in such efforts (Bergholm 2008). However, the EU-UN relationship is largely un-problematised because it is viewed as both logical and functional since it offers the most promising perspectives of cooperation at both the military and civilian levels – areas in which the EU has developed *savoir-faire* in terms of capabilities and abilities to deploy forces within a short period of time. It is also seen as an operational relationship driven by UN requirements. Structurally, the UN faces shortages in troops, but above all there are deficiencies in rapid reaction capacity and in what it calls ‘enabling assets’, such as movement control, intelligence, medical units or logistics, which are less available than infantry battalions.

The UN counts more people in its peacekeeping operations than there are in all regional and sub-regional organisations together. In light of this permanent
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overstretch, especially since the late 1990s, including doubts about its capacity to deal with these demands, the UN encouraged a variety of actors to conduct military operations, and justified these with references to maintaining international peace and security. A high level of deployment since the end of the Cold War, combined with the increasingly complex nature of post-Cold War missions, pushed the limits of the UN’s operational capacity. These limits and the African space demand for peace operations or security *tout court* are outlined in the discourse of both the EU and the UN as structuring the necessity for cooperation. This is why the UN Secretariat recurrently calls on the EU and its member states to provide such resources, and welcomes any EU initiative that strengthens the UN capacity directly or indirectly.

For the EU, coordination also offers interesting perspectives to construct and deepen ESDP tools, including capacities to act in conflict management situations. Certainly, the multiplicity of actors was a welcome development. But it has in turn intensified concerns about what tools to deploy in conflict situations and how. It has also put into perspective multiple chains of command. While the UN may view the EU as a security actor, which the UN can call upon in African conflicts, the internal dynamics of the ESDP highlights a contrasting picture in which deployment is based on the preferences of member states.

The development of the EU crisis management tools has come a long way since Maastricht, a way which has included the Franco-British Saint Malo summit. However, the available EU tools in military crisis management are not independent of the preferences of member states, in particular France and the UK. These states therefore challenge existing perceptions of the EU as a privileged and indifferent institution in the formulation of UN responses to crises in Africa. Similarly, there has been concern within the UN that the whole security identity of the EU appears to develop to the detriment of the UN’s inclusive approach as well as of UN peacekeeping needs (Tardy 2005). Importantly, it is likely to develop at the expense of Africa’s security infrastructure because such a process is by and large an extension and validation of French and British preferences in conflict management.
A relationship delaying the development of Africa’s nascent security infrastructure

Chronic instability and the conflicts in African countries explain and justify materially and perhaps morally the international interventions. While logical, the consolidation of EU-UN cooperation in African conflicts occurs at a time when Africa has demonstrated a proactive willingness to give credence to the slogan of African solutions to African problems. This slogan received support within the UN system, including major powers such as France and the UK whose long involvement with Africa has also been one of intervention as, among others, the cases of Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone respectively suggest. If the EU provided substantive support to the consolidation of Africa’s security infrastructure, the involvement of member states through bilateral initiatives could potentially undermine the consolidation of Africa’s own initiatives. Without doubt there is widespread acceptance of normative frameworks and the setting up of institutional mechanisms to solve conflicts in Africa and to defer certain security matters to the AU and its regional organisations. These have found empirical expression in the form of AU-UN-led conflict management operations in Africa, such as UNAMID in Darfur in July 2007, or the first AU-led African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) in 2003.

EU-UN cooperation, therefore, becomes self-evident in a situation in which Africa is seen to emerge as the biggest beneficiary of such cooperation. What is problematic, however, is that implementing this type of cooperation is produced and reproduced with no input from African actors. This is not only the result of the absence of vast Africa-specific knowledge in the domain, but the little that is there is hardly considered. The above-mentioned awareness is not only a consequence of hierarchical claims on the part of the EU regarding its capacity to act as opposed to the UN incapacity to act efficiently, but it is a view that is also normatively advanced by the UN.

To reaffirm the above-mentioned view, the former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan (2005), noted that in grave crisis situations the UN is not the most suitable instrument to act. He had insisted on the importance of the deployment of multinational forces under the leadership of ‘lead nations’ or
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‘framework nations’. This type of socialisation in terms of language, including the institutionalisation of such discourses through the EU-UN relationship, allow for the political legitimisation of the EU as a security actor outside its immediate perimeters. The extension of such also allows for such legitimacy to be grounded in international law. Understanding cooperation this way would reinforce the view about EU capacities as indispensable to the UN, while Africa is viewed as a liability and not an instinctive actor.

Africa as a liability and not as an actor

Constructing the conflict management agenda in Africa, including coordination with the UN, is therefore not without risks. Such risks are related to a possible new division of labour between ‘poor peacekeeping’ in Africa under the UN set-up and ‘rich peacekeeping’ in Europe under the EU. With the formalisation of the EU-UN relationship, including the operationalising of this relationship in Africa, the UN recurrently calls on the EU and its member states to provide such resources, and welcomes any EU initiative that strengthens the UN capacity directly or indirectly (Fréchette 2004).

The UN was also worried that the deepening of the EU crisis management tools could affect European contributions to the UN crisis management tools. Such a view was not misplaced as certain countries, including Ireland and Austria, had argued that their contributions to the EU conflict management framework would affect their contributions to UN conflict management. This in turn would affect Africa’s needs for security adversely as it would expose military conflict management to the interests of the powerful European states. The construction of the EU as another avenue through which the UN can act in African conflicts has potentially created possibilities for the instrumentalisation of the EU to advance the interests of powerful states in the Security Council, in particular those of France. On the one hand, the EU and its member states are strong supporters of the UN, both in accordance with the ESS and the concept of ‘effective multilateralism’ (Eide 2004). On the other hand, when actors construct capacities, the objective is to act more efficiently with acquired capacities. However, the factors explaining why the EU (through the UN) opted to get
involved in African conflicts are not the consequence of the construction of social reality, but are also based on the deepening of certain values and identities.

As we had argued, the case of EU interest in Africa points to an interaction between geography as an external environment and conflicts as a socially constructed reality. Concerns about the whole ESDP process developing to the detriment of the UN’s inclusive approach as well as of UN needs with regard to conflict management tools are therefore not misplaced. So are concerns about the consequences of this mode of subcontracting on the development of Africa’s own security infrastructure. Thierry Tardy (2005:49) argues that EU support for the UN is guided largely by the EU’s objectives to become a global security actor, to generate visibility for itself and to keep control of autonomy over decision making. An analysis of the deployment of EU tools in African conflicts confirms this trend.

While requests for EU-led operations in Africa had originated from the UN, notably from the French-led DPKO, the EU were always able to frame the terms of its engagement within the African environment in terms of its own capabilities and needs. In doing so, it has been able to control the means and ends of its involvement in African conflicts. The baseline of the EU operations in African conflicts shows that the lead states, notably France, was instrumental in the construction of such operations. The salience of the EU agenda is therefore evident and far greater in EU-UN cooperation as opposed to the salience of the UN or African agenda. Analysis of this relationship should therefore move beyond institutional concerns about EU-UN effectiveness in African conflicts, as Claudia Major (2008) would insist with regard to broader questions about the place of Africa’s security infrastructure. It is therefore questionable how EU-UN cooperation, underpinned by the EU search for a profile, could substantively be reconciled with the consolidation of Africa’s security infrastructure to deal with its own conflicts.

**Conclusions**

An attempt had been made to avoid framing the EU-UN institutional relationship and rapprochement in African conflicts independently of the power hierarchies
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within the UN, notably the UNSC with two permanent members France and the UK being leading members of the EU. Similarly, we have cautioned that such cooperation should not be analysed independently of the interaction between the national foreign policies of France and the UK, both from a bilateral perspective, including how they codify and modify the capacity of the EU to act in African conflicts. Better policies and greater coherence, including efficiency, are certainly welcome in the African conflict management environment. However, such a problem-solving but uncritical stance rooted in EU-salience, promising better, also denies the structural changes that ought to take place for Africa to consolidate its conflict management architecture. It does so by not questioning the power hierarchies underlying the EU-UN relationship with Africa. The narrative about the conflict management infrastructure is therefore a result of the power underside driven by EU requirements, while the UN’s role is one of validation on the basis of the EU’s implicit power and normative claims. The UN-EU cooperation could end up being a means to re-authorise and legitimise French and British interests, including EU policy in Africa without Africa’s own security infrastructure making the necessary leaps it ought to make.

Africa is therefore not only a field that facilitates cooperation between the EU and the UN – it is also an empirical terrain for the validation of institutionalised policies, initiated within members states of the EU, but adapted and projected into the EU. If a lot is said of the value of EU-UN cooperation in African conflicts, there are also competing and contradicting tools and objectives that these actors bring into the African conflict management environment, potentially undermining Africa’s own security infrastructure.

Sources


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